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This dissertation answers the following research question: Do Latino members of 
Congress represent Latinos better than non-Latino representatives? To evaluate this 
question, I employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. I utilize a 
broad view of representation that includes legislative actions beyond the conventional 
focus on roll call voting, such as bill introduction and bill co-sponsorship, to examine 
member activity during the 108th- 110th sessions of the House of Representatives. The 
statistical analysis finds that Latino members are considerably more active in 
representing Latino interests than non-Latino members irrespective of the size of the 
Latino constituency. This finding indicates that Latino legislators as a whole act 
differently than non-Latino members, which has serious implications for the 
substantive representation of Latinos. The qualitative components of the dissertation 
consist of interviews with staff members of Latino legislators and case studies of 
representatives. Together they probe deeper into the meaning of representation and 
investigate variation in representation styles between members and within the Latino 
sub-group. The project argues that Latinos need descriptive representation to achieve 
the greatest substantive representation and investigations of representation should 
move beyond roll call votes to include other forms of legislative participation. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the representation of Latino constituents by members of 
the U.S. House of Representatives. Specifically, this analysis attempts to determine 
whether Latinos need Latino representatives to attain the greatest amount of 
substantive representation.  Latinos have a long historical presence in the U.S. that 
dates to before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, when portions of Mexico 
became part of the Unites States.  However,  after the settlement of contemporary 
national boundaries, we typically think of mass Latino immigration flows from 
Mexico and other parts of Latin American beginning after the passage of the Hart 
Cellar Act in 1965 (Portes and Rumbaut 1996).  The Hart-Cellar Act, also referred to 
as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, fundamentally changed the 
immigration system by eliminating the stringent national origin quota system and 
replacing it with a more lax system based on hemispheric allocations and unlimited 
family reunification visas. After its passage the number of Asian, Caribbean, and Latin 
American immigrants grew rapidly from 800,000 immigrants in 1950-1960 to 1.8 
million during the period of 1961-1970 (Tichenor 2002, 220).  By 1980 the U.S. 
Census estimated the Latino population at 14.6 million, which represented 6.4% of the 
total U.S. population. By 2000, those estimates had swelled to over 35.3 million and 
12.4% of the national population. Most recent estimates from the Current Population 
Survey in 2007 put the figure at 45 million Latinos, which is 15.1 % of the total 
population and makes Latinos the largest minority group in the U.S.  
 Over the last 27 years, Latinos have tripled in size and in proportion of the 
U.S. population. The sheer size and rapidly growing nature of this minority group 
mandates an examination of the group in terms of political participation and 
representation. With this increase in total population has also been the accompanying 
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 geographic dispersion of Latinos across the U.S. to reach many different states in the 
U.S. as well as many individual Congressional districts. There are currently 115 out of 
435 total districts, in which Latinos comprise at least 15% of the population. This 
means that over one-quarter of the Congressional districts in the U.S., Latinos 
comprise a sizeable constituency whose needs as a group are worthy of representation.  
The figure below demonstrates the location of Latinos across the U.S. and their 
relative concentrations in various parts of the country. As demonstrated by the map, 
Latinos are geographically dispersed over many parts of the country. While there are 
significant concentrations in the West and South West, it should be noted that there are 
many areas that are shaded in the lightest green color that includes areas of up to 
17.4% of the population.  These areas include states such as Iowa, Arkansas, Georgia, 
and North Carolina, which are not places we would typically think of as having sizable 
Latino populations. See Figure 1.1 below. 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Latino Population in the U.S.  
Source: Social Science Data Analysis Network (SSDAN). Based on U.S. Census 
(2000) estimates 
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 However, despite the burgeoning Latino population the total number of Latino 
representatives in the U.S. Congress has not grown in a corresponding fashion.  
Twenty years ago in 1988, there were 10 Latino members in the 100th session. By the 
110th session the number of representatives has more than doubled to 23 members, 
which is shown in the graph below.  It displays the increasing presence of Latinos 
within the institution of Congress, the figures reveal the disjuncture between the 
Latino population size and the number of Latino representatives. Latinos comprise 
roughly 15% percent of the U.S. population but Latino representatives are about 5%  
of the total members of the House of Representatives. Parity between the Latino 
population size and number of representatives would mean 65 Latino members of the 
435 House members. There is mass underrepresentation of Latinos in the Congress 
and makes the study of Latino representatives particularly important.  
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Figure 1.2 Number of Latino Representatives 
Another essential issue related to the number of Latino representatives is the 
question of whether Latino members of Congress act differently as group than other 
members. This brings us to the focus of this research project.  I examine whether 
Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation to Latino constituents 
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 that their non-Latino counterparts in high salience policy areas for the Latino 
community. If Latino members act differently and offer greater representation to 
Latinos, then it is particularly important to be aware of the differences given the small 
number of Latino representatives. The need for Latino representatives becomes even 
stronger if there are not only symbolic benefits but real substantive benefits as well. 
The next section discusses in greater detail the significance of the research project, 
followed by a brief synopsis of the organization of the project, the research questions 
and goals, and the methods utilized.  
Significance of the Study 
From a theoretical point of view this study is important because of its role in 
the untangling of descriptive representation and substantive representation and its 
implications for district composition for minority groups. In the wake of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, the issue of minority groups’ access and potential for 
representation is critical due to the historical past of inequality and 
disenfranchisement. One of the main purposes of the VRA was to not only allow 
minorities a voice in government by allowing them to vote but also the ability to elect 
members of their own group (Goffman and Davidson 1992). It was assumed that 
minority representation was important for a variety of reasons both symbolic and 
substantive.  For Latinos, they have had limited success in electing House members 
from their own group. The current literature is either unsure or unconvinced as to 
whether Latinos are actually better off with Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 
1995, Casellas 2005).   
One of the primary purposes of this research project is to determine in what 
ways Latino representatives act differently than their non-Latino counterparts and how 
they may benefit Latino constituents. In contrast to the existing scholarly work in this 
area, I find a significant amount of evidence in favor of the argument that Latinos need 
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 Latino representatives in order to obtain the maximum amount of representation. This 
has important implications for the types of districts that may be needed to assure 
adequate substantive representation of Latinos such as Latino majority districts. 
However, concentrating Latinos in several districts dilutes their influence across 
multiple districts. One alternative to this could be the creation of mixed minority 
districts to achieve maximum substantive representation and maximum influence 
across many districts. I find evidence that other minority group members of Congress 
such as black representatives may offer comparable representation for Latinos as 
Latino members. Ultimately, this project seeks to learn more about minority group 
representation and the variety of representational acts that members engage in.  
 Adequate minority group representation is important not only because 
of past inequality and limited access to politics, but also because of the changing 
demographics of the United States.  In addition to their growing size, Latinos as a 
group have become increasingly more politically active in a variety of forms of 
participation. Voting rates among Latino citizens has risen (Hero et. al 2000), 
participation in hometown associations (Portes et al. 2008), and involvement in 
community organizations (DeSipio 2002) are well documented. Traditionally, Latinos 
do not participate as much as other minority groups in terms of voting but have been 
extremely active in other non-voting activities that have meaningful impacts on their 
assimilation and incorporation into the U.S. political system (Marquez and Jennings 
2000; Hero and Campbell 1996; Garcia 1997). Given the size of the Latino population, 
they have the ability to become a fairly powerful electoral group within the larger 
population (Leal et al. 2008; Baretto et. al 2008) and campaigns have begun to reflect 
a greater awareness of this possibility (Garcia 2008). To slight the group or fail to 
recognize their potential strength would be a potentially politically foolish and costly 
mistake. In fact, in the 2008 election both Democrats and Republicans expended 
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 enormous resources in an attempt to woo the Latino vote in case they turned out to be 
a swing vote and play a decisive role in the election (Rother 2008).  
 Due to their significant constituency size in 115 districts, one would expect an 
increasing responsiveness to Latino issues and concerns of Latino constituents by 
representatives. Analyzing member behavior towards this group is important due to 
their increasing presence and influence within the political sphere. It is essential to 
determine if the politicians are responsive to Latino concerns and if the efforts of the 
VRA have not adequately provided for Latino representation. In addition to non-
institutional forms of participation, Latinos need access to members of Congress to 
express their viewpoints and represent their interests in the legislative process.  
Traditionally Latinos and other minority groups have fewer avenues to shape politics 
due to fewer resources, thus making their access to representatives and representatives 
to serve them even more important. 
 Moreover in the recent past, the widely covered immigrants’ rights marches of 
spring 2006 brought the power and force of Latinos to the forefront of the public’s 
attention. The marches were a political response to bill H.R. 4437 which sought to 
increase penalties for illegal immigration and classify unauthorized persons and 
anyone who aided them in their entry as felons.  The mass participation of millions of 
Latinos in the marches across the country demonstrated several important points that 
inform the design of this research project First, despite their heterogeneity as a group, 
Latinos do think of themselves as sharing one pan-ethnic identity in addition to 
nationality-based identities that is strong enough to incite them into political 
participation (Paerregaard 2005; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Second, Latinos do 
view some policy issues as group-based issues where they come together to push for 
their unified group position, in this case comprehensive immigration reform and a path 
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 towards legalization. I now turn to the research questions and organization of the 
project.  
Research Questions & Organization of the Study 
The central research questions of this study are twofold: 
1) Do Latinos members of Congress offer greater substantive representation to 
Latinos than non-Latino legislators? 
2) Is this difference most evident in non-roll call behavior such as bill 
introductions and bill-sponsorships? 
In order to address these questions the research project is organized in two main 
parts. The first section is based on the statistical results of a data set I created based on 
member actions from the legislative record from in the 108th-110th sessions. The 
purpose of this segment is to assess whether Latino representatives offer greater 
representation and in what ways their different characteristics affect member behavior. 
The second section utilizes data based on interviews with the staffs of Latino 
legislators and case studies of representatives. Using a series of paired comparisons, I 
examine in greater detail variation between Latino members of Congress, members 
with similar Latino populations in their districts, and members who have represented 
the same district.  Additionally, this portion of the project also investigates other forms 
of non-roll call behavior across a wider policy landscape to gain more traction on how 
members’ behavior in this area differs. Ultimately, the two segments work together to 
answer the research questions and provide a comprehensive view of the actions of 
representatives and their various representation styles.  
The chapters are organized in the following manner. Chapter Two entitled, 
“Redefining Representation: A Theoretical Assessment of a Legislator’s Role as a 
Representative” provides an overview of the traditional approaches to conceptualizing 
representation and the role of a representative.  I extensively review the literature on 
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 representation and how members behave in relation to their constituents. I then 
evaluate the multitude of ways in which we can measure representation and set forth 
my argument for a broader view of representation that includes a variety of member 
actions beyond roll call votes.   
Chapter Three entitled, “A Quantitative Analysis of Latino Representation in the 
108th Session of the U.S. House of Representatives” is a statistical study of member 
actions in the 108th session of the U.S. House of Representatives. I construct a new 
data set based on member behavior in four issues areas; immigration, education, labor, 
and social security, to assess whether there are differences between Latino and non-
Latino representatives. The first three issues represent salient public policy areas to the 
Latino community, while the last issue is included as a basis for comparison since it is 
a non-salient issue. I adopt a broad definition of representation and include roll call 
votes, bill introductions, bill co-sponsorships, and house resolutions. The analysis 
indicates that Latino members of Congress are considerably more active than their 
non-Latino counterparts across all three of the salient issues, thus affording greater 
substantive representation for Latinos. In particular, the disparity between member 
behavior occurs in non-roll call behavior, which bolsters my argument that analyses of 
representation should look beyond roll call votes. Finally, in the area of social security 
policy, Latino members were no more active than non-Latinos members, which limits 
the strength of the claim that Latino members are simply more active or liberal overall.  
 Chapter Four entitled, “A One Session Phenomenon? Examining the 109th and 
110th Sessions” is an additional quantitative investigation that extends the analysis 
from Chapter Three. I use data from the legislative record of the 109th and 110th 
sessions to analyze the same sample of members from the previous chapter. The study 
of additional congressional terms is intended to serve as a robustness check to the 
quantitative findings and provides evidence that the findings are not specific to a 
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 single session.  While Latino representatives continue to be more active than non-
Latino legislators on most high salience issues, they do not maintain their 
representational advantage on education related bills in the 109th and 110th session. 
Additionally, other variables emerge as important predictors of member behavior such 
as whether a member is from a border state. Examination of the legislative record in 
these subsequent terms also reinforces the importance of examining non-roll call 
behavior by revealing important variables that were obscured in roll call-only models. 
Finally, the analysis also confirms my theory that Latino representatives are only more 
active in salient issue areas to the Latino community.  
Chapter Five entitled, “Styles of Representation: How Members with Similar 
Constituencies Behave in Different Ways”  is based on interviews with staff  members 
of Latino Congressmen and case studies of members with comparable Latino 
populations in their districts. The goal of the analysis is to assess differences in their 
views of representation and their interactions and relationship with their Latino 
constituents. The paired case studies allow close comparisons of member actions 
between representatives and provide an opportunity to examine the ways in which the 
same district was represented by different legislators.  Interviews were conducted to 
determine each office’s assessment of Latino policy interests, actions to serve those 
interests, and how closely their positions mirror those of their constituents. They 
provided a rich source of more nuanced detail regarding ways in which each office 
works with the Latino community and allowed an examination of a broader set of 
member actions.  Lastly, this chapter revisits the theoretical underpinnings of 
representation by probing each of the primary definitional and conceptual issues.  
Finally, Chapter 6, “Conclusion” discusses the implications of the quantitative 
and qualitative findings for our understanding and measurement of representation and 
the substantive representation of Latinos.  I also examine the implications of my 
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 findings for the literature on race, ethnicity, and representation as well its contribution 
to our knowledge of descriptive representation. Finally, I address how the legislative 
behavior I observed necessitates a move beyond roll call analysis in congressional 
studies and how this might change the ways in which scholars study Congress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
REDEFINING REPRESENTATION: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
LEGISLATOR’S ROLE AS A REPRESENTATIVE 
Introduction 
Representation is a fundamental concept in the study of democratic 
governments. At the heart of the debate are questions of definition, purpose, quality, 
and access. What is representation and what types of activities define this concept as a 
whole? Do all representatives behave the same? To who are they obligated and how 
closely should they mirror their constituents’ interests? Does it matter if members 
represent different groups unequally? Answers to these questions have implications 
not only for both the people who are being represented, but also our general 
understanding of representation.  One of the critical areas of inquiry in this field is the 
representation of minority groups who have been historically marginalized and face 
obstacles in the election of minority members to the legislature.  
This dissertation seeks to tackle the above questions through the examination 
of Latino representation.  One reason why the representation of Latinos is a good 
entrée into the study of representation is the disjuncture between the growing size of 
the Latino population in the United States, roughly 45 million and 15.1 percent of the 
national population according to the 2007 Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates, 
and the small number of Latino representatives in the House, 23 of 435 members. 
Originally, Latinos were concentrated at geographical points of entry into the U.S but 
have recently begun to migrate to areas outside of these traditional gateway states. 
Thus, Latinos are now dispersed across many more congressional districts than before 
and consequently influence the actions of many different members of Congress. This 
allows the examination of how member behavior may change over time due to the 
changing demographics of their constituency. Additionally, unlike African-Americans, 
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 a substantial percentage of Latinos in a given district may be non-citizens. This special 
characteristic of the group affects how the member defines his obligations to the 
people he represents. Does citizenship matter or is physical presence in a district 
enough to wield influence? Finally, the research examining Latino representation is 
scant and further investigation is necessary to determine possible differences from the 
representation of other minority groups. 
To unpack the theoretical concept of representation, this chapter begins by 
grappling with different definitions and styles of representation. Next, I examine at 
length various forms of legislative actions that members of Congress (MCs) engage in 
that constitute representation. I discuss various findings in the congressional literature 
regarding the roles and impact of roll call votes, bill introductions and co-
sponsorships, and committee action. Then, I probe deeper into the question of specific 
ways to measure representation as applied to the U.S. Congress. This discussion is 
followed by a detailed examination of the literature on the representation of minority 
groups such as African-Americans and Latinos.  
Defining Representation 
 In the broadest sense representation is defined as “The fact of standing for, or 
in place of, some other thing or person, esp. with a right or authority to act on their 
account; substitution of one thing or person for another.” 1 This forms the basis for a 
representative democracy, where members are elected to an independent body to 
represent and serve the interests of their constituents. This is in direct opposition to a 
direct democracy, where the role of a representative is either non-existent, or of an 
extremely limited direct proxy form. In the United States, the public has historically 
relied on representatives in government to act responsibly in their favor. In theory, 
                                                 
1 Oxford English Dictionary (2000) “Representation” Definition 7a. 
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 members are supposed to be responsive to their constituent interests and beliefs but are 
not necessarily strictly bound by their preferences. Additionally, citizens wield a check 
on members’ behavior by using the threat of removal from office to place some 
modest limits on the representative’s actions.  Legislators are assumed to possess 
specialized policy expertise and knowledge (Krehbiel 1991). Consequently, this is 
intended to result in better representation and higher quality policy outcomes.   
 Before delving into a discussion of representation, it is first necessary to 
explore the concept of a constituency. Determining the obligations of a member is 
defined by the answers to questions of what comprises a constituency and whether 
there are different types.  Members of the U.S. House of Representatives are elected 
by a local geographic constituency that is bounded by limits according to population 
size and space. It includes the entire population within those limits. If members are 
responsive to their constituents, then they tend to focus on local issues facing the 
district and issues of importance to people in that district. This is in contrast to a focal 
point on national issues where the constituency is the nation at large.2 The primary 
focus for House members remains geared toward local issues, whereas for U.S. 
Senators the focus is largely at the national level (Schiller 1995, Oleszek 2007). 
Another area of concern with regards to constituencies is whether members are 
equally responsive to the different groups of people within their district. Nested within 
the geographical constituency is the re-election constituency, a group of people the 
member believes are most responsible for his election and re-election (Fenno 1978). 
Closely related to this concept is the notion of a primary constituency, which is 
comprised of the member’s most ardent supporters and advocates who are likely to be 
quite active in primary elections (Fenno 2003). Do people need to be active supporters 
                                                 
2 Herrick and Fisher (2007) p. 22. 
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 or voters in order for the member to be responsive to their concerns? This question is 
of particular concern in this dissertation since the focus is on the representation of 
Latinos by U.S. House members. A sizable portion of the Latino population in a given 
district are non-citizens who are either permanent residents or visa holders and thus 
non-voters, which begs the question of what exactly constitutes the member’s 
obligation to people in this category? An additional percentage of the Latino 
population is undocumented and thus even farther from the individuals who make up 
the re-election and primary constituencies.3  Moreover, members can also be 
responsive to larger constituencies that are beyond the boundaries of their district, 
which may be based on gender, ethnicity, or other common interests. The 
representation of these groups is called surrogate representation and will be discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. Constituencies are complex, multi-layered, and 
comprised of various groups and demographics that members must attempt to 
simultaneously represent to their fullest ability.  
In addition to the concept of constituency, the remainder of the theoretical 
literature on representation wrestles with three main issues. First, establishing a 
precise definition of representation and determining its function. Second, determining 
how representatives should act with regards to constituents. Third, how to best 
measure and assess representation. The following section addresses the first two areas 
before turning to the third on measurement issues. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Given that Latinos present a special case where many of them are non-citizen constituents within 
certain districts, I addressed this issue during my interviews with staff of members of Congress. They 
were asked if members were more attuned to Latino interests if they were citizens and whether the 
percentage of non-Latino citizens in the district affected member behavior. The results of these 
discussions are presented in Chapter 5. Overall, both groups indicated that the issue of non-citizen 
constituents did not affect their responsiveness to Latinos as a whole.  
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 Trustee v. Delegate 
 One of the oldest theoretical conceptions of representation is that of the 
legislator as a trustee or delegate. A trustee is a person who is assumed to have 
extensive expertise that qualifies him to act on behalf of her constituents without 
directly following their expressed preferences at all times.4 People trust that the 
member will keep in mind their preferences, wishes, and interests, but rely on his 
personal experience, expertise, and knowledge to guide him in achieving the best 
policy outcomes, not only for his constituents but also the nation as a whole. There are 
various strengths of this model. First, members are free to use their knowledge to help 
achieve the best possible outcomes. Second, in theory citizens obtain the best of both 
worlds – good policy and the representation of their interests. Third, members are not 
forced to act in ways that contradict their own beliefs and preferences. However, one 
of the serious potential downsides to this model is when a member relies too often on 
his own knowledge and deviates from his constituents’ preferences. The result is a loss 
of total representation for constituents.  
In contrast, a delegate has a much more limited degree of autonomy and does 
not depart from constituent interests. Rather, the member acts in ways that closely 
mirror the preferences of the people he represents. The strength of this model is that 
absent a direct democracy, it affords citizens the most direct representation of their 
interests. One potential problem with this model is that citizens are not policy experts 
and do not necessarily understand the complexities of policy formulation and 
implementation. Their ideal policies may not be realistic, possible to implement, able 
to obtain passage in the legislature, or even constitute good public policy overall. One 
of the benefits of the increase of careerism in the U.S. Congress has been the 
                                                 
4 From Edmund Burke’s speech in 1774 “Speech to the Electors of Bristol.” 
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 development of members as policy experts with specialized knowledge. In the 
delegate model, the utility of this acquired knowledge is heavily discounted. 
Moreover, it may be difficult for members to ascertain the views of constituents on 
complex and technical issues, since reliance on polls can be imperfect and certain 
types of constituents are more likely to write or contact their members.  
 Often in the literature these two concepts are directly juxtaposed with one 
another when in actuality very few representatives strictly exhibit one model or the 
other. What is more likely is that in certain situations or policies, members act 
according to one logic or often combine elements from both models. For example, on 
public policies most salient to their constituents, members would be more likely to 
closely mirror their constituents’ preferences and act as a delegate. This behavior can 
be reasonably assumed because members desire to maintain a positive relationship 
with constituents and constituents are most likely to be following MCs actions on the 
issues that are most important to them. However, most MCs eventually develop policy 
interests and expertise that are not necessarily salient to their constituencies. In these 
areas, we might expect a member to rely more on his own expertise and knowledge 
rather than closely follow his constituents’ beliefs.  I explore the relative balance 
between the two concepts and member behavior in Chapter 5 which is based on 
interviews with the staffs of MCs. At its core this dichotomy attempts to dictate the 
ways in which members should act to best serve those they represent. The next pair of 
representational theories to is more concerned with the purpose of representation.  
Descriptive v. Substantive 
Descriptive representation is the notion that representatives should look like 
those they represent or have shared attributes. In its most literal interpretation this 
means that women should represent women, and blacks should represent blacks 
(Pitkin 1967). In its purest form it would result in a legislative body that directly 
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 mirrors the public with roughly the same proportions of minority groups in the 
legislature as are in the relevant population as a whole (Pitkin 1967). However, most 
of the literature arguing in support of descriptive representation does not focus on this 
form. Reasons for this are due primarily to its infeasibility to achieve because of the 
costs a total re-organization of the U.S. Congress would entail, such as loss of 
experienced members, cost of re-elections, and loss of relationships with constituents. 
Rather the discussion is based on a selective version of descriptive representation that 
results in achieving some minority members in Congress, though the aim is not 
necessarily total parity with the national population.    
The arguments in favor of descriptive representation are multi-dimensional.  
One argument assumes there are essential characteristics or experiences that are shared 
between people who are of the same gender, race, or ethnicity (Mansbridge 1999). The 
assumption is that these members will be better equipped to act in the best interests of 
these constituents. However, others disagree and argue that such a view leads to the 
implication that members of a group can only be adequately represented by legislators 
drawn from that same group (Swain 1993). Proponents contend that descriptive 
representation results in members who are more likely to bring issues to the agenda or 
be more active on issues that pertain to minority communities (Cannon 1999). For 
example, women are more likely than their male counterparts to bring forth women’s 
issues into the legislative agenda and their presence in the legislature adds a further 
dimension to debates on these issues (Swers 2003). Others point out that even if 
descriptive representation does not result in better policy or more passed legislation, it 
can still have important benefits such as people contacting their MCs more frequently 
than they would otherwise (Gay 2002). Moreover, descriptive representation has also 
been found to increase individual sentiments of political efficacy (Emig, Hesse, and 
Fisher 1996), strengthen de facto legitimacy (Gunier 1994), and result in a more 
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 positive view of the representative overall (Gay 2002; Tate 2001, 2003).  Ultimately, 
the main question surrounding descriptive representation is whether minority groups 
need descriptive representation to achieve substantive representation. 
Substantive representation is directly tied to member actions and requires 
representatives to act in the interests of those represented (Pitkin 1967). Legislators 
should be responsive to their constituent demands and preferences, though they are not 
necessarily entirely bound by them. Unlike descriptive representation, the value of 
substantive representation in and of itself is commonly accepted. All theories of 
representation argue that a responsive legislator who is aware of the interests of those 
he seeks to serve is an important component of being a good representative. However, 
what constitutes substantive representation is a frequent subject of debate in legislative 
studies. For example, should only policy outcomes, such as voting on legislation, 
matter or should other actions that shape the policy process, such as debate on the 
floor, affect how we define substantive representation? This dissertation argues in 
favor of a broad examination of representation that includes a variety of measures of 
member actions, including roll call votes, bill introductions, bill co-sponsorships, and 
house resolutions. A more detailed discussion of this conceptualization and the various 
ways to measure substantive representation are presented later in this chapter. 
 The relationship between substantive representation and the trustee/delegate 
dichotomy is muddled because it is not clear whether members are required to adopt a 
particular style in order to achieve substantive representation for their constituents. 
Instead, individual scholars studying substantive representation make claims regarding 
which style results in more representation. I argue that in certain contexts, such as high 
salience policy areas for constituents, members are more likely to act as delegates to 
provide the greatest amount of substantive representation. However, in other less 
salient areas, members are more likely to act more autonomously and feel free to allow 
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 multiple sources of influence to determine their legislative decisions. The following 
section briefly discusses several newer conceptualizations of representation that play a 
role in the conceptualization of this dissertation.  
Alternative Models of Representation 
While not the focus of this manuscript, there is still some utility in briefly 
discussing four more recent conceptions of representation analyzed by Mansbridge 
(2003) and how they may be applicable to portions of this research endeavor. 
Mansbridge attempts to shift the discussion of representation away from the theories 
discussed above in order to assess more clearly the motivations behind member 
behavior. The first model she discusses is called promissory representation which 
focuses on the classic principal-agent arrangement. It involves the representative 
making promises to voters prior to the election, voters selecting a candidate based on 
that information, and then representatives are responsible for abiding by their promises 
and being responsive to voters’ interests. This model most clearly resembles the 
delegate model where power lies with the voter to sanction the member with the threat 
of removal from office. The important issue raised by this model concerns the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. What control does the principal have 
over the agent and when is this power exerted? In other words, once the member is 
elected, how much power do constituents actually possess? In theory, they wield 
significant power with the threat of choosing another candidate in the next election, 
but in some ways this threat is not credible. For example, high incumbency rates along 
with the low level of information and limited checking of the member’s record that the 
average constituent engages in would not necessarily merit serious concern on the part 
of the Congressman.  
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  In the second model, called anticipatory representation, the “representative 
tries to please future voters”5 and voters engage in retrospective voting. Members 
attempt to shape the preferences and interests of likely voters in the next election. 
During the period between the first election and the re-election, representatives will 
engage in more thoughtful deliberation in order to anticipate future outcomes.  In 
contrast, gyroscopic representation occurs when voters choose a representative who 
will act in ways they support without external motivations. Mansbridge asserts that 
members act as gyroscopes assessing their surroundings but relying on their internal 
preferences to guide their actions. In this model, the member is relatively independent 
of pressures such as constituent interests, lobbyist, or other political forces. Neither of 
these two models is explicitly tested in this dissertation, though the effect of voters on 
members’ actions is considered in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Finally, the last model discussed by Mansbridge is surrogate representation. 
This style involves members who act on behalf of people who are not necessarily 
members of their geographic constituency. Instead they represent people and issues 
that are part of a larger group. For example, African-American representatives have 
often discussed the pressure they feel to represent not only black constituents in their 
district, but black interests at large (Swain 2003). Another example might be based on 
a substantive policy area such as the environment. A person may not receive much 
representation in this area because their direct Congressman is not involved in the 
issue area, however, by proxy they feel represented by other members who champion 
the cause. In interviews with staffs of Latino MCs, many of them reported that the 
member expressed feeling the need to be a surrogate representative to Latinos at large. 
                                                 
5 Mansbridge (2003) p. 517. 
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 From this discussion of various models and styles of representation in the literature it 
is clear there is no consensus among scholars on how members should and do act.  
Measuring Representation & Representation in Practice 
How do Members of Congress spend their time and why? 
 The most important criteria in assessing representation is defining 
representation and setting the parameters for which types of behavior should count as 
representative acts. How do members of the U.S. House of Representatives actually 
spend their time?  Since time is an extremely precious commodity on the Hill and at 
home in their districts, members must make calculations about how to best allocate 
their time. According to a 1993 congressional survey, members’ top five priorities are 
1) meeting with constituents regarding legislative issues, 2) attending committee 
hearings and meetings, 3) meeting with government officials and lobbyists on 
legislative issues, 4) studying pending legislation or discussing legislation with other 
members or staff and 5) working with informal caucuses or groups of colleagues.6 
Sixty-eight percent of members reported spending a great deal of time on meeting with 
citizens in their state or district and forty-five percent in Washington, DC, 
respectively. Interestingly, over forty percent of those who responded to the 
questionnaire indicated that they allocated little time to attending floor debate, 
working with party leaders to build coalitions, and overseeing agencies concerning the 
implementation of policies.7 Members cultivate a “homestyle” where they spend 
considerable amounts of time meeting with constituents, engaging in casework, 
holding town hall meetings, and making their presence known in the district (Fenno 
                                                 
6 Davidson, Oleszek, Lee (2008) p. 131. Source U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization. 
7 Ibid p. 132. 
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 1978). Representatives must engage in an elaborate balancing act between 
representative and legislative acts. 
The next question to follow is what factors motivate members to allocate their 
time in certain ways? A considerable amount of literature argues that members are 
primarily focused on re-election and consequently focus on activities that will help 
achieve this goal (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1973).  Several tactics useful toward re-
election include engaging in position-taking and credit-claiming. One reason to use 
such tactics is as a method of signaling their positions (Fenno 1978), while another is 
to improve and maintain good relations with one’s constituency (Mayhew 1974, 
Kindgon 1989).  Another possible reason is that members who lack general influence 
over the legislative agenda, such as freshman, minority members, and extremists, are 
more likely to utilize this behavior to express their viewpoints and establish their 
reputations (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). To explain participation in committees 
and subcommittees, Hall (1996) argues that members are motivated by a desire to 
serve districts interests, personal policy interests, or promote the agenda of the 
president from their own party.8 In the face of these competing influences, members 
must make decisions on how to best allocate their time based on demands from 
constituents, party leaders, interest groups, and their personal preferences.  
Measurement Issues in Representation Studies 
The following discussion will now turn toward measurement issues and 
assessing the ways in which existing scholars have attempted to operationalize 
representation.  Delimiting the boundaries of what should count as representation is 
based not only on what is theoretically important and significant, but also on the type 
of method the researcher would like to use to analyze representation. For example, 
                                                 
8 Hall (1996) p. 174 
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 certain types of member behavior are more amenable to quantitative analysis, such as 
roll call votes and bill introduction, in contrast to debate on the floor and town hall 
meetings with constituents. In the narrowest sense, scholars have often limited this 
definition to actual votes cast. With regards to the study of the U.S. Congress, roll call 
votes are readily available and easily converted for use in statistical analysis. 
Additionally, other measures, such as ideological scores or ratings such as 
NOMINATE and ADA scores,9 utilize roll call votes to devise their composite 
indices.  However, it is unclear whether the choice to primarily use measures based on 
roll-call voting in many studies of representation has been made from a theoretical 
stance as opposed to one of methodological convenience. 
As far as the theoretical justification for limiting the analysis to voting 
behavior, some scholars have argued that only policy outcomes and substantive policy 
changes are what really matters in terms of representation and effectiveness. Others 
argue that it is the only strong signal of a member’s position. The major difficulty with 
this view is that it reduces MCs to voting machines who do not engage in other 
meaningful behavior on behalf of their constituents.  Despite the plethora of evidence 
that members devote valuable time to activities that are not directly tied to floor-votes 
and make careful considerations on how actively to participate (Hall 1996), an 
overwhelming proportion of the literature focuses on this type of behavior in analyses 
that assess how well a member is representing his constituents (Fiorina 1974, 
Kingdon, 1989, Swain 1993, Cannon 1999, Lublin 1997, Whitby 1997).  Additionally, 
while constituent interests play a role in how members cast their votes (Fiorina 1974), 
the influence of the party as a main explanatory factor in their voting behavior cannot 
be understated (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  If party can often account for differences 
                                                 
9 For more information on the calculation of these scores see Poole and Rosenthal (1996) for 
NOMINATE scores and http://www.adaction.org/ for Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. 
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 in member voting behavior, then the role of other influences in motivating members’ 
decisions is obscured. More importantly, voting may be an area in which party is the 
main explanatory factor, but may not have the same role in explaining other forms of 
behavior. 
Areas of legislative activity that have recently garnered more attention are 
those of bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and committee actions. At the 
Congressional level, several recent studies examine this behavior (Hall 1996, Rocca 
and Sanchez 2008, Gamble 2007, Swer 2003). The value of these activities is that they 
are important steps in the deliberative process which eventually lead to policy 
outcomes.  At the very minimum, bill introductions are important given that this is the 
only way a bill can eventually become a law. While it is true that a very small 
percentage of bills introduced ever make it out of committee, bill introduction is a 
necessary step before it can even get to a floor vote. Moreover, introducing legislation 
is not a costless activity. Researching and drafting legislation takes time and staff 
resources in addition to the recruitment efforts to identify potential co-sponsors for 
support. It allows members to bring issues of vital importance to their constituents to 
the chamber for consideration. Bill introduction also serves an important role as a 
signaling mechanism to constituents, party leaders, and other members about the MC’s 
positions on issues and how important those issues are to the member. Even bills that 
do not pass have still been shown to affect the legislative agenda (Schiller 1995). 
There is also some evidence that members who are more active than simply 
participating in floor votes, have considerable influence in shaping the legislative 
agenda (Wawro 2000). Overall, bill introduction is an extremely valuable contribution 
as a representative act.  
While bill co-sponsorship is not as costly of a behavior in terms of the time 
investment, it still serves many of the same signaling functions and provides needed 
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 support to a bill (Kessler and Kreihbel 1996). For example, if a bill receives a large 
number of co-sponsors it is more likely to get pushed faster through the committee 
process and come to the floor for a vote because of its higher perceived salience 
among members (Adler and Wilkinson 2005). Additionally, both types of activities 
can help members achieve their goal of re-election via position taking (Mayhew 1974, 
Koger 2003). Given the effects of bill introduction and co-sponsorship on the 
discourse of debate, the range of issues debated, and the resources devoted to engaging 
in this behavior, it is necessary to consider them a vital part of measuring 
representation. Incorporating these two measures into statistical analysis is feasible 
given that it is amenable to a coding scheme, however, the coding of such data is a 
time-intensive endeavor particularly if one desires to account for directionality of the 
actions.  
Committee actions are also important since the actual shaping of legislation 
takes place in committee in terms of the framing the issue and defining the policy 
terms. Mark-ups and amendments are dealt with largely within this realm and 
members engage in longer debates on the merits of each bill than they would on the 
floor (Oleszek 2007). While not as clearly amenable to quantitative analysis, with the 
exceptions of committee votes or introduction of amendments, qualitative analysis on 
the debate, memos, and testimony in committees remain valuable sources of 
information about representation. The variety of ways in which these behaviors are 
important and influential, in addition to the fact that members devote significant 
amounts of time to them, require that these types of behavior also be considered in 
studies of representation. Analyses that are limited to roll call votes provide us only a 
glimpse of member behavior and representation. This dissertation demonstrates that 
broader measures of representation beyond roll call votes are more nuanced, and work 
better to explain members’ behavior.  
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 Minority Groups and Representation 
The body of literature closest to this dissertation is that which explores 
underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, such as African-Americans and Latinos. It 
explicitly wrestles with the value of descriptive representation and whether it is 
required for the substantive representation of minority groups. While there is extensive 
research on black representation, Latino representation has only recently received 
more attention. I will briefly review the findings in each area and evaluate the ways in 
which they measure and define representation. Many of the general critiques of the 
broader congressional representation literature also apply to this smaller subset of 
work. In particular, the emphasis on voting behavior and roll call votes is dominant 
and needs to be expanded by incorporating other forms of member actions in future 
studies.  
African-American Representation 
The majority of the research examining African-American representation 
argues that black members of Congress offer greater substantive representation than 
their white counterparts, even when controlling for party (Lublin 1997, Cannon 1999, 
Tate 2003, Whitby 1997).  Substantive representation is measured by how well the 
representative acts as a delegate and represents black interests. While members are 
much more likely to bring these issues to the debate, it does not necessarily result in 
more policy outcomes favorable to their African-American constituents. Other 
scholars argue that black legislators are unable to build coalitions with other members 
in order to pass the legislation they introduce, and thus African-Americans might be 
better off simply voting for Democrats who generally reflect the policy positions of 
the African-American community (Black and Black 2002). Additionally, black 
members vary in the degree of which they actively pursue black interests (Swain 
2003). Moreover, others point out that the creation of majority-minority districts to 
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 help black candidates get elected, paradoxically results in the overall dilution of black 
influence, who previously affected multiple members of Congress as opposed the one 
black member gained from such a district (Lublin 1997).  Despite the consensus that 
black representatives provide greater substantive representation for blacks, this 
literature remains unresolved on whether descriptive representation is necessary for 
substantive representation.  
Latino Representation 
 While not as extensive as the black representation literature, the literature 
regarding Latino representation is equally as divided regarding the overall benefit of 
Latino legislators for Latino substantive representation. The earliest work in this area 
focused on whether Latino members acted in a more liberal fashion than non-Latino 
members (Welch and Hibbing 1984).  Later work found that Latino members with 
higher ideological scores that favored Latino policies did not act differently than non-
Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 1995) .10  Casellas (2005) offers the most 
comprehensive analysis to date of Latino representation and the election of Latino 
candidates to the U.S. Congress as well as state legislatures. Casellas’ work on Latino 
representatives focuses largely on the process of their election to office. Regarding 
representation, his work confirms the finding that Latino legislators tend to be more 
liberal than their non-Latino counterparts. All of the above work relies on ideology 
scores, which are based on roll call votes. The main problem with this approach is that 
                                                 
10 This study utilized SWVRI scores which were compiled by polling all Latino state legislators to 
determine what Latino interests are and then constructing a measure based on these responses. The 
theoretical problem with the scores is that they assume what Latino state legislators hold Latino 
interests to be is the same as the Latino public’s and Latino national representatives’ view of Latino 
interests. However, there are potentially key differences between these groups and assuming their 
congruence should not be automatic. Additionally, Kerr and Miller (1997) demonstrate several 
methodological errors in terms of research design and the interpretation of results made by Hero and 
Tolbert (1995). Thus, the findings of Hero and Tolbert (1995) should be considered with some 
reservations. 
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 votes constitute a small proportion of member action and members are often pressured 
to tow the party line when voting. It is likely that an examination of other legislative 
activity beyond roll call votes would elucidate more subtle differences between Latino 
and non-Latino member actions.  
 A more recent approach adopted by scholars has begun to investigate non-roll-
call behavior (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). While the shift away from roll-call votes is 
an important step, there are some problems with the current approach. This work has 
generally centered upon measuring representation as the total number of actions and 
rather than analyzing the substantive nature of those actions. If we assume that 
members act as delegates, then the substantive nature of their actions matters. This 
dissertation argues it is important to distinguish not only between the total number of 
actions in each issue area, and also the nature of those actions. For example, a member 
could be very active in anti-immigration bills and an examination of the record would 
count him as a frequent participator and thus more representative than others who are 
less active. However, a key part of data is lost in this type of coding if these actions 
end up being against the needs and interests of constituents, which is contrary to the 
very nature of representation. Even if we assume members are acting as trustees, the 
general directionality of the actions should matter to some degree since the trustee 
model is not entirely divorced from constituent preferences. 
In sum, the literature on race and representation by and large has indicated 
there are some significant benefits from descriptive representation. This dissertation 
elucidates the importance of descriptive representation by demonstrating its 
requirement for the greatest substantive representation for Latinos. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an extensive discussion of the nature and definition 
of representation, measurement issues regarding legislator behavior, and the 
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 representation of minority groups. This dissertation aims to expand on theoretical 
models of trustee and delegate via interviews with staffs of members of Congress and 
case studies to assess the circumstances under which representatives are more apt to 
act as trustees or delegates. Furthermore, this dissertation argues for a re-
conceptualization of what constitutes representation by providing strong evidence that 
important differences, such as the impact of a Latino legislator, are obscured by a 
focus solely on roll call votes. In the next chapter, I develop an empirical model to 
evaluate member behavior in the 108th session of the U.S. House of Representatives.  
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 CHAPTER THREE 
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF LATINO REPRESENTATION IN THE 108TH 
SESSION OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I contend that an examination of representation in the 
U.S. Congress must go beyond roll votes and discussed several limitations in current 
studies of Latino representation. I argued that given the limited nature and frequency 
of roll call votes we must begin to incorporate other forms of legislative participation, 
such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions. Additionally, the 
literature remains unclear on whether Latinos require Latino representatives to achieve 
greater substantive representation.  
This chapter is comprised of a series of statistical models to assess variation in 
Latino and non-Latino member actions across different types of activities and policy 
areas. First, I advance my hypotheses and discuss how they stem from the literature on 
race and representation. Second, I justify the selection of immigration, education, 
labor, and social security policies for this investigation and discuss the parameters for 
each policy area. Subsequently, I turn to the research design where I describe the 
composition of the data set, the theoretical motivations of the dependent and 
independent variables, and model specifications. Lastly, I present the empirical results 
and discuss the implications of the findings for the literature and my future research.  
  As a whole these tests indicate that Latinos achieve the most substantive 
representation with Latino members of Congress. Latino legislators act differently 
than their non-Latino counterparts in policy areas of high salience to the Latino 
community. In contrast, on low salience issues such as social security, Latino 
members are not different than non-Latinos, and variation in member behavior is 
mostly accounted for by party. Non-Latino members do not become more responsive 
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 to Latino interests or issues as the proportion of Latinos in their districts increase, thus 
indicating that descriptive representation does lead to greater substantive 
representation.  Moreover, the effect of a Latino representative is obscured in the 
models that rely solely on roll call votes. However, the models that incorporate 
additional forms of legislative participation, demonstrate significant differences 
between Latino and non-Latino members, thus providing strong support for my 
methodological argument of the need to move beyond roll call votes.  
Theory & Hypotheses  
Recall from the previous chapter, the model of the representative as delegate in 
which the legislator is viewed as strictly adhering to constituent preferences and acts 
accordingly (Pitkin 1967). The analysis in this chapter measures the degree to which 
members act as a delegate to assess the substantive representation of Latinos. The 
existing literature assessing race, ethnicity, and representation has relied primarily on 
roll call data (Welch and Hibbing 1984, Cannon 1999, Lublin 1997, Casellas 2005). 
The main problem with this approach is the limited snapshot of member behavior 
since roll call votes account for a small proportion of how members spend their time 
(Hall 1996). More recent work has begun to examine non-roll call behavior such as 
bill introduction and co-sponsorship (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). However, the focus is 
on the aggregate total of actions to infer the level of representation rather than taking 
into account their substantive nature. In measuring representation, scholars often 
assume members act as delegates, thus the substantive nature of their actions matters.  
The quantitative models in this chapter seek to overcome the limitations of existing 
approaches by incorporating additional forms of legislative participation, assessing the 
total number of actions and the directionality of those actions.  
Findings from the representation literature indicate that members should act as 
delegates on high salience issues and be responsive to constituent interests.  
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 Immigration, education, and labor policies are high salience issues in the Latino 
community.11 If the argument for descriptive representation holds, then Latino 
members who have more Latino constituents should be more responsive on these 
issues than their non-Latino counterparts. Conversely, on issues of lower salience to 
their Latino constituents, Latino members’ actions may not differ at all from non-
Latinos.  I advance two hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses to be examined in this 
study: 
H1 Latino Representatives will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-
education, and pro-labor legislation than Non-Latino Representatives. 
H1b The difference in representation acts between Latino and non-
Latino members will be most evident in non-roll call legislative action.  
 
H2 Representatives with larger Latino constituencies will act more often to 
achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than 
representatives with smaller Latino constituencies, irrespective of the race or 
ethnicity of the representative.  
H2b The effect of Latino percentage on member actions will be greatest 
on non-roll call legislative actions.  
  
H3 There will be no substantive difference between Latino and non-Latino  
Representatives’ actions in the area of social security, given its limited salience 
to the Latino community. 
 
The selection of immigration, education, labor, and social security policies 
stems from the choice to analyze salient policy areas amongst Latinos and one policy 
area that is considered non-salient as a basis for comparison.12  Immigration policy 
                                                 
11 Pew Hispanic Center 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanic Voter Attitudes. See footnote 12 for 
more details on support levels compared to other issues. 
12 It should be noted that immigration, education, and labor are not the only salient Latino policy areas.  
In recent surveys, education, labor/economic concerns, war, crime and healthcare are top priorities. 
According to Pew Hispanic Survey of Hispanic Voter Attitudes (2008) the following issues were 
marked as most important education (93%), cost of living (92%) jobs (91%), health care 90%, crime 
(82%), war in Iraq (75%), and immigration (75%).  See http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/90.pdf for 
more details.  The selection of labor, education, immigration was due to both high salience among 
Latino voters and the regular presence of bills in these areas. Bills on crime, war, and cost of living are 
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 was chosen given its direct impact on the Latino community and recent media 
attention regarding this issue. Additionally, immigration policy has become an 
increasingly salient issue amongst Latinos in light of debates over a guest worker 
program, the potential for another amnesty, and the introduction of legislation aimed 
at illegal immigrants. Salience of the issue among Latinos was demonstrated among 
other things by the recent pro-immigration marches in the spring of 2006 and 2007 
(Lavariega-Montiforti 2008; Barreto et al. 2009). Education policy was selected given 
its consistency as the most important issue ranked by Latinos in national public 
opinion surveys.13 Similarly, labor issues concerning treatment of workers and labor 
rights are often cited as a top concern among Latinos.14  
Social security was selected because while it is an issue that is relevant to all 
districts given the inevitable participation in the program by all individuals, it is 
generally considered a lower salience issue for Latinos.15 It provides an opportunity to 
compare member actions in salient Latino policy areas to a non-salient area to assess if 
there are substantive differences between non-Latino and Latino member actions.  
Additionally, it also allows me to determine if Latinos were simply more liberal 
ideologically than non-Latino Democrats. However, if they do not differ significantly 
over social security then this suggests they are only more liberal in a selective manner 
based on reflecting their constituents’ interests.  
                                                 
few and far between and rarely voted on.  Attitudes on the War in Iraq are also much more divided than 
some of the other issues, which make it difficult to define directionality. Health care bills are numerous 
but are typically quite lengthy and contain many different provisions. Coding the directionality of this 
type of bill would be more difficult and subjective compared to the relatively straightforward and 
concise nature of education, immigration, and labor bills. Future work in the area would aim to cover 
additional high salience policy areas. 
13 Martinez- Ebers et al (2004), LNPS (1989), LNS (2006) 
14 Pew Hispanic Center 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanic Voter Attitudes 
15 Ibid. 
33 
 
 The determination of pro-education, pro-immigration and pro-labor positions 
to be reflected by the representative are rooted in the public opinion data on Latino 
attitudes on policy positions. For example, in the Kaiser Family Foundation/ Pew 
Hispanic Center National Survey of Latinos (2002), 76% of Latinos indicated that they 
feel the United States should allow more Latin American to enter the US. Only 21% 
believe there should be a reduction in legal immigration from Latin America and 85% 
indicated support for a path towards legalization for undocumented people.16  
Similarly in a 2004 Kaiser/Pew Study on Education and Latinos, there were high 
levels of support for various pro-education policies. For example, 93% of Latino 
respondents felt that state and federal funds should be used to help schools that were 
not meeting standards and 54% were ‘very concerned’ and 27% were ‘somewhat 
concerned’ about budget problems affecting education programs. Additionally 65% of 
Latino respondents indicated that they support measures to ensure equal money spent 
on each student even if it involves redistribution of funds from wealthy districts to 
poor districts.17 A pro-labor stance is substantiated with availability of jobs and 
improving of the economy as top concerns.18  Summed together these findings signal 
broad levels of support of immigration, education and labor by Latinos, thus 
supporting my position that representatives with sizeable Latino constituents should be 
reflecting pro-immigration, education and labor standpoints in their legislative 
behavior. 
For the purposes of this analysis, immigration policy is defined as all bills 
specifically referring to visas and naturalization, deportation, penalties for illegal 
                                                 
16 See the NSL (2002) report for more information. 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14086 
17  See NSL: Education (2004) for more information. http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/National-
Survey-of-Latinos-Education-Chartpack-and-Summary-of-Findings.pdf 
18 See NSL: Politics and Civic Participation (2004) http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/The-2004-
National-Survey-of-Latinos-Politics-and-Civic-Participation-Summary-and-Chart-Pack.pdf 
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 crossings, border control, and the treatment of immigrants during border crossing 
and/or immigration proceedings.19 Education policy included all bills related to 
education, including teacher requirements, funding and appropriations, support of 
programs such as Head Start, student loan forgiveness, etc. Labor policy was narrowly 
defined to include bills that directly affected workers rights, working conditions, 
wages, unions, and protection of workers. General economic bills were not included 
under labor policy. Social security included almost all bills listed under the keyword 
Social Security in the legislative record online on THOMAS20 with the exception of 
bills related to State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), or Medicare. 
Since these bills are very closely related to health care, they were not included.21 
Social security bills included bills related to public retirement, disability, survivors, 
supplemental security income (SSI), as well as access to these benefits and 
information about them. Overall, the aim in determining appropriate limits was to 
include bills most directly relevant to each policy area.   
Hall (1996) argues that since a relatively small proportion of actual legislative 
activity involves floor voting, the consideration of other forms of participation, such as 
bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, committee and subcommittee actions, memos to 
other members, and actions by the staff of legislators are necessary when assessing the 
overall amount and degree of representation. I adopt a broader definition of legislative 
participation in this study. I focus on roll call votes, bill co-sponsorship, house 
resolutions, and bill introduction since these are both more closely related to potential 
legislative outcomes and more quantifiable.  
                                                 
19 This is a more narrowly defined version of immigration policy that is embraced by policy experts in 
this area. See Tichenor (2002), Massey (2002). Bills dealing with immigrants’ access to services such 
as Medicare or the education system have not been included in this analysis because these issues deal 
with more than one policy area.  
20 http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
21 In future analysis, these bills will be included under a separate health care policy category.  
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 Research Design  
To determine if Latino members are more likely to represent Latino interests 
more than non-Latino members, I created several new data sets using member actions 
from three recent U.S. House of Representatives sessions, the 108th – 110th (2003-
2008). In this chapter, I present the results of the analysis of the 108th session. To 
measure the amount of substantive representation, I coded a variety of legislative 
actions by both Latino and non-Latino members in the four policy areas and summed 
the total actions in each area to construct three dependent variables. I coded the actions 
using the Congressional Record online from THOMAS, which is run by the Library of 
Congress.22 The first measure of representation captures the total number of roll call 
votes relating to immigration, education, labor, and social security respectively. 
Member actions were coded as +1 if the vote supported immigration, education, labor, 
or social security, and -1 if the vote was against any of the issue areas. Members who 
abstained from the roll call were coded as 0. The next dependent variable measures the 
total number of member actions in the areas of bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, 
and house resolutions. If the measure was positive, the member was assigned a score 
of +1 and if the measure was negative, the member was assigned a score of -1. The 
last representation measure is a total representation score, which is an aggregate of roll 
call votes and other legislative actions.  
This analysis did not examine all 435 members of the House of 
Representatives. Rather, I utilized a sample of members due to the nature of collection 
of the data for the dependent variables.23 The sample was not completely random 
                                                 
 
22 http://thomas.loc.gov/. 
23 The collection of the data for the dependent variable included a thorough review of the legislative 
record in order to identify relevant non-roll call behavior. In order to identify all bills introduced and 
co-cosponsored by a given member, one must look at the entire list of bills in a given session that a 
member was associated with. For many members, this is over 500 bills. The organization of the bills is 
either numerical or by keyword. When identifying the relevant pieces of legislation it was necessary to 
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 because there were only 22 Latino representatives in the 108th Congress. Thus, a 
modified stratified sample was relied upon which includes all 22 Latinos, a random 
sample of 25 non-Latino members with a substantial Latino constituency (defined as 
more than 15%) from the relevant subpopulation of 91 members, and a random sample 
of 25 non-Latino members without a substantial Latino constituency from the 
remaining subpopulation of 322 members.24 The stratified sample allows a 
comparison of legislative actions from each of the three groups of members. For the 
purposes of this dissertation the trade-off to code member actions from a sample rather
than entire population was made largely to allow for a comparative analysis of 
member behavior across multiple sessions. In the following chapter, the results from 
the 109th and 110th sessions are presented and discussed. Table 3.1 lists all memb
 
ers in 
the sam
s to 
n policies 
                                                
ple. 
The main explanatory variables to be examined are the racial and ethnic 
demographics of the district and the race or ethnicity of the representative. The racial 
and ethnic characteristics that were coded include the percentage of Latinos, Blacks, 
Asians and Whites, where Whites was treated as the baseline category. In terms of the 
representative’s race or ethnicity, I coded whether the member was Asian, Latino, 
Black, or White, where White a represented the baseline category. With regard
Latinos, I also noted whether the member was of Cuban descent since Cuban 
representatives might have different views on either immigration or educatio
 
consult the specifics of each bill to gain more detailed information in order to determine if it should be 
included and the directionality of the bill’s content. On some issues directionality of the bill is difficult 
to determine due to divided Latino public on the issue and the potentially long and complicated nature 
of some other issue areas. For example, health care bills contain many provisions that cover a broad set 
of issues such as availability of services, funding, access, regulations about standards. For these reasons 
a selection of issues and a sample of members were analyzed rather than coding all issues for all 
members. 
24 The sample was generated using the “sample” command in Stata 10. A complete list of members 
included in the sample is provided in Table 3.1.  
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 given the special refugee status afforded to Cubans and the generally more 
conservative inclinations of Cubans.25The inclusion of the racial and ethnic categories
allows the model to ascertain the relationship between the number of substantive acts 
and the member’s race or ethnicity. The purpose is not merely to test white legislator 
behavior compared to Latino member behavior but also to determine if other minori
group legislators such as Asians or Blacks offer equal substantive representation to 
Latino members. This finding would provide ev
 
ty 
idence for racial coalitions and the 
creation
 
ositions 
 
 of Latino representation will test whether Latinos are equally served by 
Democ
ty 
 
                                                
 of mixed majority-minority districts.  
The models also include a variety of control variables. First, party is included
to assess whether Latino representatives are simply reflecting their party’s p
and partisan ideologies, or whether they are in fact acting differently from 
representatives who are their fellow party members. In the black representation 
literature some scholars such as Lublin (1997) argue that black constituents might be 
better off with democratic representatives because of greater ability to form coalitions
with other members and less concentration of black voters in one district. Analyzing 
party in terms
rats.   
Years in office is another important control because incumbency has a varie
of advantages including more resources, better committee assignments, and better 
relations with other members (Jacobson 2001). Members who feel more secure about 
re-election may be more likely to either deviate from the party position or the views of
 
25 For instance, unlike Mexican or other Latino immigrants, there is no such thing as an undocumented 
or illegal Cuban immigrant. The U.S. policy towards Cubans prior to the 1980s welcomed all Cubans as 
political refugees. In 1995, Congress amended the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and adopted the so-
called “Wet foot-dry-foot policy” which holds that Cubans who make it to dry land would be allowed to 
remain in the U.S. and be eligible for fast-tracked applications to permanent residency. Additionally 
Cubans tend to be more conservative and more often identify as Republicans than their other Latino 
counterparts. 
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 their constituents. Age is included because older members may be more conservative
than younger members. Conservative viewpoints are in the opposite direction of
Latino issues examined in this study. Moreover, while party can be a proxy for 
conservatism, there is a segment of the Democratic members that is conserva
 
 the 
tive. 
These d
 of 
cent 
 
le 
, 
ies, 
rols were coded using information 
from The Almanac of American Politics (2004). 
 
ifferences would not be captured with the inclusion of party alone.   
Gender is coded to examine potential differences in the frequency and type
actions between men and women. Women legislators have a higher propensity to 
introduce bills related to gender (Swers 2003) and may be more attentive to other 
minority groups within their district such as Latinos, given a shared experience of 
marginalization. The percentage of each district that is urban is relevant since re
immigrants are often geographically concentrated in urban areas and may lead 
members in these districts to be more attentive to Latino issues. Median income is
included because it may influence the member’s level of responsiveness to class 
concerns. Median income is a proxy for class and both the Congressional Black and 
Hispanic Caucuses openly state that they are committed to the representation of peop
in their respective minority groups but also the poor.  Lastly, I created a border state 
variable since there are large concentrations of immigrants and Latinos in these areas
they are sites of illegal entry which are directly affected by border security polic
and representatives from these areas may feel more pressure from their Latino 
constituency. The explanatory variables and cont
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 Table 3.1: List of Representatives Used in Sample (n = 72)
Representative District Name, State (District #)
Latinos (n = 22)
Pastor, Ed Phoenix, AZ (4th)
Grijalva, Raúl M. Tucson, AZ (7th)
Becerra, Xavier Los Angeles, CA (31st)
Solis, Hilda L. El Monte, CA (32d)
Roybal-Allard, Lucille Los Angeles, CA (34th)
Napolitano, Grace F. Norwalk, CA (38th)
Sánchez, Linda T. Lakewood, CA (39th)
Baca, Joe Rialto, CA (43d)
Sanchez, Loretta Santa Ana, CA (47th)
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana Miami, FL (18th)
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln Miami, FL (21st)
Diaz-Balart, Mario Miami, FL (25th)
Gutierrez, Luis V. Chicago, IL (4th)
Menendez, Robert Union City, NJ (13th)
Velázquez, Nydia M. Brooklyn, NY (12th)
Serrano, José E. Bronx, NY (16th)
Hinojosa, Rubén Mercedes, TX (15th)
Reyes, Silvestre El Paso, TX (16th)
Gonzalez, Charles A. San Antonio, TX (20th)
Bonilla, Henry San Antonio, TX (23d)
Ortiz, Solomon P. Corpus Christi, TX (27th)
Rodriquez, Ciro D. San Antonio, TX (28th)
Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (n = 25)
Kolbe, Jim Tucson, AZ (8th)
Calvert, Ken Corona, CA (44th)
Lofgren, Zoe San Jose, CA (16th)
Pelosi, Nancy San Francisco, CA (8th)
Dooley, Calvin M. Hanford, CA (20th)
Cardoza, Dennis A. Atwater, CA (18th)
Honda, Michael M. San Jose, CA (15th)
Tauscher, Ellen O. Alamo, CA (10th)
Lee, Barbara Oakland, CA (9th)
Bono, Mary Palm Springs, CA (45th)
DeGette, Diana Denver, CO (1st)
Musgrave, Marilyn N. Fort Morgan, CO (4th)
Meek, Kendrick B. Miami, FL (17th)
Keller, Ric Orlando, FL (8th)  
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 Table 3.1 (Continued)
Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15%
Lipinski, William O. Chicago, IL (3d)
Rothman, Steven R. Fairlawn, NJ (9th)
Berkley, Shelley Las Vegas, NV (1st)
Gibbons, Jim Reno, NV (2d)
Lowey, Nita M. Harrison, NY (18th)
Crowley, Joseph Queens/Bronx, NY (7th)
Rangel, Charles B. New York City, NY (15th)
Meeks, Gregory W. Queens, NY (6th)
Stenholm, Charles W. Abilene, TX (17th)
Sessions, Pete Dallas, TX (32d)
Thornberry, Mac Clarendon, TX (13th)
Non-Latinos without a significant Latino constituency (n = 25)
Shadegg, John B. Phoenix, AZ (3d)
Waxman, Henry A. Los Angeles, CA (30th)
DeLauro, Rosa L. New Haven, CT (3d)
Crenshaw, Ander Jacksonville, FL (4th)
Goss, Porter J. Sanibel, FL (14th)
Rush, Bobby L. Chicago, IL (1st)
Evans, Lane Rock Island, IL (17th)
Johnson, Timothy V. Urbana, IL (15th)
Pence, Mike Columbus, IN (6th)
Carson, Julia Indianapolis, IN (7th)
Lewis, Ron Cecilia, KY (2d)
Hoyer, Steny H. Mechanicsville, MD (5th)
Kildee, Dale E. Flint, MI (5th)
Gutknecht, Gil Rochester, MN (1st)
Andrews, Robert E. Haddon Heights, NJ (1st)
McCarthy, Carolyn Mineola, NY (4th)
Weiner, Anthony D. Brooklyn, NY (9th)
Quinn, Jack Hamburg, NY (27th)
Gillmor, Paul E. Old Fort, OH (5th)
Brown, Sherrod Lorain, OH (13th)
Cole, Tom Moore, OK (4th)
Hooley, Darlene West Linn, OR (5th)
Jenkins, William L. Rogersville, TN (1st)
Wamp, Zach Chattanooga, TN (3d)  
41 
 
 Empirical Results 
The statistical analysis utilizes OLS regression since the dependent variables 
are approximately interval level.26 For each of the three dependent variables for the 
four issues, I ran four separate models.  The baseline model includes all of the 
independent variables except those related to race and ethnicity. Model 2 incorporates 
all of the variables from Model 1 plus the racial and ethnic demographics of each 
district. Model 3 then includes all of the variables from Model 2 plus the race or 
ethnicity of the representative. Finally, Model 4 distinguishes between Cuban and 
other Latino representatives.  The purpose of the multi-model approach is to 
demonstrate how the effects of relevant variables changes when other factors are 
considered. The advantage of this model is to isolate the effects of certain variables 
and determine how the effects of those variables changes with the inclusion of other 
salient variables. In particular, this approach highlights the effect of a Latino 
representative on the amount of representation garnered.  I will now discuss the results 
for each of the representation measures and their corresponding models.27 
Immigration 
The first measure of representation presented in Table 3.2 below is the 
aggregate of roll call votes on immigration bills.   Recall that roll call votes have been 
the primary source of data for the study of congressional representation in general, and 
                                                 
26 The roll call dependent variable for immigration ranges from -5 to 7, the non-roll call measure ranges 
from -4 to 20 and the total representation measure ranges from -9 to 27. For education the roll call 
variable ranges from 3 to 9, the non-roll call measure ranges from 0 to 51, and the total representation 
measure ranges from 3 to 60. The roll call dependent variable for labor ranges from -1 to 1 and for 
social security ranges from 0 to 2. For non-call measures, the range for labor is from -3 to 20, and the 
range for social security is from 0 to 11.  
27 For the purposes of clarity, full disclosure of results and ease in referencing the statistical results, the 
full OLS tables with the complete model specification appear in text in the remainder of this Chapter 
and in Chapter 4. While presentation of abbreviated models with the most significant variables would 
likely provide a better visual aesthetic, some less salient variables are significant in a few of the models. 
Therefore, I elected to present the full results so that readers could easily ascertain the effect of each 
variable across the different issues and sessions. 
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 in studies of black and Latino representation.  The main finding of Model 1 is that, 
controlling for all other variables, a Democrat is associated with a 6.5 increase in the 
number of roll call votes in favor of immigration. Percent of the district that is urban is 
also statistically significant but has less overall substantive importance. For example, a 
ten point increase in the urban percentage of a district is associated with only about a 
0.6 increase in roll call votes. None of the other variables in Model 1 are significant. 
 In Model 2, which incorporates racial and ethnic demographics, party remains 
significant.  Both the percentage of Latinos and Blacks are significant and percent 
urban is less so. This finding might be accounted for in part by the fact that Latinos 
and Blacks tend to live in primarily urban areas. This provides some support for H2, 
though despite their significance the effects of the coefficients remains modest since a 
10 point increase in the percentage of Latinos or Blacks is associated with only around 
a 0.4 and 0.5 point increase in roll call votes respectively. In Model 3, the effect of the 
party variable remains strong but the coefficient declines slightly to 5.9. Latino 
constituency and Latino representative are positive but are not significant.  While 
Black constituency actually remains significant with a weak substantive effect, Black 
representative is not significant.  Finally, Model 4 finds that a Cuban representative 
results in a 3 point increase in total roll call votes in favor of immigration, however 
other Latinos representatives is not a significant variable.  In general, these results 
appear to call into question the validity of both H1, that Latino representatives will be 
more active than non Latinos, and H2, that members with larger Latino constituencies 
will be more active than those with smaller constituencies. The results run counter to 
the claim that descriptive representation matters. However, they rely on the limited, 
but commonly used, metric of roll call votes. The next two sets of models use a wider 
range of representative actions to investigate how the results may be affected. 
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 The specification of the models in Table 3.3 (see below) is the same as in 
Table 1 except for the different formulation of the dependent variable.  Member 
actions on non- roll call legislative activity such as bill introduction, bill co-
sponsorship, and house resolutions comprise the second dependent variable, which I 
will refer to as the representation score (R-score).  
In Model 1, presented in Table 3.3, party is again significant with a 5.6 
increase in actions if a member is a Democrat. The strength of urban percentage is 
slightly higher than in the previous set of models with 10 point increase in urban 
percentage being associated with a 1.3 increase in the R-score. In this case border state 
is positive and significant resulting in a 2.4 increase in the R-score. Party remains 
positive though the coefficient declines slightly in Model 2. The percentage of Latinos 
remains significant and a 10 point increase in percentage is associated with a 1.6 
increase in the member’s R-score. In Model 3, which incorporates the race or ethnicity 
of the representative, Latino constituency is no longer significant, however, whether a 
member is Latino becomes significant. A Latino representative is associated with a 6.5 
increase in the R-score. Model 4 demonstrates that not all Latino members act the 
same. Cubans are positive but not significant, whereas non-Cuban Latinos (primarily 
Latinos of Mexican and Puerto Rican descent) are associated with just over a 7 point 
increase in the R score. Party continues to be significant but the effect of the ethnicity 
of the representative turns out to be larger than party. Overall, the results of non-roll 
call legislative actions demonstrate that the ethnicity of the representative matters 
more for the representation of immigration issues than the relative racial and ethnic 
composition of the constituency, which provides support for H1 and H1b, while party 
remains a consistent factor. 
In Table 3.4 below, the dependent variable is a composite measure of total 
representation acts on immigration bills. While it is true that one can argue roll call 
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 votes and non-roll call actions are apples and oranges in terms of the motivations for 
engaging in those behaviors, it is still useful to examine an overall picture of member 
behavior. In other words, by combining the two sets of actions, the strength of the 
variables has a higher degree of clarity as well as the comprehensive picture of 
member behavior in the entire issue area.  
In Model 1 of this table, party is once again the dominant variable with a 12 
point increase in the R-score with Democrat members. Urban percentage and income 
are significant but with minimal substantive impacts. Border state is positive and 
associated with a 2.6 increase in the R-score, though it is just outside the standard 5% 
bounds of significance. Party remains significant in Model 2, but with a slightly 
weaker effect of a 10.7 increase in the R-score.  Latino constituency is significant but 
has little substantive impact with a 10 point increase in percentage associated with a .2 
increase in the member’s R-score. Model 3 shows that party is still strong and Latino 
constituency is no longer significant. Similar to Model 3 in Table 2, a Latino 
representative is associated with just under an 8 point increase in a member’s R-score. 
Model 4 demonstrates that party is significant and both Cuban and Non-Cuban Latinos 
are associated with just under an 8 point increase in R-score. Overall, the combination 
of both types of representation acts, demonstrates that party and the ethnicity of the 
representative matter in total representation on immigration related bills.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 6.503 6.052 5.902 6.380
(0.618)** (0.646)** (0.658)** (0.700)**
Years in Office 0.048 0.064 0.080 0.062
(0.042) (0.041) (0.043)+ (0.044)
Age -0.018 -0.021 -0.029 -0.019
(0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033)
Male -0.400 -0.535 -0.840 -0.810
(0.573) (0.570) (0.626) (0.615)
Urban % 0.059 0.016 0.023 0.018
(0.021)** (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Median Income -1.797e-05 2.159e-05 8.822e-06 -2.493e-06
(2.191e-05) (2.981e-05) (3.181e-05) (3.189e-05)
Border State 0.261 -0.012 0.260 0.724
(0.480) (0.582) (0.608) (0.652)
Latino % 0.036 0.012 0.007
(0.015)* (0.024) (0.024)
Black % 0.051 0.077 0.078
(0.023)* (0.037)* (0.037)*
Asian % 0.029 0.017 0.016
(0.048) (0.052) (0.051)
Latino Rep. 1.201
(1.081)
Black Rep. -1.192 -1.398
(1.525) (1.502)
Asian Rep. 2.219 1.883
(2.408) (2.372)
Latino 0.611
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.112)
Cuban Rep. 2.873
(1.421)*
Constant -4.366 -3.476 -2.828 -2.574
(2.743) (2.683) (2.832) (2.785)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.2: Analysis of Immigration Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 5.626 4.643 4.565 4.086
(1.459)** (1.343)** (1.281)** (1.390)**
Years in Office -0.184 -0.126 -0.054 -0.036
(0.099)+ (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Age 0.086 0.084 0.030 0.020
(0.076) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Male 1.276 1.486 1.137 1.107
(1.353) (1.183) (1.219) (1.222)
Urban % 0.131 -0.021 -0.005 0.000
(0.049)** (0.053) (0.050) (0.051)
Median Income -1.702e-04 -5.579e-06 -3.148e-06 8.218e-06
(5.172e-05)** (6.194e-05) (6.193e-05) (6.332e-05)
Border State 2.360 -0.623 -0.067 -0.533
(1.132)* (1.210) (1.184) (1.295)
Latino % 0.161 0.052 0.057
(0.031)** (0.047) (0.047)
Black % 0.070 0.021 0.020
(0.048) (0.073) (0.073)
Asian % 0.143 0.099 0.099
(0.099) (0.102) (0.102)
Latino Rep. 6.540
(2.104)**
Black Rep. 3.185 3.392
(2.969) (2.983)
Asian Rep. 5.344 5.682
(4.688) (4.711)
Latino 7.132
(non-Cuban) Rep. (2.209)**
Cuban Rep. 4.860
(2.821)+
Constant -7.896 -6.317 -3.799 -4.055
(6.475) (5.575) (5.512) (5.529)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.54 0.68 0.73 0.74
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.3: Analysis of Immigration Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 12.129 10.694 10.468 10.465
(1.809)** (1.683)** (1.620)** (1.770)**
Years in Office -0.136 -0.062 0.026 0.026
(0.122) (0.106) (0.106) (0.110)
Age 0.068 0.063 0.001 0.001
(0.094) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084)
Male 0.876 0.951 0.297 0.297
(1.678) (1.483) (1.541) (1.555)
Urban % 0.190 -0.005 0.019 0.019
(0.061)** (0.066) (0.064) (0.065)
Median Income -1.882e-04 1.601e-05 5.674e-06 5.725e-06
(6.414e-05)** (7.759e-05) (7.830e-05) (8.062e-05)
Border State 2.622 -0.635 0.193 0.191
(1.404)+ (1.515) (1.497) (1.649)
Latino % 0.197 0.064 0.064
(0.039)** (0.059) (0.060)
Black % 0.121 0.098 0.098
(0.061)+ (0.092) (0.093)
Asian % 0.172 0.116 0.116
(0.124) (0.129) (0.130)
Latino Rep. 7.740
(2.660)**
Black Rep. 1.993 1.994
(3.754) (3.798)
Asian Rep. 7.563 7.565
(5.927) (5.998)
Latino 7.743
(non-Cuban) Rep. (2.812)**
Cuban Rep. 7.733
(3.592)*
Constant -12.262 -9.793 -6.628 -6.629
(8.030) (6.984) (6.970) (7.040)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.69 0.78 0.82 0.82
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.4: Analysis of Combined ImmigrationLegislative Actions (108th)
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 Education 
The results for the analysis of education are similar to the above results, though 
there are a few important differences, as indicated in Table 3.5. In the first set of 
models regarding the aggregate roll call votes on education bills, party is again the 
primary significant variable.  However, across all four models, the effect of party is 
associated with around a 3.4 increase in the total votes in favor of education bills 
which is a much weaker effect than the immigration roll call models. In Model 3, with 
includes racial and ethnic demographics of the district and the race or ethnicity of the 
representative, a Latino representative has a small effect. It results in a 1.1 increase in 
the pro-education roll call votes, however, this coefficient is only significant at the 
10% level.  
 In Table 3.6 below, the dependent variable consists of member actions on non-
roll call activities. In Models 1 and 2, party remains a strong influence and being a 
Democrat is associated with over a 12 point increase in the total R-score. Similar to 
the immigration models for non-roll call activity, the influence of a Latino legislator is 
elucidated in Model 3. A Latino legislator is associated with over a 12 point increase 
in the total R-score and has an equally as strong effect as party. One key difference 
between the analysis of education and immigration is the effect of a black legislator. In 
the immigration models, the strength of this coefficient was weak and it was never 
significant. However, in Model 3 for education, a black legislator is associated with 
just over a 12 point increase in the total R-score at the 10% level. While this is outside 
the usual standard of 5% level of significance, the finding is nevertheless intriguing. In 
Model 4, which distinguishes between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, non-Cuban 
Latino representatives have a slightly stronger effect of a 13 point increase in the R-
score, whereas Cuban representatives have an effect of an 11.7 increase in the R-score.  
The strength and effect of a black representative remains constant at a 12.5 point 
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 increase at the 10% level of significance. Similar to the immigration findings, the 
results for the above two sets of models for education indicate that race or ethnicity of 
the representative matters more than racial demographics of the district and it matters 
most in non-roll call activity, which again provides support for H1 and H1b. 
 The last set of models concerns the third dependent variable which combines 
roll call and non-call activity for a total representation analysis of education, which are 
presented in Table 3.7. Party remains a strong factor and is associated with close to a 
16 point increase in the total R-score across all four models. In Model 2, a 10 point 
increase in the percentage of blacks in a district has a small effect resulting in a 1.9 
increase in the R-score, however this result is at the 10% significance level. In Model 
3, the effect of a Latino representative remains strong and is associated with a 13.7 
increase in the R-score. Similar to Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.5, in Models 3 and 4 in 
Table 3.6, a black representative is associated with a 13 point increase in the R-score 
but the significance level is at 10%. Lastly in Model 4, a non-Cuban Latino legislator 
results in a 14 point increase in the R-score and a Cuban legislator results in a 13 point 
increase with significance at the 10% level. The combined model demonstrates that 
party and Latino legislator are the most significant factors affecting the total 
representation for education.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 3.435 3.435 3.408 3.471
(0.372)** (0.404)** (0.395)** (0.432)**
Years in Office -0.028 -0.027 -0.035 -0.037
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Age 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.019
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Male -0.203 -0.338 -0.005 -0.002
(0.345) (0.356) (0.376) (0.379)
Urban % -0.007 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Median Income 1.899e-06 1.580e-05 2.721e-05 2.573e-05
(1.320e-05) (1.863e-05) (1.911e-05) (1.966e-05)
Border State -0.194 0.005 0.071 0.132
(0.289) (0.364) (0.365) (0.402)
Latino % 0.005 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Black % 0.017 0.009 0.009
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023)
Asian % -0.032 -0.003 -0.003
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
Latino Rep. 1.107
(0.649)+
Black Rep. 0.434 0.407
(0.916) (0.926)
Asian Rep. -3.240 -3.284
(1.447)* (1.462)*
Latino 1.030
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.686)
Cuban Rep. 1.326
(0.876)
Constant 5.063 5.198 4.084 4.118
(1.652)** (1.676)** (1.701)* (1.716)*
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.68 0.69 0.73 0.73
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.5: Analysis of Education Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 12.591 12.212 12.532 12.257
(2.784)** (2.991)** (2.899)** (3.168)**
Years in Office -0.201 -0.189 -0.092 -0.082
(0.188) (0.189) (0.190) (0.197)
Age 0.193 0.156 0.071 0.065
(0.145) (0.145) (0.148) (0.151)
Male 1.291 0.076 0.925 0.907
(2.582) (2.635) (2.759) (2.783)
Urban % 0.026 -0.038 -0.020 -0.017
(0.094) (0.118) (0.114) (0.116)
Median Income -3.030e-05 7.530e-05 1.463e-04 1.528e-04
(9.868e-05) (1.379e-04) (1.402e-04) (1.443e-04)
Border State -1.282 0.638 1.051 0.784
(2.160) (2.693) (2.680) (2.950)
Latino % 0.035 -0.161 -0.158
(0.070) (0.105) (0.107)
Black % 0.175 -0.046 -0.046
(0.108) (0.165) (0.166)
Asian % -0.222 -0.234 -0.234
(0.220) (0.230) (0.232)
Latino Rep. 12.667
(4.761)*
Black Rep. 12.470 12.589
(6.719)+ (6.796)+
Asian Rep. -0.986 -0.793
(10.610) (10.733)
Latino 13.007
(non-Cuban) Rep. (5.032)*
Cuban Rep. 11.703
(6.428)+
Constant -6.335 -4.528 -2.862 -3.009
(12.354) (12.412) (12.476) (12.597)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.36 0.40 0.48 0.49
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.6: Analysis of Education Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 16.026 15.647 15.940 15.727
(2.860)** (3.056)** (2.937)** (3.209)**
Years in Office -0.229 -0.216 -0.127 -0.119
(0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.199)
Age 0.208 0.167 0.089 0.084
(0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.153)
Male 1.088 -0.262 0.919 0.906
(2.653) (2.692) (2.795) (2.820)
Urban % 0.020 -0.051 -0.031 -0.029
(0.096) (0.120) (0.115) (0.117)
Median Income -2.840e-05 9.110e-05 1.735e-04 1.785e-04
(1.014e-04) (1.409e-04) (1.420e-04) (1.461e-04)
Border State -1.475 0.644 1.122 0.915
(2.220) (2.752) (2.714) (2.989)
Latino % 0.040 -0.174 -0.171
(0.072) (0.107) (0.108)
Black % 0.192 -0.037 -0.037
(0.110)+ (0.167) (0.168)
Asian % -0.254 -0.237 -0.237
(0.225) (0.233) (0.235)
Latino Rep. 13.774
(4.823)**
Black Rep. 12.904 12.996
(6.806)+ (6.885)+
Asian Rep. -4.226 -4.077
(10.748) (10.873)
Latino 14.037
(non-Cuban) Rep. (5.098)**
Cuban Rep. 13.029
(6.512)+
Constant -1.272 0.669 1.222 1.109
(12.694) (12.683) (12.638) (12.762)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.57
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.7: Analysis of Combined EducationLegislative Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 10.359 10.212 10.241 9.759
(1.422)** (1.571)** (1.529)** (1.663)**
Years in Office -0.048 -0.039 -0.007 0.011
(0.096) (0.099) (0.100) (0.103)
Age 0.050 0.047 0.021 0.012
(0.074) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079)
Male -0.464 -0.530 0.133 0.103
(1.319) (1.384) (1.455) (1.461)
Urban % 0.033 0.007 0.019 0.024
(0.048) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061)
Median Income -1.758e-05 1.535e-05 5.321e-05 6.465e-05
(5.041e-05) (7.243e-05) (7.392e-05) (7.573e-05)
Border State -0.672 -0.951 -0.604 -1.073
(1.104) (1.414) (1.413) (1.549)
Latino % 0.026 -0.081 -0.076
(0.037) (0.056) (0.056)
Black % 0.023 -0.063 -0.064
(0.057) (0.087) (0.087)
Asian % -0.001 0.029 0.030
(0.116) (0.121) (0.122)
Latino Rep. 6.777
(2.511)**
Black Rep. 4.896 5.104
(3.544) (3.568)
Asian Rep. -3.977 -3.637
(5.596) (5.635)
Latino 7.374
(non-Cuban) Rep. (2.642)**
Cuban Rep. 5.086
(3.375)
Constant -3.991 -3.657 -4.303 -4.561
(6.312) (6.519) (6.580) (6.613)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.67
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.8: Analysis of Labor Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 2.698 3.065 3.139 2.604
(0.774)** (0.844)** (0.867)** (0.930)**
Years in Office 0.062 0.054 0.036 0.056
(0.052) (0.053) (0.057) (0.058)
Age 0.009 0.011 0.024 0.013
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
Male 0.051 0.216 0.665 0.631
(0.717) (0.743) (0.825) (0.817)
Urban % 0.027 0.045 0.042 0.047
(0.026) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Median Income 1.491e-05 7.199e-06 2.337e-05 3.605e-05
(2.742e-05) (3.890e-05) (4.191e-05) (4.234e-05)
Border State -0.642 -0.884 -1.025 -1.544
(0.600) (0.760) (0.801) (0.866)+
Latino % -0.008 -0.001 0.004
(0.020) (0.032) (0.031)
Black % -0.044 -0.063 -0.064
(0.030) (0.049) (0.049)
Asian % -0.019 0.012 0.012
(0.062) (0.069) (0.068)
Latino Rep. -0.194
(1.424)
Black Rep. 0.904 1.135
(2.009) (1.994)
Asian Rep. -4.008 -3.631
(3.173) (3.150)
Latino 0.467
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.477)
Cuban Rep. -2.068
(1.886)
Constant -1.341 -2.089 -3.427 -3.712
(3.433) (3.501) (3.731) (3.697)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.41
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.9: Analysis of Social Security Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)
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 Labor 
Labor exhibits similar results to the previous two issue areas. In the previous 
two issue areas there was a sizable number of roll call votes to justify a model that 
focused on roll call votes. However, in both labor and social security the number of 
roll call votes was very small.28 Consequently, my discussion of each of these two 
issue areas will focus on the non roll call models since the roll call only models and 
the total representation model offer limited additional explanatory value due the small 
number of roll call votes. The dependent variable in the labor non- roll call model 
consisted of bill co-sponsorship and bill introductions. As in the previous two issue 
areas, I use four separate models which incorporate different racial and ethnic based 
variables in addition to my distinction between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, which 
are presented in Table 3.8 above.  
 In Model 1 for labor, which includes all variables except those pertaining to 
race and ethnicity, being Democrat is once again the single most significant variable 
and results in a 10.35 increase in the R-Score. In Model 2, which included the racial 
and ethnic demographics of the district, party maintains a similar effect and is the sole 
variable of influence.  In Model 3, which incorporates the race or ethnicity of the 
representative, a Latino representative results in a 6.77 increase in the R-score and is 
significant at the 1% level. Model, 4, which distinguishes between non-Cuban Latinos 
and Cubans, non-Cuban Latino results in a 7.37 increase in the R-score. Cuban Latino 
is not significant whereas, party is significant results in a 9.75 increase in the R-Score.  
                                                 
28 For labor there was one roll call vote and social security there was two roll call votes. Despite the 
small population of votes, I still ran a roll call only model for each issue area. For labor since there is 
only one observation, I also ran a logit model and did not observe a change in the results. Party was the 
only significant variable. The results are available by request. In addition, I ran a combined model of 
roll call and non roll call behavior for both labor and social security.  The findings in the total models 
have roughly the same findings as the non-roll call models, which can be attributed in part to the limited 
influence of the addition of roll call votes to the models.  See Tables 3.8 and 3.9 for the non-roll call 
models. 
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 Social Security 
Social security policies were analyzed in this study as a non-salient issue 
where it is expected that Latino members would not act differently than non-Latino 
members. In theory, Latino members should be most responsive to issues that are of 
greatest importance to their Latino constituencies. The statistical analysis confirms 
hypothesis H3, where across all four models, Latino representative or Latino 
percentage in the district are not significant (see Table 3.9 above). For social security, 
there is no substantive difference in the representation afforded by a Latino 
representative compared to a non-Latino. In the non-roll call model, where most of the 
legislative activity in this area occurred, once again party remains a solid predictor 
with an average of a 3 point increase to the total R-score. None of the other variables 
are statistically significant. The importance of the non-findings for Latino 
representative confirms the strength of my argument that Latino legislators act 
distinctly differently from non-Latinos with respect to issues of importance to the 
Latino community, but not necessarily across all issues.  If Latinos simply acted the 
same as non-Latinos of the same party, then party ideology is the determining factor. 
On the other hand, if Latinos consistently act in a different manner than non-Latinos of 
the same party, then we might attribute this to an ideology rooted in their unique 
ethnic background. However, neither of these two extremes appears to be the case. 
Latinos only sometimes deviate from their party. The findings here suggest Latino 
members are more likely to part ways with their colleagues on issues of high salience 
to their constituents rather than low salience issues.  
Discussion 
The results from the above tables present two main findings. First, relying 
solely on roll call votes provides a very limited view of member actions and a 
restricted perspective on the nature of representation as theorized in hypotheses H1b and 
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 H2b . According to the roll call models, the only consistently important factor was 
party. However, when I expanded my examination of representation to include other 
forms of legislative activity, such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house 
resolutions, another important variable was illuminated. While the effect of party 
remained strong, the ethnicity of the representative is critical in determining the total 
R-score for a representative across education, labor and immigration bills. The 
excessive reliance on roll call votes and NOMINATE scores29 results in a very limited 
view of congressional participation. For example, in my examination of the record, on 
average 10,000 bills are introduced per session, 1,000 will come to the floor for a vote, 
and at most 500 bills will pass, many of which are appropriations bills and not 
substantive policy changes. The results of the analysis strongly suggest that an 
examination of congressional representation must include other forms of legislative 
participation.  
Furthermore, while the racial composition of the district is certainly relevant, 
the ethnicity of the representative appears to be a more important factor in the degree 
of pro-immigration, education, and labor actions, which provides strong support for 
H1.  A commonly held assumption in the literature on race and representation is that 
members will become more responsive to minority groups as the size of those 
minority groups grow, independent of the racial or ethnic background of the 
representative. However, the findings of this investigation dispute that assumption and 
in fact find that non-Latino members do not become significantly more responsive to 
their Latino constituency as the proportion of Latinos in their districts grows. 
Maximum substantive representation for Latinos is achieved by having Latino 
members of Congress. Furthermore, the non-finding of the significance of Latino 
                                                 
29  See (Poole and Rosenthal 1996) for more detailed information on the composition of NOMINATE 
scores based on roll call votes.   
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 representative in the area of social security provides additional strength to the 
argument that Latino representatives are not simply more active in all areas, but rather 
more active with regards to salient issues among the Latino community.  
2nd Sample from the 108th Session 
 One of the potential criticisms of this data set is the use of a particular sample 
of representatives rather than the entire population. To alleviate concerns regarding the 
sample, I conducted an additional analysis for the 108th session with all Latino 
members, and another random sample of 25 members from districts with at least 15% 
Latinos and 25 members with districts less than 15% Latinos. .  Recall that in group 
two, members with at least 15% Latinos, there were a total of 92 members. With the 
second sample, I have now covered the behavior of more than half of the people in this 
group. I treated the second sample as a replication and used the exact same statistical 
models. The list of members in the second sample is listed below in Table 3.10. 
The quantitative results corroborate the results from the analysis presented 
earlier in this chapter. Across all roll call models, being a Democrat is the only 
significant variable. The roll call models for immigration and education are listed 
below in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. In the non-roll call model of labor and immigration 
policies, Latino Representative is significant and results in a considerable change in 
the total representation score, 7.5 and 5.8 respectively. However, in the non-roll call 
models for education, Latino representative has a co-efficient of 8.2 but falls just 
outside the ten percent significance level. This is the only slight deviation from the 
results from the original 108th sample. Social Security remains constant across the two 
samples and is only affected by party. These findings provide additional support for 
my argument that Latinos are only more active in high salience issue areas to the 
Latino community. 
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 Table 3.10 List of Representatives Used in  2nd 108th Sample
Representative District Name, State (Distr
Latinos (n = 22)
Pastor, Ed Phoenix, AZ (4th)
Grijalva, Raúl M. Tucson, AZ (7th)
Becerra, Xavier Los Angeles, CA (31st)
Solis, Hilda L. El Monte, CA (32d)
Roybal-Allard, Lucille Los Angeles, CA (34th)
Napolitano, Grace F. Norwalk, CA (38th)
Sánchez, Linda T. Lakewood, CA (39th)
Baca, Joe Rialto, CA (43d)
Sanchez, Loretta Santa Ana, CA (47th)
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana Miami, FL (18th)
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln Miami, FL (21st)
Diaz-Balart, Mario Miami, FL (25th)
Gutierrez, Luis V. Chicago, IL (4th)
Menendez, Robert Union City, NJ (13th)
Velázquez, Nydia M. Brooklyn, NY (12th)
Serrano, José E. Bronx, NY (16th)
Hinojosa, Rubén Mercedes, TX (15th)
Reyes, Silvestre El Paso, TX (16th)
Gonzalez, Charles A. San Antonio, TX (20th)
Bonilla, Henry San Antonio, TX (23d)
Ortiz, Solomon P. Corpus Christi, TX (27th)
Rodriquez, Ciro D. San Antonio, TX (28th)
Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (n = 25)
Capps, Lois Santa Barbara,CA (23rd)
Capuano, Michael E. Somerville, MA (8th)
Combest, Larry and Randy Lubbock, TX (19th)
Culberson, John Abney Houston, TX (7th)
DeLay, Tom Sugarland, TX (22nd)
Emanuel, Rahm Chicago, IL (5th)
Flake, Jeff Mesa, AZ (6th)
Frost, Martin Dallas/FW, TX (24th)
Gallegly, Elton Thousand Oaks,CA (24th)
Harman, Jane El Segundo, CA (36th)
Issa, Darrell E. Temecula, CA (49th)
Jackson-Lee, Sheila Houston, TX (18th)
Lantos, Tom San Mateo,CA (12th)
McKeon, Howard P. "Buck Santa Clarita, CA (25th)  
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 Table 3.10 (Continued)
Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (continue
Millender-McDonald, JuaniLong Beach,CA (37th)
Miller, Gary G. Brea, CA (42nd)
Miller, George Richmond, CA (7th)
Pascrell, Bill, Jr. Paterson, NJ (8th)
Payne, Donald M. Newark, NJ (10th)
Pearce, Stevan Las Cruces, NM (2nd)
Renzi, Rick Flagstaff, AZ (1st)
Schiff, Adam B. Pasadena, CA (29th)
Stark, Fortney Pete Fremont, CA (13th)
Towns, Edolphus Brooklyn, NY (10th)
Udall, Tom Santa Fe, NM (3rd)
Non-Latinos without a significant Latino constituency (n = 25)
Bachus, Spencer Birmingham, AL
Boehlert, Sherwood Utica, NY (24th)
Burton, Dan Indianapolis,IN (5th)
Case, Ed Honolulu, HI (2nd)
Crane, Philip M. Schaumburg,  IL (8th)
DeMint, Jim Greenville,SC (4th)
Doolittle, John T. Granite Bay, CA (4th)
Duncan, John J., Jr. Knoxville, TN (2nd)
Etheridge, Bob Raleigh, NC (2nd)
Forbes, J. Randy Chesapeake, VA (4th)
Franks, Trent Glendale, AZ (2nd)
Hart, Melissa A. Pittsburgh, PA (4th)
Kanjorski, Paul E. Wilkes-Barre, PA (11th)
Langevin, James R. Warwick,RI (2nd)
Markey, Edward J. Framingham, MA (7th)
Neal, Richard E. Springfield, MA (2nd)
Northup, Anne M. Louiseville, KY (3rd)
Peterson, Collin C. Red Lake Falls, MN (7th)
Pitts, Joseph R. Lancaster, PA (16th)
Putnam, Adam H. Bartow, FL (12th)
Ryan, Timothy J. Youngstown, OH (17th)
Shays, Christopher Stamford, CT (4th)
Simpson, Michael K. Boise, ID (2nd)
Visclosky, Peter J. Gary, IN (1st)  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 7.321** 7.308** 7.319** 7.964**
(0.538) (0.599) (0.625) (0.624)
Years in Office -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 -0.018
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
Age 0.029 0.033 0.031 0.046+
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Male -1.122+ -1.090 -1.207+ -1.283+
(0.654) (0.666) (0.709) (0.666)
Urban % 0.051** 0.040 0.039 0.037
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Median Income -7.067e-05** -5.401e-05 -5.751e-05 -7.165e-05+
(2.484e-05) (3.815e-05) (3.944e-05) (3.729e-05)
Border State -0.340 -0.806 -0.924 0.050
(0.491) (0.583) (0.700) (0.733)
Latino % 0.018 0.032 0.007
(0.017) (0.032) (0.031)
Black % -0.014 -0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.035) (0.033)
Asian % 0.003 0.005 -0.003
(0.047) (0.048) (0.045)
Latino Rep. -0.807
(1.467)
Black Rep. -0.960 -1.400
(1.750) (1.648)
Asian Rep. -0.103 -0.105
(2.125) (1.993)
Latino -0.913
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.377)
Cuban Rep. 2.907
(1.854)
Constant -3.374+ -3.541 -3.362 -3.447
(2.018) (2.156) (2.239) (2.100)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.842 0.848 0.850 0.870
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.11: Analysis of Immigration Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 3.533** 3.572** 3.664** 3.648**
(0.370) (0.387) (0.397) (0.427)
Years in Office -0.000 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Age 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Male 0.009 -0.004 -0.076 -0.074
(0.450) (0.431) (0.451) (0.455)
Urban % -0.012 -0.039* -0.038* -0.038*
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Median Income 2.495e-05 7.601e-05** 7.770e-05** 7.805e-05**
(1.709e-05) (2.468e-05) (2.506e-05) (2.548e-05)
Border State 0.109 -0.405 -0.162 -0.186
(0.337) (0.377) (0.445) (0.501)
Latino % 0.035** 0.019 0.019
(0.011) (0.020) (0.021)
Black % 0.014 0.028 0.028
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
Asian % -0.012 -0.016 -0.016
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Latino Rep. 0.746
(0.933)
Black Rep. -0.945 -0.935
(1.112) (1.126)
Asian Rep. -1.046 -1.046
(1.350) (1.362)
Latino 0.749
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.941)
Cuban Rep. 0.655
(1.267)
Constant 4.357** 3.942** 3.648* 3.650*
(1.388) (1.395) (1.423) (1.435)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.624 0.681 0.695 0.695
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.12: Analysis of Education Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 4.349** 4.242** 4.186** 3.947**
(1.091) (1.061) (1.060) (1.136)
Years in Office 0.030 0.020 -0.007 -0.004
(0.073) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Age -0.021 -0.034 -0.015 -0.020
(0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
Male 0.319 0.378 0.771 0.799
(1.326) (1.180) (1.204) (1.211)
Urban % 0.175** 0.061 0.066 0.067
(0.037) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Median Income -2.726e-04** -8.343e-05 -6.629e-05 -6.106e-05
(5.035e-05) (6.760e-05) (6.692e-05) (6.783e-05)
Border State 2.509* 0.398 1.621 1.260
(0.994) (1.034) (1.187) (1.333)
Latino % 0.138** 0.035 0.044
(0.030) (0.054) (0.057)
Black % 0.065 0.043 0.043
(0.044) (0.060) (0.060)
Asian % 0.001 -0.012 -0.009
(0.083) (0.082) (0.083)
Latino Rep. 5.754*
(2.490)
Black Rep. 2.877 3.039
(2.970) (2.998)
Asian Rep. 1.663 1.664
(3.605) (3.625)
Latino 5.793*
(non-Cuban) Rep. (2.504)
Cuban Rep. 4.380
(3.373)
Constant -2.517 -3.406 -4.684 -4.653
(4.090) (3.820) (3.799) (3.820)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.662 0.752 0.775 0.776
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table3.13: Analysis of Immigration Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second 
Sample)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 9.944** 9.760** 9.564** 9.461**
(2.239) (2.462) (2.511) (2.699)
Years in Office -0.109 -0.127 -0.170 -0.168
(0.151) (0.150) (0.154) (0.156)
Age 0.090 0.046 0.068 0.065
(0.106) (0.108) (0.110) (0.113)
Male 2.617 2.552 3.724 3.736
(2.721) (2.739) (2.851) (2.878)
Urban % 0.117 0.003 0.009 0.009
(0.077) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100)
Median Income -2.311e-04* -4.026e-05 -6.557e-06 -4.290e-06
(1.034e-04) (1.569e-04) (1.585e-04) (1.612e-04)
Border State 1.258 0.742 1.984 1.828
(2.041) (2.400) (2.812) (3.167)
Latino % 0.105 -0.035 -0.031
(0.069) (0.129) (0.135)
Black % 0.191+ 0.080 0.080
(0.103) (0.142) (0.144)
Asian % -0.003 -0.018 -0.017
(0.193) (0.194) (0.196)
Latino Rep. 8.232
(5.897)
Black Rep. 9.807 9.877
(7.033) (7.122)
Asian Rep. 2.596 2.596
(8.539) (8.612)
Latino 8.249
(non-Cuban) Rep. (5.950)
Cuban Rep. 7.637
(8.013)
Constant -3.593 -3.710 -5.406 -5.392
(8.397) (8.869) (8.997) (9.075)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.432 0.467 0.496 0.496
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.14: Analysis of Education Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 7.762** 7.604** 7.608** 7.306**
(1.064) (1.130) (1.078) (1.153)
Years in Office 0.036 0.032 0.003 0.007
(0.072) (0.069) (0.066) (0.067)
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.030 0.023
(0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048)
Male 0.187 0.298 0.148 0.183
(1.293) (1.257) (1.225) (1.230)
Urban % 0.068+ 0.001 0.009 0.011
(0.036) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043)
Median Income -7.815e-05 2.246e-05 3.412e-05 4.074e-05
(4.910e-05) (7.200e-05) (6.807e-05) (6.888e-05)
Border State 1.405 -0.206 1.978 1.522
(0.969) (1.101) (1.208) (1.354)
Latino % 0.086** -0.057 -0.045
(0.032) (0.055) (0.058)
Black % 0.009 0.069 0.069
(0.047) (0.061) (0.061)
Asian % 0.022 0.005 0.009
(0.088) (0.083) (0.084)
Latino Rep. 7.589**
(2.533)
Black Rep. -2.366 -2.160
(3.021) (3.044)
Asian Rep. 2.738 2.739
(3.668) (3.681)
Latino 7.639**
(non-Cuban) Rep. (2.543)
Cuban Rep. 5.851+
(3.425)
Constant -3.847 -4.201 -5.969 -5.929
(3.988) (4.069) (3.864) (3.879)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.618 0.666 0.723 0.726
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.15: Analysis of Labor Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 2.835** 3.051** 3.179** 3.136**
(0.670) (0.735) (0.754) (0.811)
Years in Office 0.119* 0.115* 0.118* 0.119*
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
Age -0.006 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Male -0.159 -0.309 -0.614 -0.609
(0.815) (0.817) (0.857) (0.865)
Urban % 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.021
(0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Median Income -6.655e-05* -4.992e-05 -5.495e-05 -5.399e-05
(3.094e-05) (4.683e-05) (4.763e-05) (4.842e-05)
Border State 0.277 0.940 0.941 0.875
(0.611) (0.716) (0.845) (0.952)
Latino % -0.011 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.039) (0.040)
Black % 0.044 0.080+ 0.080+
(0.031) (0.043) (0.043)
Asian % -0.046 -0.047 -0.047
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
Latino Rep. -0.876
(1.772)
Black Rep. -2.894 -2.864
(2.114) (2.140)
Asian Rep. -1.519 -1.518
(2.566) (2.588)
Latino -0.869
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.788)
Cuban Rep. -1.127
(2.408)
Constant 2.613 2.183 2.226 2.231
(2.514) (2.647) (2.704) (2.727)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.430 0.469 0.490 0.491
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3.16: Analysis of Social Security Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second 
Sample)
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 Conclusions 
 The results of the models have implications for future work in this area and the 
relevant literature. First, the justification for examining representation beyond roll call 
voting is bolstered by the results of this study. Analysis based solely on roll call votes 
obscured the finding that it matters if a representative was Latino. This substantive 
finding is important given that the current race and representation literature fails to 
offer a clear answer to whether Latino members afford a higher amount of substantive 
representation. Moreover, the difference in the effect of a black legislator in education 
policy compared to immigration or labor polices is interesting. While it is not 
surprising that black members of Congress would consistently act in favor of pro-
education bills given the salience of the issue in the black community, the effect of a 
black member is comparable to the effect of Latino legislators. While the findings 
indicate that race matters on immigration, labor and education bills, I am cautious to 
conclude that it will be salient across all other issue areas given the social security 
findings. Thus, an examination of additional issues is critical for the explanatory 
power of future research in this area.   
Additionally, this examination of the legislative record indicates that a 
considerable amount of member action is spent on non-roll call legislative activity. 
This study has utilized the most easily quantifiable measures of such activity, but other 
potentially important forms of action are less amenable to quantification. For example, 
debate on the House floor, meetings of small groups of members, policy statements, 
and memos between members are all rich sources of representational acts. A mixed-
methods approach allows for a fuller investigation of the issues and different types of 
representative acts across members of Congress. Chapter 5 of this dissertation aims to 
address this issue with a qualitative examination of the legislative record, case studies 
of representatives and analysis of interviews with staff of members of Congress. 
68 
 
  
CHAPTER FOUR 
A ONE SESSION PHENOMENON? EXAMINING THE 109th and 110th SESSIONS  
Introduction 
 Drawing on the analysis of the previous chapter on Latino representation in the 
108th Session of the U.S. House of Representatives, this analysis seeks to provide 
robustness checks to the quantitative findings. In the last chapter, I argued that Latino 
representatives are significantly more active in areas of high salience to the Latino 
community than their non-Latino counterparts, even controlling for the racial and 
ethnic demographics of the district. I also argued that this distinction in behavior was 
best elucidated when examining non-roll call behavior. Whereas party, being a 
Democrat, was the only predictor of behavior in the roll call models across all issues, 
whether a member was Latino became a significant and important variable in 
predicting the member’s total representation score in the non-roll call models.    
In the congressional literature, findings can sometimes be called a ‘one session 
phenomenon’ because the results do not seem to hold across additional sessions. This 
can happen due to the changing composition of the legislative body and the policy and 
political atmospheres. Therefore, in this chapter I present my analysis of the 109th and 
110th sessions across the four policy areas of immigration, education, labor and social 
security. The purpose of this investigation is not only to determine more conclusively 
if Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation but also if the ways in 
which they are more active differ over sessions. Also central to this extension is 
whether the other members in the sample become more responsive across the issue 
areas examined due to external motivating factors such as the current economic 
climate.  In other words, do Democrats become more active and representative over 
time and thus reduce the need for Latino constituents to have Latino legislators? 
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 Finally, the additional analyses are important for my argument regarding the need to 
distinguish between roll call and non-roll call behavior.  To augment the statistical 
analysis and provide a deeper explanation for some of the divergent findings, I also 
draw upon interviews that I conducted with the staff members of Latino members of 
Congress in Chapter Five.  
Theory & Research Design 
 The hypotheses, models and data collection in this chapter are identical to 
those presented in the previous chapter.30 I will briefly review them here for the 
purposes of clarity of the latter presentation of the findings and discussion of the 
results.  The hypotheses examined for the 109th and 110th sessions are as follows. 
 
H1 Latino Representatives will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-
education, and pro-labor legislation than Non-Latino Representatives. 
H1b The difference in representation acts between Latino and non-
Latino members will be most evident in non-roll call legislative action.  
 
H2 Representatives with larger Latino constituencies will act more often to 
achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than 
representatives with smaller Latino constituencies, irrespective of the race or 
ethnicity of the representative.  
H2b The effect of Latino percentage on member actions will be greatest 
on non-roll call legislative actions.  
  
H3 There will be no substantive difference between Latino and non-Latino  
Representatives’ actions in the area of social security, given its limited salience 
to the Latino community. 
 
In the additional sessions, I utilized the same sample of 72 members that was 
used for the primary analysis of the 108th session. In instances where the member left 
Congress for any reason such as death, loss of election or retirement, I substituted the 
                                                 
30 For a longer discussion of the details on the collection of data and coding, please refer to Chapter 3 
pages 33-38.  
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 subsequent member for that district. 31 I elected to continue with the original sample 
and use substitutions, in order to provide consistency in the analyses by keeping as 
many variables as possible, such as district demographics, constant over time. By 
tracking the same districts over time, the findings are even stronger than if I had 
selected a new random sample for each additional session. By the 110th session there 
were also three additional new Latino members who won seats in the House of the 
Representatives. Albio Sires was nominated to replace Robert Menendez, who took 
over one of the New Jersey Senator positions when John Corzine became governor. 
John Salazar was elected in New Mexico. Finally, in a complicated case of 
redistricting in several Texas districts, Ciro Rodriguez lost his seat to Henry Cuellar.32  
 The data was collected from the Library of Congress website, THOMAS, 
which houses the entire legislative record.  Member behavior on roll call votes, bill 
introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions were included in the data set. 
The four issue areas examined are immigration, education, labor and social security. 
As you may recall from the previous chapter, I selected three high salience issue and 
one low salience issues for the analysis. The first three policies are high salience issues 
to the Latino community where I argue members should be the most active if they 
have sizeable Latino populations within their constituency and/or the member is 
Latino. The fourth area, social security, is a low salience issue that was included as a 
                                                 
31 In the 109th session there were six substitutions. The members who left from the 108th sample were 
Calvin Dooley, William Lipinski, Ciro Rodriguez, Porter Goss, Jack Quinn, and Charles Stenholm. The 
new members were Jim Costa, Daniel Lipinksi, Henry Cuellar, Connie Mack, Brian Higgins, and Chet 
Edwards. In the 110th session there were seven substitutions. The members who left from the 109th 
sample were Lane Evans, Jim Gibbons, Gil Gutcknecht, William Jenkins,  Kim Kolbe, Robert 
Menendez and Henry Bonilla. The new members were Phil Hare, Dean Heller, Gabrielle Giffords, Tim 
Walz, David Davis, Ciro Rodriguez, and Albio Sires.  
32 However, Ciro Rodriguez became a House member again in the 110th session when he ran against 
incumbent, Henry Bonilla, and beat him. All of these districts overlap in the San Antonio area. This 
case and variation among these Latino representatives is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, where 
I examine pairs of members.  
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 control. Its inclusion in the previous analyses allowed me to offer a rebuttal to the 
argument that Latino representatives are either more active overall compared to other 
members, or more liberal. In my analysis of the 108th session, I found that there was 
no difference between Latino and non-Latino members on social security bills, thus 
providing strength to my argument that Latino representatives are only more active in 
policy areas of high salience to the Latino community.    
Empirical Results 
The statistical analysis utilized OLS regression since the dependent variables 
are approximately interval level and it was the method used in my analysis of the 108th 
session. I ran several sets of models to tease out the differences between roll call and 
non-roll call behavior. Additionally, the models were multi-staged and incorporated 
different sets of independent variables to distinguish between their effects.  The 
standard set of independent variables in every model  included party, age of member, 
years in office,  gender, urban percentage, median income, and whether the district 
was in a border state.33 The racial and ethnic related explanatory variables include the 
percentage of the district that is Latino, black or Asian and the race or ethnicity of a 
member. Model 1 refers to the models where only independent variables that are not 
related to any racial or ethnic demographics are included. In Model 2, I included the 
district demographics that included the racial and ethnic breakdown for the district. 
Model 3 comprises all of the above variables in addition to the race or ethnicity of the 
member. Finally, in Model 4 there is a distinction between non-Cuban Latino and 
Cubans in case the conservative bias of Cuban Latinos is skewing the results of the 
Latino representative variable in model 3.  I will now proceed to present the findings 
from the 109th and 110th Sessions. 
                                                 
33 For a longer discussion of the logic behind the inclusion of each explanatory variable, please refer to 
Chapter 3 pages 37-39.  
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 109th Session 
 The 109th session of the U.S. House of Representatives took place from 
January 3, 2005 to January 3, 2007. The House was Republican controlled and termed 
the “Do-Nothing” Congress and the “Lamest of the Lame Duck” sessions by the 
media and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) due to the lack of real progress 
in any of the major policy areas.34 Congress was only in session for 242 days which is 
the smallest amount of time since World War II, where the 80th session, 1947-1949 
met for 256 days.  The result of this inaction and limited time in session was observed 
in the data of this analysis since there was a significant drop in the number of bills in 
every policy area.  
 Across the four policy areas the roll call analysis for the 109th session was 
much more limited than in the 108th session. For both labor and social security, no 
actual floor votes took place in these areas. While a small number of votes was 
observed in the 108th session, a reduction to zero indicates that these issues were 
extremely low priority to the members at the time. The roll call models in Table 4.1 on 
immigration bills confirmed the findings of the previous sessions, where party was a 
dominant explanatory factor. Party was associated with 2 point increase in the number 
of times a member voted in favor of on immigration related bills.  In contrast to the 
108th session results, party was not a significant variable in explaining the outcomes 
on education roll call votes. However, this statistical result can be largely explained by 
the small number of votes, four, and the limited range of variation of actions on those 
four bills.  The relative amount of agreement and consensus on the bills was much 
higher than in the previous analysis. The majority of members voted in favor of the 
                                                 
34 Washington Post 12/3/06. 
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 bills, thus limiting the degree to which party could be a significant explanatory 
variable. 
Latino representative also has an effect with a 1.7 increase in votes in favor of 
immigration. This finding was not observed in the 108th session. While the co-
efficients of 2 and 1.7 seem small, they are actually significant given the range of 
votes. In this session only three roll call votes pertaining to immigration policies 
occurred which is in contrast to the seven that took place in the 108th session.  Similar 
to the immigration roll call models, Latino representative is associated with a 1.5 
increase in votes in favor of education and is significant at the 1% level in Table 4.2 
above. The Latino representative finding across immigration and education roll call 
models, gives some support for the argument that even in roll call behavior, Latino 
constituents are better represented by Latino members of Congress than their non-
Latino counterparts. 
The non-roll call models of the 109th session have some similarities but also 
several interesting differences with the data from the 108th session. For immigration 
policy, party remains significant across all four models in Table 4.3 below, and is 
associated with a 4.3-4.4 increase in non-roll call actions in favor of immigration. This 
finding is not surprising given the Democratic Party’s liberal platform on immigration 
compared to the conservative position of the Republican Party.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 2.282** 1.893** 1.820** 1.867**
(0.510) (0.473) (0.470) (0.519)
Years in Office 0.046 0.056+ 0.068* 0.067*
(0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Age 0.041 0.034 0.022 0.023
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Male -0.355 -0.271 -0.301 -0.302
(0.488) (0.447) (0.478) (0.482)
Urban % 0.077** 0.022 0.030 0.029
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Median Income -3.478e-05+ 9.024e-06 1.032e-05 9.375e-06
(1.898e-05) (2.372e-05) (2.453e-05) (2.509e-05)
Border State 0.071 -0.727 -0.586 -0.540
(0.415) (0.460) (0.467) (0.514)
Latino % 0.048** 0.020 0.020
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
Black % 0.043* 0.023 0.023
(0.018) (0.028) (0.028)
Asian % 0.078* 0.067+ 0.067
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
Latino Rep. 1.662*
(0.768)
Black Rep. 1.259 1.248
(1.148) (1.158)
Asian Rep. 1.239 1.215
(1.880) (1.899)
Latino 1.614*
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.804)
Cuban Rep. 1.836
(1.104)
Constant -8.818** -7.283** -7.065** -7.011**
(2.409) (2.202) (2.298) (2.330)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.637 0.728 0.753 0.754
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.1: Analysis of Immigration-Related Roll Call Actions (109th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 0.410 0.398 0.261 0.101
(0.279) (0.287) (0.265) (0.288)
Years in Office 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.007
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Age 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Male 0.018 0.049 0.272 0.277
(0.267) (0.271) (0.269) (0.267)
Urban % 0.000 -0.013 -0.004 -0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Median Income -2.155e-05* -2.486e-06 3.839e-06 7.040e-06
(1.039e-05) (1.437e-05) (1.382e-05) (1.392e-05)
Border State -0.326 -0.632* -0.484+ -0.640*
(0.227) (0.279) (0.263) (0.285)
Latino % 0.016* -0.011 -0.009
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Black % 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Asian % 0.003 0.023 0.023
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Latino Rep. 1.568**
(0.433)
Black Rep. 0.408 0.446
(0.646) (0.642)
Asian Rep. -1.986+ -1.903+
(1.059) (1.053)
Latino 1.732**
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.446)
Cuban Rep. 0.975
(0.612)
Constant 1.938 2.013 0.814 0.631
(1.319) (1.334) (1.295) (1.292)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.137 0.207 0.379 0.398
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.2: Analysis of Education-Related Roll Call Actions (109th)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 4.644** 4.331** 4.328** 4.471**
(0.934) (0.938) (0.958) (1.058)
Years in Office -0.068 -0.054 -0.030 -0.033
(0.065) (0.063) (0.067) (0.068)
Age 0.054 0.059 0.037 0.038
(0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055)
Male 0.125 0.547 0.412 0.408
(0.894) (0.885) (0.974) (0.981)
Urban % 0.074* 0.031 0.036 0.034
(0.032) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Median Income -4.481e-06 2.792e-05 2.914e-05 2.628e-05
(3.473e-05) (4.698e-05) (5.001e-05) (5.112e-05)
Border State -0.425 -1.961* -1.876+ -1.736
(0.760) (0.911) (0.952) (1.048)
Latino % 0.051* 0.025 0.023
(0.024) (0.037) (0.037)
Black % -0.007 -0.044 -0.044
(0.036) (0.057) (0.057)
Asian % 0.125+ 0.096 0.096
(0.073) (0.081) (0.082)
Latino Rep. 1.598
(1.566)
Black Rep. 2.195 2.161
(2.339) (2.360)
Asian Rep. 2.941 2.867
(3.833) (3.868)
Latino 1.451
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.639)
Cuban Rep. 2.128
(2.249)
Constant -10.527* -9.985* -8.930+ -8.766+
(4.409) (4.362) (4.685) (4.746)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.496 0.557 0.575 0.576
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.3: Analysis of Immigration-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)
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   One interesting difference is the role of the border state variable. I constructed 
a border state variable that designated whether a member came from a state that 
bordered Mexico. I included it because border politics might affect a member’s actions 
despite other variables that might lead them to favor immigration politics such as 
party. In the 108th session, border state was never significant across any of the issue 
areas or any of the models within an area. However in this session, members from 
border states were associated with two additional acts that were anti-immigration. 
While in the roll call data, this negative finding would mean that members could either 
vote in favor of anti-immigration legislation or vote against pro-immigration 
legislation, this is not the translation for the non-roll call data. This data captures the 
sum total of deliberative acts by members to introduce and co-sponsor legislation. In 
other words, Congressman from border districts introduced or co-sponsored bills that 
were anti-immigration or supported house resolutions of that position.  This finding 
indicates that something in the nature of border politics changed between the 108th and 
109th sessions to lead to its stronger effect.  
In contrast to the previous session, in the 109th session, Latino representative is 
not a significant variable across any of the models for non-roll call actions on 
immigration policy. Additionally, the percentage of Latinos in the district is also not 
significant across the models. Given the design of the models to incorporate additional 
racial and ethnic variable with each succeeding model and the strong results of the 
108th session, these results are surprising. In Table4.3 Model 2, where there are only 
the district demographics, the percentage of Latino is not significant. Then in Models 
3 and 4 where the race of the representative is included, neither the percentage of 
Latinos nor a Latino representative is significant.  
One possible explanation for the observation of the small coefficients and 
insignificant findings for each of the variables is multicollinearity between the two 
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 variables. In essence, the presence of the two variables in this model makes is difficult 
for the statistical analysis to differentiate their individual effects and muddies the 
results.  To test the strength of this hypothesis, I ran the Model 3 (the all inclusive 
model) again but this time dropped the other variable. When I ran Model 3 with either 
only Latino representative or the percentage of Latinos in the districts, each variable 
became significant. The potential problem of multicollinearity between these two 
variables is something I have been aware of from the start of this project, however in 
previous literature in this area the standard has been to include both variables in the 
model despite potential risks. The argument to support the inclusion of the two 
variables is that both factors are necessary to determine if non-Latino members 
become more responsive as the percent of Latino constituents in their district 
increases.  Moreover, I conducted a test of the variation inflation factor (VIF) in the 
108th session which assesses the relative problems posed by multicollinearity. The VIF 
was below 10, thus leading me not be overly concerned. However in the 109th session, 
it appears to be a much more significant problem given the washing out of both 
variables. While I am uncertain of how to overcome this problem statistically, another 
way to gain some traction in this area is in the matching-style paired cases that I study 
in Chapter Five. I examine several districts and assess member behavior over time 
with the switch of members from a non-Latino to a Latino representative.  I analyze 
how the actions of the two Congressmen compare given that the district demographics 
have remained nearly constant and the only variable that changed was the race or the 
ethnicity of the member.  
 Another possible reason for the limited Latino Representative finding was 
raised during the interviews that I conducted with the Hispanic Liaisons and 
Legislative Directors of various Latino Congressmen. I asked many questions 
regarding immigration legislation, bill introductions, co-sponsorships, proposals 
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 during the 108th-110 sessions. 35 When asked what explained the significant decrease 
in bill introductions and co-sponsorships in the area of immigration, every respondent 
cited the role of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) in dictating the direction 
of immigration policy. Staff members indicated that the CHC had switched to a 
platform of comprehensive immigration reform and wanted to move away from 
‘piecemeal’ attempts to reform the immigration system. Under this plan, the CHC 
asked members to only introduce and support bills that sought to improve the rights of 
immigrants, paths toward legalization for undocumented immigrants, increasing the 
allowances for guest workers, and some security measures for border control.  The 
push for broad-based reform became even stronger during this particular session due 
to the immigration rights protests that took place in March 2006. Most of the CHC 
members who had been quite active on non-roll call immigration related bills in the 
108th session dramatically reduced their participation levels in the 109th. However, 
when broad-based bills were introduced, these members were active supporters. In 
essence the role of the CHC in shaping immigration legislation skewed the statistical 
results to make it appear as if being a Latino Representative had no effect on 
immigration policy.  
In the analysis of non-roll call behavior on education policy the results were 
mixed compared to the 108th session. Being a Democrat remained a strong predictor 
for promoting education bills and was associated with a 10 point increase in the R-
score. However, similar to immigration policy in the 109th, the finding that a Latino 
Representative resulted in more substantive representation in the 108th session was not 
observed in the 109th session. In fact, none of the other independent variables were 
                                                 
35 Methodological details regarding the interviews including the questionnaire, sample will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapter. In Chapter Five, I utilize various types of data and research to 
probe more deeply the quantitative results and findings.  The questionnaire is available in the Appendix 
on page 147. 
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 significant besides party. The findings are presented in Table 4.4 below. The 
additional analysis on the 110th session also revealed the same non-finding for Latino 
Representative. These results have led me to revise my previous argument that Latino 
constituents are best served by Latino representatives in the area of education.  While 
education is rated consistently as the most important issue to Latinos, it is also ranked 
as an important issue to non-Latino constituents, particularly Democrats. Thus, it is 
not surprising that Democrats are extremely active in this area and offer the best 
representation in this area not just in terms of raw participation but the largest ability 
to actually pass legislation given the size of the Democratic Party.  
The results for labor policy in the 109th session are very similar to the 108th and 
are presented in Table 4.5 below. Once again party is a strong and significant 
coefficient with a 5.3 increase in the R-Score.  In Models 3 and 4 that include the 
entire spectrum of race and ethnicity based variables, the percent Latino and black are 
significant, however the coefficients are very small.  Latino Representative is 
significant and results in 3 additional acts in support of labor. Similar to the 108th 
results, in Model 4 which distinguishes between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, the 
effect of a Non- Cuban Latino is even stronger than the Latino Representative in 
Model 3.  The analysis of this group of data mirrors the results from both of the 108th 
samples. Thus, my argument that Latino representatives offer greater substantive 
representation in the area of labor policy than non-Latinos members is bolstered by 
this additional analysis.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 10.144** 10.477** 10.327** 10.253**
(1.881) (2.007) (2.052) (2.267)
Years in Office -0.120 -0.118 -0.100 -0.098
(0.132) (0.135) (0.143) (0.146)
Age 0.190+ 0.193+ 0.174 0.174
(0.105) (0.109) (0.116) (0.118)
Male 2.365 2.455 2.832 2.834
(1.800) (1.894) (2.084) (2.102)
Urban % 0.098 0.109 0.128 0.129
(0.065) (0.085) (0.088) (0.090)
Median Income 1.598e-05 2.965e-05 5.175e-05 5.321e-05
(6.996e-05) (1.005e-04) (1.071e-04) (1.095e-04)
Border State -0.853 -1.193 -0.985 -1.056
(1.530) (1.949) (2.039) (2.246)
Latino % 0.005 -0.066 -0.065
(0.050) (0.078) (0.080)
Black % -0.042 -0.124 -0.124
(0.078) (0.122) (0.123)
Asian % -0.050 -0.050 -0.050
(0.157) (0.174) (0.176)
Latino Rep. 4.395
(3.352)
Black Rep. 4.812 4.830
(5.008) (5.056)
Asian Rep. -0.601 -0.563
(8.205) (8.289)
Latino 4.470
(non-Cuban) Rep. (3.511)
Cuban Rep. 4.123
(4.819)
Constant -17.755* -19.137* -19.989+ -20.073+
(8.881) (9.334) (10.029) (10.170)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.484 0.488 0.508 0.508
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.4: Analysis of Education-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 5.308** 5.281** 5.073** 4.775**
(0.770) (0.813) (0.810) (0.890)
Years in Office 0.021 0.019 0.032 0.039
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
Age 0.041 0.052 0.041 0.037
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
Male -0.469 -0.256 -0.280 -0.271
(0.737) (0.767) (0.823) (0.825)
Urban % 0.031 0.051 0.068+ 0.072*
(0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Median Income 3.523e-06 -2.972e-05 -3.044e-05 -2.450e-05
(2.866e-05) (4.073e-05) (4.226e-05) (4.300e-05)
Border State -0.521 -0.692 -0.353 -0.643
(0.627) (0.790) (0.805) (0.882)
Latino % -0.016 -0.070* -0.067*
(0.020) (0.031) (0.031)
Black % -0.031 -0.045 -0.046
(0.032) (0.048) (0.048)
Asian % 0.049 0.042 0.043
(0.064) (0.069) (0.069)
Latino Rep. 3.073*
(1.323)
Black Rep. 1.076 1.146
(1.977) (1.984)
Asian Rep. 1.159 1.312
(3.239) (3.253)
Latino 3.377*
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.378)
Cuban Rep. 1.970
(1.891)
Constant -5.036 -5.494 -5.713 -6.053
(3.639) (3.781) (3.959) (3.992)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.595 0.607 0.642 0.646
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.5: Analysis of Labor-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 1.144* 1.346** 1.459** 1.266*
(0.440) (0.462) (0.474) (0.521)
Years in Office 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.045
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
Age 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Male 0.191 0.104 0.186 0.192
(0.421) (0.436) (0.482) (0.483)
Urban % 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.010
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Median Income 2.228e-05 2.937e-05 3.560e-05 3.945e-05
(1.635e-05) (2.314e-05) (2.475e-05) (2.515e-05)
Border State 0.001 0.177 -0.000 -0.188
(0.358) (0.449) (0.471) (0.516)
Latino % -0.004 0.012 0.015
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
Black % -0.009 -0.027 -0.027
(0.018) (0.028) (0.028)
Asian % -0.055 -0.056 -0.055
(0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
Latino Rep. -0.814
(0.775)
Black Rep. 0.862 0.907
(1.158) (1.161)
Asian Rep. -0.378 -0.279
(1.897) (1.903)
Latino -0.616
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.806)
Cuban Rep. -1.528
(1.106)
Constant -1.129 -1.705 -1.537 -1.758
(2.076) (2.148) (2.319) (2.335)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.261 0.289 0.311 0.320
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.6: Analysis of Social Security-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)
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 Finally in the last issue area, social security, which was the low salience Latino 
issue area, the only significant variable was party. Being a Democrat resulted in a 
member supporting an additional 1.3 acts in favor of social security.  While the 
coefficient might appear to be quite small, it is important to recognize that the range of 
actions in this area is not very large compared to other areas.36 None of the racial or 
ethnicity based variables are significant. These findings are analogous to those of the 
108th session. This provides robustness to my argument that Latino representatives are 
not merely more active and more liberal members than non-Latino members, rather 
they specifically differentiate themselves on high salience issue to the Latino 
population.  I will now turn to my discussion of the 110th session and how those 
results compare to the original analysis performed on the 108th session data.  See 
Table 4.6 above for the results of the social security bills.  
110th Session 
The 110th session of the U.S. House of Representatives spanned from January 
3, 2007 to January 3, 2009 during the final two years of former President George W. 
Bush’s eight year reign. In contrast to the previous sessions, this is the first session in 
my analysis that Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party in both the House 
and Senate. During this session Nancy Pelosi became the first House Speaker that was 
a woman. During the entire session, the presidential campaign dominated the political 
discussion in the media culminating in the election of Democrat, Barak Obama in 
November 2008.   One critical event during this session was the downward turn in the 
economic climate, massive loss of jobs and rise in unemployment. The economic 
                                                 
36 In the 109th session there were a total of 39 bill introductions, co-sponsorships, and house resolutions 
in social security. Compare this range to that of education where there was a total of 109 actions in non 
roll call behavior.  
85 
 
 crisis has continued to persist and has undoubtedly shaped the actions of members in 
the latter half of the 110th session and the analysis of this term.  
Similar to the 108th across both education and labor roll call votes, in the 110th 
session roll call models party was a significant variable, as seen in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
below. In education, being a Democrat was associated with between a 2.5 and 3 point 
difference in votes in favor of education. On bills related to labor that effect was even 
stronger with a coefficient of 5.8 and 6.4 depending on which model is examined. 
Border state resulted in roughly 1-1.6 less actions in favor of labor policy, thus giving 
potential credence to the argument made by Borjas (1999) that people in high 
immigrant areas may feel threatened by the labor flow of unskilled foreign workers.  
No roll call votes occurred on social security, thus making it impossible to offer a 
robustness check on the finding from the 108th session social security roll call 
behavior finding.  
The push for reforms, divisiveness over the issue, and the CHC platform led to 
a halt of any serious progress in immigration policy. In the 110th session only a single 
immigration bill came up for a house vote and it was a bill on immigrant smuggling in 
which almost all members voted in favor. The result was that none of the variables in 
the analysis were significant.37 The precipitous decline in the number of bills coming 
to the house floor is indicative of not only the strength of the CHC in cajoling its 
members into a unified position, but also the division in the House over the issue. The 
inability to come to a consensus over what should be done about immigration policy 
and divided public opinion prevented members from making any headway in this area.  
                                                 
37 There was extremely limited variation in member behavior, thus leading to no relevant variables. Due 
to a sample size of 1 vote, I also ran a logit analysis since it is the most appropriate tool of analysis in 
such instances. For all cases in which there was only 1 vote, I  ran logit analysis and there was no 
substantive change in the results. For the purposes of uniformity in presentation of results, I elected to 
present the OLS tables for all models given that there was no observable difference in the OLS and logit 
results. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 2.522** 2.461** 2.498** 2.976**
(0.522) (0.518) (0.536) (0.568)
Years in Office -0.002 0.008 0.006 0.009
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Age 0.017 0.009 0.011 0.010
(0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Male -0.409 -0.337 -0.444 -0.472
(0.484) (0.476) (0.524) (0.510)
Urban % -0.005 -0.038+ -0.041+ -0.047*
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Median Income -1.702e-05 1.449e-05 8.837e-06 -2.072e-06
(1.932e-05) (2.627e-05) (2.819e-05) (2.790e-05)
Border State -0.222 -1.017* -1.054+ -0.616
(0.427) (0.505) (0.537) (0.562)
Latino % 0.034* 0.044* 0.040+
(0.013) (0.021) (0.020)
Black % 0.003 0.017 0.017
(0.021) (0.032) (0.031)
Asian % 0.043 0.039 0.039
(0.040) (0.045) (0.044)
Latino Rep. -0.676
(0.901)
Black Rep. -0.792 -0.891
(1.321) (1.285)
Asian Rep. 0.704 0.645
(2.154) (2.094)
Latino -1.188
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.909)
Cuban Rep. 1.121
(1.223)
Constant 5.738* 6.712** 6.976** 7.675**
(2.314) (2.323) (2.510) (2.463)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.352 0.431 0.440 0.479
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.7: Analysis of Education-Related Roll Call Actions (110th)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 5.831** 5.862** 5.876** 6.483**
(0.493) (0.475) (0.493) (0.505)
Years in Office 0.015 0.027 0.032 0.036
(0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032)
Age 0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
Male -0.213 -0.149 -0.144 -0.178
(0.457) (0.436) (0.483) (0.453)
Urban % 0.013 -0.020 -0.020 -0.028
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Median Income -3.702e-06 3.728e-05 3.901e-05 2.515e-05
(1.825e-05) (2.407e-05) (2.597e-05) (2.479e-05)
Border State -0.717+ -1.604** -1.620** -1.064*
(0.403) (0.463) (0.495) (0.500)
Latino % 0.039** 0.037+ 0.030+
(0.012) (0.019) (0.018)
Black % -0.004 -0.014 -0.014
(0.019) (0.030) (0.028)
Asian % 0.022 0.018 0.019
(0.037) (0.042) (0.039)
Latino Rep. 0.169
(0.830)
Black Rep. 0.551 0.424
(1.217) (1.142)
Asian Rep. 0.360 0.284
(1.984) (1.861)
Latino -0.482
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.808)
Cuban Rep. 2.452*
(1.087)
Constant -1.982 -1.277 -1.102 -0.214
(2.186) (2.128) (2.312) (2.188)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.761 0.803 0.804 0.830
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.8: Analysis of Labor-Related Roll Call Actions (110th)
 
88 
 
  
In non-roll call behavior, party has a significant and sizeable effect across all 
three salient policy areas. In immigration, the effect results in a 5 point difference in 
additional bills co-sponsored or introduced. For labor policy, the role of party is 
comparable, resulting in around a 6 point difference in the R-score.  For education, 
being a Democrat results in roughly a 3 point increase in participatory acts. Similar to 
the other sessions, it is not unexpected that being a Democrat results in more actions in 
favor of these three areas, given their liberal orientation.  Refer to Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 
4.11 below for the results for each policy area. 
The more intriguing results lie in the role of other variables across the policy 
areas. In Table 4.9, Model 1 of immigration policy, which does not incorporate any 
racial or ethnically related variables, border state once again, emerges as a significant 
variable with a 2.8 increase in the R-score. However, this effect washes out in Model 2 
and is replaced by a small effect of Latino percentage. In models 3 and 4 which 
incorporate the racial and ethnic characteristics of the district and the member of 
Congress, Latino Representative emerges as a significant variable with a sizeable 
impact of a 4.8 increase in non-roll call actions in favor of representation.  It should 
also be noted that Asian Representative is significant, however in this sample there is 
only one Asian member, Michael Honda, thus we can only draw very limited 
conclusions from this result.  In contrast, in labor non-roll actions, the only significant 
variable is party which results in a 5 point difference in the representation score. 
Party is also a dominant explanatory variable in non-roll behavior on education 
policy, resulting in approximately an 11 point increase in actions. Seniority of a 
member results in a -0.6 decrease in member actions.  Similar to the results from the 
108th session, in Models 3 and 4, Black Representative is associated with a large effect 
of 13.8 and is just above significance at the .05 level. Latino Representative is not 
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 significant, thus confirming the previous 109th session result. The effect of Black 
Representative is even stronger than party and provides some evidence that Latinos 
may be best represented by black members of Congress, rather than Democrats or 
Latino members.  
Recall the inclusion of social security as a fourth, non-salient issue area as a 
control for the salient policy areas of immigration, education, and labor. If a member 
is a Democrat, the result is a 1.5 increase in actions in favor of social security, as seen 
in Table 4.12 below. None of the other variables were significant. This social security 
non-finding provides additional support for my argument that Latino representatives 
are not simply more liberal and more active than other members, rather they 
specifically target their legislative actions in areas of importance to the Latino 
community.  
Discussion  
 The purpose of this further discussion is to examine the broader trends across 
all three sessions and determine the implications of the findings across the three 
sessions on the arguments I made in Chapter Three. I argued that Latino members of 
Congress provided more substantive representative in the areas of immigration, 
education, and labor than their non-Latino counterparts. This difference was evident in 
non-roll behavior and would have been obscured by an analysis of roll call votes 
alone. Furthermore, I argued that Latino representatives were not simply more active 
and liberal than other members and provided the case of social security policy to 
support my argument.  I will examine each issue area and assess whether Latino 
constituents are better served by Latino members and differences in roll call and non-
roll behavior.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 5.236** 5.362** 5.160** 5.178**
(1.103) (1.065) (1.015) (1.117)
Years in Office -0.155* -0.128+ -0.065 -0.065
(0.076) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Age 0.109+ 0.080 0.028 0.028
(0.059) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Male 0.666 0.649 0.166 0.165
(1.022) (0.979) (0.992) (1.001)
Urban % 0.108** 0.028 0.046 0.046
(0.036) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Median Income -5.485e-05 5.445e-05 4.277e-05 4.235e-05
(4.083e-05) (5.400e-05) (5.340e-05) (5.482e-05)
Border State 2.827** 1.103 1.678 1.694
(0.902) (1.039) (1.018) (1.105)
Latino % 0.090** 0.009 0.009
(0.027) (0.039) (0.040)
Black % 0.008 -0.016 -0.016
(0.042) (0.061) (0.062)
Asian % 0.001 -0.063 -0.063
(0.083) (0.085) (0.086)
Latino Rep. 4.807**
(1.707)
Black Rep. 1.941 1.937
(2.502) (2.526)
Asian Rep. 7.376+ 7.374+
(4.080) (4.115)
Latino 4.788**
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.787)
Cuban Rep. 4.876*
(2.404)
Constant -14.105** -12.497* -9.850* -9.824*
(4.889) (4.774) (4.754) (4.839)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.585 0.655 0.712 0.712
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.9: Analysis of Immigration-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 11.190** 10.945** 11.211** 11.389**
(2.969) (3.109) (3.062) (3.369)
Years in Office -0.787** -0.765** -0.596** -0.595**
(0.203) (0.207) (0.213) (0.215)
Age 0.529** 0.508** 0.365* 0.365*
(0.159) (0.164) (0.170) (0.171)
Male 3.014 3.172 2.587 2.577
(2.751) (2.857) (2.995) (3.021)
Urban % 0.181+ 0.093 0.102 0.100
(0.096) (0.133) (0.131) (0.134)
Median Income 9.114e-06 8.718e-05 1.067e-04 1.026e-04
(1.099e-04) (1.576e-04) (1.612e-04) (1.654e-04)
Border State -0.023 -1.966 -1.951 -1.788
(2.428) (3.030) (3.071) (3.334)
Latino % 0.086 -0.012 -0.014
(0.079) (0.118) (0.120)
Black % 0.020 -0.217 -0.217
(0.123) (0.185) (0.186)
Asian % 0.124 -0.061 -0.061
(0.241) (0.258) (0.260)
Latino Rep. 6.991
(5.151)
Black Rep. 13.818+ 13.781+
(7.551) (7.620)
Asian Rep. 17.538 17.515
(12.311) (12.416)
Latino 6.800
(non-Cuban) Rep. (5.391)
Cuban Rep. 7.661
(7.254)
Constant -34.269* -31.397* -23.927 -23.667
(13.161) (13.930) (14.346) (14.601)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.428 0.442 0.501 0.501
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.10: Analysis of Education-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 5.012** 5.129** 5.048** 4.663**
(0.940) (0.994) (1.026) (1.122)
Years in Office -0.055 -0.053 -0.034 -0.037
(0.064) (0.066) (0.071) (0.072)
Age 0.067 0.069 0.053 0.054
(0.050) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
Male -0.376 -0.349 -0.567 -0.545
(0.871) (0.914) (1.003) (1.006)
Urban % 0.045 0.054 0.060 0.065
(0.030) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045)
Median Income -6.321e-06 -6.111e-06 -1.389e-05 -5.091e-06
(3.479e-05) (5.040e-05) (5.399e-05) (5.507e-05)
Border State -0.559 -0.600 -0.376 -0.729
(0.769) (0.969) (1.029) (1.110)
Latino % -0.003 -0.028 -0.025
(0.025) (0.040) (0.040)
Black % -0.016 -0.011 -0.011
(0.039) (0.062) (0.062)
Asian % -0.021 -0.041 -0.042
(0.077) (0.086) (0.087)
Latino Rep. 1.459
(1.726)
Black Rep. -0.051 0.029
(2.530) (2.537)
Asian Rep. 2.620 2.668
(4.125) (4.134)
Latino 1.872
(non-Cuban) Rep. (1.795)
Cuban Rep. 0.010
(2.415)
Constant -4.526 -5.097 -4.200 -4.764
(4.167) (4.456) (4.806) (4.862)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.469 0.471 0.481 0.488
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.11 Analysis of Labor-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 1.248** 1.531** 1.434** 1.587**
(0.443) (0.447) (0.460) (0.504)
Years in Office -0.036 -0.029 -0.035 -0.034
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Age 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Male -0.287 -0.296 -0.269 -0.278
(0.411) (0.411) (0.450) (0.452)
Urban % -0.004 0.005 0.009 0.007
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Median Income -3.002e-05+ -1.359e-05 -1.541e-05 -1.890e-05
(1.641e-05) (2.267e-05) (2.421e-05) (2.473e-05)
Border State -0.085 -0.205 -0.062 0.078
(0.363) (0.436) (0.461) (0.499)
Latino % 0.004 -0.008 -0.009
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Black % -0.026 -0.010 -0.010
(0.018) (0.028) (0.028)
Asian % -0.064+ -0.053 -0.052
(0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
Latino Rep. 0.547
(0.774)
Black Rep. -0.853 -0.884
(1.135) (1.139)
Asian Rep. -0.959 -0.978
(1.850) (1.857)
Latino 0.384
(non-Cuban) Rep. (0.806)
Cuban Rep. 1.121
(1.085)
Constant 2.707 1.626 1.131 1.354
(1.965) (2.004) (2.155) (2.183)
Observations 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.200 0.275 0.293 0.300
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.12: Analysis of Social Security-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)
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 Immigration 
 Immigration politics and policy is an area very intimately tied to the Latino 
community, given their historical experience as immigrants.  In this area, I expected to 
see the most obvious difference between Latino and non-Latino members given that 
this issue is squarely within the Latino policy domain and one where many Latino 
constituents seek help with casework from their representatives. As previously noted, 
the landscape of immigration and politics has evolved and changed considerably 
during the time period of this analysis from 2003 to 2009. Pushes for a broader guest 
worker program, amnesty for undocumented people and a path towards legalization, 
and militarization of the border have all become increasingly salient. Schisms within 
and between the parties as well as the Executive Branch have lead to minimal actual 
progress in the area. The force of the immigrant rights movement was visualized 
during the marches across the U.S. in spring 2006 that drew millions of participants. 
Latinos around the country resoundingly pronounced their support for comprehensive 
immigration reform and marched for freedom and equal rights. The result was 
increased media attention towards the issue and a unified push by the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus for comprehensive reform, though little substantive progress 
occurred in the House. Several versions of comprehensive immigration bills were 
introduced, but none successfully navigated the entire legislative process to culminate 
in a floor vote.  
How then does this history of immigration politics mesh with the results of the 
quantitative analysis and my arguments? For both the 108th and 110th sessions, Latino 
representative did offer more substantive representation than their non-Latino 
counterparts in the arena of non-roll call behavior. However, in the 109th session, this 
effect was not observed. As argued previously, this non-finding was likely a result of 
the increasing tensions over immigration politics that culminated in the protests in 
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 2006 during the 109th session.  The unified position of the CHC led Latino members to 
temporarily reduce their introduction of less comprehensive immigration-related bills. 
It should be noted that once it became clear that comprehensive immigration reform 
was going to be a long and difficult battle, in the 110th session Latino members started 
to introduce more immigration bills again. 38 Moreover, the number the actual 
immigration bills that came to the floor for a vote consistently declined through the 
sample from 7 votes in 108th session to 3 in the 109th to 1 in the 110th.  
Another interesting change over the period of analysis is the emergence of 
whether a member is from a border state becoming a relevant explanatory variable. 
Originally the variable was included because members could either be more adamantly 
pro-immigration because of the large portion of their constituency that is immigrant- 
based, or be more anti-immigration because of nativist concerns over the increasing 
dominance of immigrant issues in their district. While in the 108th session, there was 
no observed effect, in both of the latter sessions the border state variable became a 
significant and in some models was negative and associated with less actions in favor 
of immigration. During this period, the rise of the organization of the Minutemen 
Project, where citizens policed the border for illegal crossings, brought increased 
negative media attention towards the issues. Additionally, raids and deportations of 
undocumented people by the Unites States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
started to become a more frequent occurrence. The change in the role this variable 
plays is also most likely the result of the changing political atmosphere of immigration 
politics that became increasingly more hostile towards undocumented immigrants. 
Given the historical background underlying the empirical results, I would still argue 
                                                 
38 This argument is supported not only by the legislative record but also was expressed in various 
interviews with staff members of Latino representatives.  
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 that Latino representatives provide more substantive representation to Latino 
constituents than their non-Latino constituents on immigration policy.  
Education 
 Education policy is consistently ranked as one of the top issues in general 
public opinion surveys (NES, PEW, GSS) and is always ranked as the most important 
issue to the Latino community (LNS, Pew Hispanic Research Survey).  Accordingly, I 
expected that Latino members of Congress would actively pursue legislation in this 
area reflecting the importance of the issue to their Latino constituents. The results, 
however, have been quite mixed. In the 108th session, Latino representatives were 
more active than non-Latinos, however in both the 109th and 110th session, this 
difference is not observed. Instead, the one consistent variable across all three sessions 
was party. Being a Democrat resulted in greater substantive representation and often 
resulted in significant increases in pro-education actions. However, this finding is not 
unforeseen given the lengthy history of education as a dominate issue in the 
Democratic Party’s platform.  
 One fascinating and unexpected finding concerns the effect of a black 
representative. From both public opinion surveys and the black representation 
literature, it has been established that like Latinos, education is a top priority for the 
African American community (Cannon 1999, NES). While it could have been 
anticipated the black members of Congress would be fairly active in this area, it was 
unpredictable for the effect observed in the 108th and 110th sessions to be as strong as 
party and have more explanatory power than whether a member is a Latino 
representative. While the results of this finding are not consistent across all three 
sessions and the number of black members in the sample is limited to six, the results 
are thought-provoking nonetheless.   
97 
 
 In the race and representation literature there is an underlying assumption that 
descriptive representation most often results in the greatest substantive representation, 
however this issue area provides evidence to the contrary. In fact, Latino constituents 
may be better off with Democrats than Latino representatives, but they also might be 
as equally well served by black members. The idea of minority groups being better 
served by Democrats rather than individual members from their group is by no means 
novel. In fact, it is often suggested that minority members are outliers within the 
chamber and have limited ability to form coalitions, which means the presence of 
majority minority districts may paradoxically dilute the overall influence of the 
minority group (Lublin 1999). However, the suggestion that they might be best served 
by a different minority group is unique and offers new implications for the idea of 
coalitions between minority groups and the drawing of district lines. In the end, the 
take away message from the education analysis is that Latinos are best served by 
either Democrats or possibly black members of Congress. Education policy is an area 
where the mantra of descriptive representation always leads to the best substantive 
outcome is not accurate.  
Labor 
 Traditionally labor policy is an issue area that neither receives significant 
amounts of attention in any given session of Congress nor is often covered extensively 
by the media. Instead broader economic based-bills regarding macroeconomic and tax 
policies are usually the focus of legislative action.  Labor is typically a standard issue 
in which the Democratic Party is in favor of positive labor changes and workers rights. 
However, during periods of economic crisis, the public becomes more concerned with 
issues of unemployment, wages, and job growth. By late 2008 it was clear that the 
U.S. economy was beginning to slope downward with an increase in the 
unemployment rate (6.1% Sept 08) and inflation starting to rise (5.4% Aug 08) 
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 (Lewis-Beck 2009). The economic climate continued to deteriorate with the 
September 2008 crash through 2009 with an increasing number of home foreclosures, 
declining value in stock shares, rapidly increasing unemployment. The salience of 
economic-related policy and awareness of the status of economic indicators 
dramatically increased among the general public during the 2008 election season 
(Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2009). The growing importance of policies within the 
economic realm is reflected in my analysis of the legislative record. In the 108th and 
109th sessions, very few labor-related bills made it to a floor vote in the house. 
However, in the 110th session, which occurred during the start of the economic decline 
and the crash in the fall of 2008, the number of bills rapidly increased from zero roll 
calls in the 109th to five in the 110th.  
 During periods of low salience to the general public at large, such as the 108th 
and 109th sessions, Latino legislators were considerably more active than non-Latino 
representatives on non-roll call actions such as bill co- sponsorship and introduction. I 
argue this is because labor concerns have always been at the forefront of the issues 
that most directly affect Latino constituents given the economic dependence on 
segments of the Latino community to provide work in the agricultural, hotel, and 
service industries (Waldinger and Lichter 2003).  However, when there is a significant 
boost in media attention towards the increasingly dire economic situation, 
representatives at large, particularly Democrats, are forced to treat labor policy as a 
high salience issue.  The issue becomes very important to constituents and members 
must respond in kind or risk political alienation as consequences of inactivity.  
In my analysis of the 110th session of non-roll call behavior, the effect of a 
Latino representative is no longer observed. Rather, party becomes the dominant 
explanatory variable to predict positive actions in favor of labor legislation.  I am 
hesitant to conclude that this means that Latinos are equally served by Democrats 
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 given the findings for the 108th and 109th sessions which demonstrate distinct 
differences in behavior between Latino and non-Latino members. The economic crisis 
of 2008 should be treated as an external shock that makes the results from the 110th 
session muddied. Drawing a conclusion on this issue must be reserved for a period of 
increased economic stability where the issue becomes less salient overall. If we 
observe that during a future period of low salience, Democrats are equally as active as 
Latino members of Congress, then we can conclude that the 110th session marks a 
distinct change by Democrats in this issue area. However, if Democrats return to their 
previously limited activity in this area, then we must conclude that the behavior 
observed in the 110th session was a response to a powerful external stimulus.  In other 
words, the jury is still out on whether Latinos need Latino members of Congress to get 
the most substantive representation for labor policy, but I would be inclined to say that 
is the most probable outcome.  
Social Security 
 Of the four issues areas in this study, social security is the least salient issue 
area to the public at large and one of particularly low salience to the Latino 
community. Its inclusion in this analysis was intended to serve as a control to 
determine if Latino members of Congress were simply more active or more liberal 
than other members. Across all three sessions, there was no observed impact of a 
Latino representative on legislative behavior in this area.  This non-finding provides 
strong evidence for my argument that Latino members are only more active in issue of 
high salience to Latino community. They are in essence quite responsive to the 
concerns of their constituents and offer greater substantive representation than non- 
Latino members.  The only significant variable in my analysis of social security was 
that of party. Being a Democrat consistently led to additional non-roll call actions in 
favor of social security and more roll call votes supporting social security bills.   
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 One other interesting side note is that not only is this a low salience issue but 
over time the number of social security roll call votes has also declined from two bills 
in the 108th session to zero in both the 109th and 110th session.  This policy area has 
been reduced to complete inaction despite what many economists argue is a system 
that is in serious jeopardy. While the immediate policy concerns are that of 
unemployment, job creation and housing stability, eventually legislators will have to 
turn to more long-term economic policy concerns. Sadly, one of the particularly 
damaging consequences of the downturn has been the effect on the private retirement 
accounts of individual citizens. Consequently, the public may increase their attention 
towards the government-supported Social Security retirement program to ensure the 
system will still be functioning and available when they need it. It will be interesting 
to see if this pattern of decline continues to be observed, or rather in a similar manner 
to labor policy, a period of increased legislative activity will occur due to external 
pressures. 
Roll Call v. Non-Roll Call behavior 
 One of the primary arguments that I made in the previous empirical chapter 
was the need to examine not only roll call behavior but also non-roll actions. My 
argument was based on two facts. First, practically speaking a very small percentage 
of a member’s action within the legislative chamber involves actual voting on bills. 
This is mostly due to the lengthy process a bill must undergo before it comes up for a 
floor vote and disagreements between the various bureaucracies within the house on 
the exact version of any given bill (Davidson and Olezek 2007). Second, in my 
analysis of the three salient Latino public policy areas, the examination of non-roll call 
behavior revealed a key explanatory viable, whether a member is Latino, which would 
have otherwise been obscured if I had only focused on roll call behavior.  
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  After examining in close detail the actions of members in the 109th and 110th 
session, I believe there is even stronger evidence to support my argument that non-roll 
call behavior should be examined in order to get the most accurate view of 
representation. First, I observed a decline in roll call votes across all of the areas 
during certain sessions. The smaller number of total observations of roll calls would 
provide a very limited perspective on the relevant policy area given that in non-roll 
call behavior there were still plenty of actions taking place. Second, in all of my roll 
call models, the only variable that consistently is significant and has a sizeable effect 
is that of party. However, in the non-roll call models several variables are also 
important. For example, Latino representative is significant in many models and has 
implications for descriptive representation. Likewise, in some of the education models, 
black representatives also have important effects that have implications for 
coordination between minority members. Additionally, whether a member is from a 
border state can result in negative actions in a given area, which demonstrates some of 
the pressures that members may feel in high immigrant areas. All of these variables 
have important substantive implications for politics and policy, and thus it would be 
unfortunate not to recognize their broader impact. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an extensive form of robustness checks by 
examining member actions across two additional sessions of Congress. The result has 
been a confirmation of my argument that Latinos are best served by Latino legislators 
on immigration and labor policies. However, in the area of education, Latinos may be 
best represented by Democrat or black members of Congress. On social security bills, 
the low salience issue to Latinos, Democrats offer the greatest substantive 
representation. Finally, examination of non- roll call behavior in the three salient 
issues revealed important variables that were hidden in the roll call models.
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                                                           CHAPTER 5 
STYLES OF REPRESENTATION: HOW MEMBERS OF SIMILAR 
CONSTITUENCIES BEHAVE IN DIFFERENT WAYS 
Introduction 
 In this final substantive chapter, I utilize several case studies, paired 
comparisons, and data obtained from interviews with the staffs of Latino members to 
assess varying representation styles. The analysis presented here is intended to further 
differentiate between the actions of members of Congress representing sizeable Latino 
constituencies. The first set of cases will examine differences in behavior between 
Latino and non-Latino representatives to evaluate additional ways in which their 
behavior might vary.  Drawing on the quantitative analysis from the previous two 
chapters, I revisit the claims I made previously regarding the substantive 
representation of Latinos. In the latter portion of the chapter, I move away from the 
Latino vs. non-Latino comparisons to evaluate within group differences among Latino 
members. In what ways are their actions similar and in what ways do they think 
differently about their Latino identity and their relationship with the Latino 
community? Finally, based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I draw some 
conclusions about which members have best served the Latino community and their 
policy interests.  
Latino versus Non-Latino Members 
One potential methodological concern that is raised by some scholars in 
response to my quantitative analysis is why I did not adopt a matching estimation 
model to examine member behavior. In his foundational pieces on frameworks for 
causal models, Rubin developed what is now commonly known as the Rubin Causal 
Model. (Rubin 1974, 1990). One of the necessary components of causal models is that 
there are treatments that are assigned to units in the study. By definition a treatment 
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 must be something that conceptually is able to be manipulated.  For example, patients 
in Group A receive a drug treatment and patients in Group B were not given the 
medicine. However, qualities such as race or age cannot be thought of as being able to 
be manipulated and randomly assigned to people in a similar manner. Due to this 
requirement, I decided not to employ a matching estimation model, since the treatment 
in my research project is whether a member is Latino or not and its effect on member 
behavior. Given the appeal of matching techniques, I offer this informal and 
rudimentary examination using paired comparisons on various shared characteristics 
of members and a case where a district switched from a non-Latino to a Latino 
representative to explore variation in behavior. 
Paired Comparisons  
 In this section, I employ the sample of all Latino and non-Latino 
representatives with sizeable Latino constituencies to compare and assess their actions 
across non-roll call behavior. The aim is to examine more qualitatively their legislative 
records to determine the ways in which Latinos and non-Latinos operate differently to 
serve the Latino community. Recall that the statistical results, on average, indicated 
that Latino representatives were considerably more active in salient policy areas than 
non-Latinos, irrespective of the size of the Latino population in their district.  I begin 
with a brief presentation of three examples of paired members from the 108th and 109th 
sessions. Then, I will discuss a case study of two members who represented the same 
district in California, one who was not Latino and the current member, who is Latino.  
The cases for the paired comparison were selected randomly using Stata, but I limited 
the sample to members with percent Latino in the district within a specified range. To 
compare a Latino member with 70% Latinos to a non-Latino with only 20% Latinos in 
their district, presents a serious bias in case selection in favor of my arguments. Thus, 
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 for the purposes of equal comparison, I only examine two members’ actions that have 
similar Latino populations.   
The first case to be explored is that of Joe Baca (D) from CA and Calvin 
Dooley (D) from CA.  Both members are Democrats with nearly 60% of their district 
composed of Latinos.  Joe Baca represents the 43rd district, an interior area in Southern 
California that includes Ontario, Rialto, and San Bernardino. Dooley represents the 
20th district which is a central interior district that is based in Fresno. Joe Baca, the 
Latino representative, is considerably more active across the salient policy areas of 
immigration, education, and labor than his non-Latino counterpart. He has 
approximately three times the number of actions in each area than Representative 
Dooley.  It should be noted that both members are Democrats, so this is not simply a 
case of partisan differences but rather ethnicity-based differences that explain the 
variation in their actions despite comparable Latino constituencies. The exact number 
of actions in each area is presented below in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Non-Roll Call Actions for Calvin Dooley and Joe Baca 108th 
Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members
Calvin Dooley Joe Baca
State CA CA
Latino No Yes
Latino% 63.1 58.3
Immigration 4 13
Education 3 15
Labor 4 14
Social Security 2 5  
 A second example is from the 109th session comparing the actions of Jim Costa 
and Jose Serrano. Jim Costa replaced Calvin Dooley in the 20th district in California.  
It has the largest Latino population that is not currently represented by a Latino 
member of Congress. One of the advantages of examining this district is that one 
would assume this is a case where you would expect to see non-Latinos be the most 
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 active and exhibit a legislative record comparable to Latino representatives. However, 
despite the sizeable Latino population, Rep. Dooley was not particularly active on 
Latino issues and neither is his successor, Jim Costa. In fact, Costa was even less 
active in the 109th session, than Dooley was in the 108th. In contrast, Jose Serrano, the 
other member selected for a comparison, is extremely active on salient Latino policies. 
Rep. Serrano, a Puerto Rican, serves the 14th district of New York which 
encompasses the Bronx. Both members have roughly 63% Latinos in their district, but 
the difference in their actions is quite stark.  Their actions by policy area are presented 
below in Table 5.2. For education and labor, Rep. Serrano is at least four times more 
active than Rep. Costa and on immigration policies he is three times more active.  The 
observed difference in behavior cannot be attributed to party, since both members are 
Democrats. Some may argue that non-Latino members do not need Latinos to form a 
winning coalition, however in this district Latinos comprise the majority of the 
constituents. At the minimum, their sizeable presence and potential electoral sanction 
should have motivated Reps. Costa and Dooley to be attentive to their policy concerns.  
Since I have presented two examples for the same district, one might wonder if this is 
a special case where Latino representation happens to be surprisingly low. I now turn 
to a new district.  
Table 5.2 Non-Roll Call Actions for Jim Costa and Jose Serrano 109th 
Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members
Jim Costa Jose Serrano
State CA NY
Latino No Yes
Latino% 63.1 62.8
Immigration 2 6
Education 3 13
Labor 1 8
Social Security 2 3  
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  The third case is from the 2nd sample of the 108th session and examines the 
behavior of Representatives Lois Capps (D) and Robert Menendez (D). Rep. Capps 
serves the 23rd district which is based in Santa Barbara, California. At the time, 
Menendez served as the representative for the 13th district which comprises portions of 
Newark, Elizabeth, and Union City.  Both members are Democrats and have a Latino 
population in their district that is near the mid-forties in percentage terms. While this 
match is not as close as the two previous cases, this is due to the limited number of 
non-Latino members who have above 40% Latinos in their districts. Additionally, for 
Latino members, Menendez has the smallest percentage of Latinos with 47.6%. In this 
case, one might expect Menendez to be less active given the lower number of Latinos 
and the diverse nature of his district. However, he is still quite active in the salient 
issue areas and consistently more active than Representative Capps. The details of 
their legislative actions are reported in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 Non- Roll Call Actions for Lois Capps and Robert Menendez 110th 
Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members
Lois Capps Robert Menendez
State CA NJ
Latino No Yes
Latino% 41.7 47.6
Immigration 3 7
Education 2 16
Labor 4 10
Social Security 5 2  
The examination of member behavior in these three examples above confirms 
my claim that Latino members are more active than non-Latinos. However, this does 
not imply that every non-Latino legislator in my sample was always significantly less 
active than Latino members. There are a handful of exceptions and surprisingly a few 
of those cases were not necessarily representatives from the districts with the largest 
Latino constituency. For example, Representatives Honda and Lee are especially 
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 active and in some instances even more active than Latino members. See Table 5.4 
below for details on their activity in each policy area. One potential explanation for 
their behavior may be that they both represent very liberal districts in the Bay Area, 
San Jose, and Oakland where these issues may be salient to the area as a whole. 
Another intriguing variable is the role of the percentage of Asians in their districts. In 
all cases of non-Latino members with lower percent Latinos in the district (below 
20%) who are very active on Latino issues, they have a corresponding significant 
Asian presence within their district. Rep. Honda has 29.4 % and Rep. Lee has 15.4% 
Asians in their respective constituencies. It is possible that the rather than a liberal Bay 
Area effect, the explanation is instead that Asians may share similar policy preferences 
with Latinos, thus the combination of the two populations in one district combines to 
exert significant pressure on the member to respond to those policy arenas.  
Table 5.4 Active Non- Latino Representatives with low Latino Populations 
Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members 109th Session
Michael Honda Barbara Lee
State CA CA
Latino No No
Latino% 17.2 18.7
Immigration 8 6
Education 16 24
Labor 7 10
Social Security 3 3  
 While the two examples above are of members with small Latino populations, 
there are also non-Latino members with sizeable Latino populations who are 
extremely active. However, there are not enough members who share these attributes, 
to make the variable of percent Latino in a district significant in my quantitative 
analysis in the previous two chapters. Two examples of members who do fall into this 
category are Charles Rangel and Zoe Lofgren. Rep. Rangel represents the 14th district 
in New York which encompasses Harlem. Rep. Lofgren represents the 16th district in 
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 California, which is based in San Jose. The percentage of Latinos in their districts is 
47.5% and 37.6%, respectively.  Across all issue areas, both members participated at 
rates analogous to Latino members and in some cases, were even more active.  Table 
5.5 displays their actions in each area. However, it should be noted that these 
examples are exceptions to the sub-group. On an individual policy basis, education is 
the one area in which members from this group are equally as active as Latinos. As a 
whole across all three issue areas, non-Latinos with significant Latino populations are 
less active than their Latino counterparts. 
Table 5.5 Active Non-Latino Representative with high Latino Populations 
Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members 108th Session
Charles Rangel Zoe Lofgren
State NY CA
Latino No No
Latino% 47.5 37.6
Immigration 11 12
Education 25 23
Labor 16 14
Social Security 9 10  
 One additional paired comparison elucidates the role of party. The statistical 
results indicate that party played a significant role in determining the total 
representation score for a given member. The effect was often comparable to that of a 
member being Latino. In the examples discussed in this section, being a Democrat did 
not always lead to an equal number of legislative actions in each policy area. 
However, the effect of being Republican on non-Latinos with significant Latino 
populations in their district is striking. While there are less Republicans in this group 
than Democrats, the number is significant enough to at least comment on a pattern. In 
the 108th and 109th sessions there were 8 Republicans in this group and 6 in the 110th 
session. Not only is their behavior much more infrequent than other members in their 
group or the Latino members, but it is also often negative in nature. In other words, 
109 
 
 when they do participate, they engage in acts that are anti-immigration, anti-education, 
and anti-labor.  
 For example, Mary Bono (R) who represents the 45th district in California has 
38% Latinos in her district.  In the 109th session, her total immigration score was -4 
which means she actively supported anti-immigration bills. Her education, labor, and 
social security scores were 0, -1, and 2. Overall, she appears to be a very inactive 
member and when she is active, it is to support bills that are in direct opposition to the 
policy positions of her Latino constituents.  The records of Rep. Ken Calvert (R) 44th 
district, Corona, California and Rep. Pete Sessions (R) 32nd district, Dallas, Texas 
appear to follow the same pattern. Despite all three members having nearly a third of 
their district that is comprised of Latinos, their actions consistently reflect anti-
immigration and anti-labor positions. Moreover, on education which is a top issue for 
the general public, they appear to be inactive and not participate in any of the over one 
hundred educational bills that were introduced during the 109th session. The results are 
presented below in Table 5.6.   
 
Table 5.6 Republican Non-Roll Activities with Sizeable Latino Population 
Non-Roll Call Actions for Republicans 109th
Mary Bono Ken Calvert Pete Sessions
State CA CA CA
Latino No No No
Latino% 38 35 27.4
Immigration -1 -1 -4
Education 0 0 0
Labor -1 -2 -2
Social Security 2 5 5  
 After examining various groups of legislators and their legislative records, 
several facts become clear. First, Latinos on average appear to be the most consistently 
active across all three policy areas, however sometimes less active on education. 
Second, there is a significant range of activity level of non-Latinos with sizeable 
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 Latino populations. Some members are extremely active independent of district 
composition while others seem totally insulated from pressures from the Latino 
community. Finally, being a Republic in the non-Latino group is associated with a low 
amount of activity and activity that is negative in nature. I will now turn to a closer 
inspection of the case of George Brown Jr. and his successor, Joe Baca, who 
represented the same district, the 43rd district in California to analyze how member 
behavior differs when serving the exact same constituency.  
A Tale of Two Representatives from Southern California 
 The selection of a case for this section was a difficult process for several 
reasons. My aim was to identify a district that switched from a Latino member to a 
non-Latino member and a district that switched from a non-Latino member to a Latino 
member. Ideally the district would be similar in composition and geographic area 
across both members’ terms.  Since all Latino representatives have been elected from 
nearly majority Latino districts, there are no cases where a district switched from 
Latino legislator to being represented to a non-Latino member during the period of my 
study through the 110th session. However, it should be noted that in a special election 
primary in the May of 2009 to replace the vacancy of Hilda Solis’ seat, Judy Chu, beat 
the Latino challenger, State Senator Gil Cedillo, and then went on to win in the 
general election in July 2009.39 Her election in a predominately Latino district (64%), 
which encompasses large portions of East L.A., has challenged traditional views of 
Latino voting behavior and could potentially change how we view substantive 
representation of Latinos. Examination of her behavior in the 111th session compared 
to former Rep. Solis’ behavior will be a critical case to examine in the book version of 
this research endeavor.  
                                                 
39 Rebecca Kimitch, “Judy Chu Wins 32nd Congressional District Race” 
http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/ci_12839817 
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  Among the twenty-three districts represented by Latinos, very few were 
eligible to be classified as a case where it was represented by a non-Latino and then 
switched to a Latino member. Five of the districts were created after a U.S. Census 
and drawn to have a majority of Latinos, therefore there was no predecessor. Six of the 
districts underwent significant re-drawing of district boundaries in response to results 
from the U.S. Census immediately before or after the Latino member assumed office. 
In eight of the districts, the district switched from one Latino legislator to another 
Latino. This left only four eligible cases that met the criteria. From this group, I had to 
eliminate the case of Reps. Pastor and Udall because Rep. Pastor has been in office 
since 1991 and the legislative record for the non-Latino member was not available on 
THOMAS.40 I excluded the case of John Salazar and John McInnis because Salazar 
was only recently elected and there were minimal observations of his legislative 
behavior. The remaining cases were Joe Baca and George Brown Jr. and Silvestre 
Reyes and Ron Coleman. I chose Baca/Brown because Baca assumed office in 1999 
and Reyes assumed office in 1997. By selecting the Baca/Brown case, I had an 
additional session of legislative data for the non-Latino member to draw inferences 
from than I did in the Reyes/Coleman case.41 Now that I have justified my case 
selection, I will now move on to briefly discuss the district and the biographical 
backgrounds of Reps. Baca and Brown.  
  George Brown Jr. was the longest serving member from California and the 
oldest member of the house when he died from surgical complications on July, 15th 
1999.42 He represented what was once called the 42nd district and Joe Baca won the 
                                                 
40 THOMAS, the Library of Congress online resource, has very limited specific legislative data prior to 
the 103rd session.  
41 In preparation of this dissertation into a book manuscript, I would also like to include the 
Reyes/Coleman case as a point of comparison between the two pairs.  
42 Green, Stephen. 1999. “Liberal George Brown Jr. Dies” Daily News: Los Angeles: Obituary. July 
17, 1999.  
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 special election to take over his seat in the fall of 1999. In 2003, the district lines were 
slightly altered and it was re-named the 43rd district due to massive population growth 
in the area.  The original 42nd district is now entirely within the current 43rd district. 
The 43rd district is east of Los Angeles and includes the cities of Colton, Fontana, 
Rialto, Ontario and San Bernardino. It is located in the Inland Empire and between the 
Pacific Ocean and the San Bernardino Mountains.43   At the time of Brown’s death, 
the Latino population was estimated at nearly 50% in the district after the 2000 
Census. Over the next 8 years that percentage grew over another 10 percent to nearly 
60% Latinos under Rep. Baca. 
 George Brown Jr. was born near the Mexican border in Holtville, CA. He 
received his bachelor’s degree in physics from UCLA and served in World War II. In 
his lengthy career as a congressman, he had a reputation as a champion of the sciences 
and served on the Science, Space, Technology Committee, where he was chairman 
during the 102nd and 103rd sessions.44 He was very active in building and securing 
funding for the National Sciences Foundations (NSF) and a strong supporter of NASA 
and the space program.  He was also an active member on the House Agriculture 
Committee. Despite his seniority of 32 years in the House, elections in his district 
were highly competitive which is atypical for most legislators. He often won by a slim 
majority with around 50% of the vote and once only won by 996 votes.45  
 In contrast, Joe Baca was born in Belen, New Mexico in a house with fourteen 
siblings where Spanish was the predominant spoken language. Similar to Brown, Baca 
also served in the military as a paratrooper from 1966-1968. Prior to taking over 
                                                 
43 District information was obtained from Joe Baca website http: 
www.house.gov/baca/districtinfo/di.htm 
44 Biography on The George Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering at UCSB website 
http://nees.ucsb.edu/outreach/gebrown 
45 “George Brown Jr.” Almanac of American Politics 1998 
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 Brown’s seat in 1999, he was active in the CA state assembly and worked in 
community relations for 15 years before entering politics.46  In 1999 during the special 
election, he ran against Brown’s widow, Marta Macias Brown, and beat her to win the 
congressional post.  Just like Brown, Baca also serves on the House Agriculture 
committee as well as House Financial Services and Natural Resources Committees. In 
November of 2006 he was elected as Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
(CHC). He is traditionally very active in health, education, immigration, labor and 
Latino-related bills. 47  
I compare the legislative actions and participation of Brown during the 104-
106th sessions and Baca during the 106th-107th sessions to examine variation in 
representation styles.48 I examine a wide range of issues that is broader than the three 
salient policies examined in the previous two chapters in order to get a better sense of 
how the members allocated their time and energy in the policy sphere. Rep. Brown 
was not very active on high salience Latino public policy areas during the 104th-106th 
sessions. When active, he focused his attention on bills aimed at the sciences, 
environment, agriculture and technology. For example, he introduced a bill in the 
105th session regarding national forests.  Additionally, he was very active on health 
care bills, in particular those related to treatments of specific diseases such as cancer 
and the funding of the Medicare and Medicaid systems. Brown co-sponsored very few 
bills in the following areas: immigration, education, labor, economy, crime, and 
Latino-related bills, which are typically thought of as most of the top issues to the 
                                                 
46 Biographical information obtained from Rep. Joe Baca’s website 
http://www.house.gov/baca/meetjoe/bio.htm. 
47 Barone  The Almanac of American Politics 1998, 2000, and 2008 editions. 
48 I do not discuss the results from my examination of the legislative record for Baca during the 108th 
through 110th sessions since the 42nd district was renamed to the 43rd district in 2003 and included more 
Latinos than it previously had before. Baca’s actions in latter sessions were consistent with his behavior 
observed in the previous sessions and confirm his dedication to salient policy areas to the Latino 
community.  
114 
 
 Latino community. On immigration, he was not involved in any bills during the 104th 
session and only 2 bills in the 105th session and 106th sessions.  Similarly, on both 
Labor and Latino-related bills49 he agreed to be a co-sponsor on two bills in each area 
in each session.  His participation levels on education bills was moderately higher than 
in other Latino issue areas with at least three co-sponsored bills in each session that I 
examined. He focused far less on high salience Latino issues than Baca during his 
terms in the House of Representatives. His true focus while serving in the House was 
his passion of science and technology.  
 From the outset of his campaigns and prioritization of important issues, Joe 
Baca has consistently embraced his Latino background and the priority of Latino 
issues. On his website he lists Latino issues as a separate category of bills targeted 
towards the Latino community. He says “whether it is in the fields of education, 
health, immigration, or business, he will continue to fight for issues that are important 
to Hispanics.” In a speech delivered in his district in San Bernardino, he pronounces 
“that Latinos are coming! Latinos are coming! United Latinos will win”.50 Baca plays 
off of Paul Revere’s famous quote and intimates that Latinos are a powerful group to 
be reckoned with and that cannot be ignored by politicians.  As Chairman of the CHC, 
he fought hard to push bills that would help the Latino community and spoke out 
against the increasing number of anti-immigrant messages in the media.51  
 An examination of his legislative record further substantiates his dedication to 
the Latino community.  In his first term during in the second half of the 106th session, 
                                                 
49 Latino-related bills are defined as bills that specifically target the Latino community in the statutory 
language of the bill. For example, in the 107th session H.R. 5499 sought to increase health programs for 
Latinos.  
50 Baca. Joe. Speech at a Latino Forum in San Bernardino. January 12, 2006 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RM9uH4XgOmI 
51 Baca, Joe.  Speech at Media Matters Press Conference regarding Anti-Immigrant Messages in the 
Media. Dec 23, 2008. 
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 he co-sponsored five Latino-related bills and introduced two others. On immigration, 
he co-sponsored six pieces of legislation in the 106th session and eight in the 108th in 
addition to introducing one bill. On education, he participated in seven bills in the 
second half of the 106th session and twenty in the 107th. His participation levels on 
labor and health care legislation are equally as active. With the rising Latino 
population in his district, the inclusion of additional Latinos after the 2003 
redistricting, growing seniority and his elevation to the CHC chair, his activity in 
Latino policy domains increased even more dramatically. For example, by the 109th 
session his attention towards Latino-specific bills had increased to twelve bills in this 
area, three of which he introduced.  In a speech at the Democratic National 
Convention in Denver in 2008 as CHC chair, Baca proclaimed “Latinos are growing 
in numbers and in influence. The Latino vote will be critical”. While he may not been 
correct about the potential for Latinos to be swing voters, his statements indicate that 
he views Latinos as an important political constituency that politicians must respond 
to and represent. His legislative record and his statements demonstrate a serious 
commitment to serving his Latino constituents and Latinos as a group.  
What then does the examination of Reps. Brown and Baca’s background and 
legislative record demonstrate about the representation of Latinos? It is clear that the 
personal backgrounds of each representative influenced their trajectory within the 
Congress. For example, Brown’s educational background in physics led to him 
becoming a lifelong supporter of advances in scientific research and technological 
advancement.52 Likewise, Baca grew up in a Latino household speaking Spanish, 
which inevitably cemented his Latino identity and helped guide him towards a path of 
                                                 
52 Brown Jr., George “ Past and Prologue: Why I am Optimistic about the Future” Speech delivered 
April 29th at the 23rd Annual  American Academy of Arts and Sciences Colloquium on Science and 
Technology Policy.  
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 aiding Latinos. Personal background played a foundational role in determining the 
focus of each member’s scarce legislative resources. 
There is no question that George Brown Jr. was an amazing representative who 
was involved in series of monumental pieces of legislation given his long tenure in 
Congress. For example, he was a co-sponsor on the bill to establish the Environmental 
Protection Agency and he pushed for passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.53 
However, despite his abundance of activity in scientific policy domains, he failed to 
serve his Latino constituents by addressing their most salient policy concerns. While 
the Latino community can benefit from scientific advances, they still have more direct 
policy concerns that affect them as individuals that were not addressed by Brown. For 
example, Brown’s record on immigration is very sparse. Despite having a sizeable 
Latino population in his district, Brown rarely participated in Latino-specific bills.  
Conversely, Joe Baca has devoted much of his political career to serving the 
Latino community. What is important to take note of is that for the first two sessions, 
Baca represented the exact same district as Brown, however his emphasis could not 
have been any more different. Moreover, as the district became even more dominated 
by Latinos, Baca further increased his activity in this area.  One interesting note is that 
Baca enjoyed a much larger winning margin in subsequent elections than Brown ever 
did and part of this may be the degree to which he catered to Latino voters demands. 54 
This detailed examination of two legislators representing the same district has 
demonstrated that Latino members of Congress do offer greater substantive 
representation than their non-Latino counterparts. After analyzing differences between 
non-Latino members and Latino members, I turn to variation among Latino 
                                                 
53 Information obtained from Biography on The National Academies website 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/nrclibrary/George_E_Brown.html. 
54 Washington Post database on National Election Results. 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/elections/keyraces/551/  
117 
 
 representatives in terms of their actions, Latino identity, and relationships with the 
Latino Community.  
Variation among Latino Representatives 
 The literature on race and representation often discusses representatives of a 
given race or ethnicity as monolithic actors. The black representation literature has 
concluded that African Americans are best served by black members of Congress 
because as a group they tend to offer the most substantive representation (Cannon 
1999; Tate 2003). While the averages of their behavior indicate strong similarities 
between members, it should not be assumed that no in-group variation exists.   
In fact, there is evidence that variation between members exists in the electoral 
politics arena. For example, some studies have found that black politicians can vary 
widely in the degree to which they embrace identity politics and run a campaign based 
on the politics of difference (Cannon 1999).  Often politicians from minority groups 
feel they face a difficult choice concerning identity politics. They can pander to 
members of the minority group and embrace their identity as a member of the group 
but risk alienating members of the out group. Candidates can also elect to present 
themselves more broadly as a good representative for their constituents’ interests at 
large in order to appeal to the widest audience. Similarly, representation styles can 
vary widely according to which group of their constituents they hold to be the most 
important to represent or the most critical for re-election (Fenno 1978). Moreover, 
despite sharing the same race or ethnicity, minority members come from various 
backgrounds and political points of view. In particular, the Latino community is more 
heterogeneous in nature than the black community as demonstrated by the number of 
countries of origin, diversity in political opinions, and presence of both conservative 
and liberal segments of the Latino community.  Consequently, in the last segment of 
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 this chapter, it is important to examine differences among Latino members of the 
House of Representatives.   
 A brief examination of the total number of actions for a given Latino member 
in each session reveals a very wide range of participation levels.55  For example, 
across all four issue areas in the 108th session, Rep. Henry Bonilla engaged in six non-
roll call actions and a total of twelve actions when including roll call votes. 
Conversely, the most active Latino member, Rep. Raul Grijalva engaged in ninety-
nine non-roll call actions and one hundred and eighteen total actions, including roll 
call votes. To put this range in perspective, the median number of non-roll actions was 
twenty-two and the median for total representation actions was approximately twenty -
six.  Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of the members (indicated by the dots) 
according to their total non-roll call activity and total representation score that 
included roll call data. The graph demonstrates two important points. First, clearly 
some members are more active than other members within the Latino sub-group. 
Second, given the linear nature of the graph, it is clear that the effect of including roll 
call actions is minimal and the majority of the behavior is non-roll call based. To give 
more context on variation within the subgroup and elucidate the participation levels of 
specific members, the subsequent three tables list all Latino members for the 108th-
110th sessions and their total actions within each term. The data is presented below in 
Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9.  
                                                 
55 The totals represent member actions across the four policy areas examined in the previous two 
chapters. The issues are immigration, education, labor and social security. 
119 
 
 ‐10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
‐10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
To
ta
l A
ct
io
ns
Non‐Roll Call Actions
109th Session Latino Members 
Series1
 
Figure 5.1 Variation Among Latino Representatives in the 109th Session 
Table 5.7 Range of Latino Members’ Actions 108th 
Latino Members's Actions in the 108th Session
Name of Representative Non Roll Call Total Actions
Bonilla, Henry 6 12
Diaz-Balart, Mario 12 21
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln 17 26
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana 23 32
Velázquez, Nydia M. 22 40
Reyes, Silvestre 24 42
Ortiz, Solomon P. 26 43
Becerra, Xavier 29 44
Gonzalez, Charles A. 35 52
Sanchez, Loretta 33 52
Menendez, Robert 35 53
Roybal-Allard, Lucille 34 53
Napolitano, Grace F. 40 58
Pastor, Ed 43 61
Baca, Joe 47 66
Hinojosa, Rubén 57 73
Solis, Hilda L. 56 74
Rodriguez, Ciro 68 85
Sánchez, Linda T. 66 85
Gutierrez, Luis V. 72 87
Serrano, José E. 73 90
Grijalva, Raúl M. 99 118
Mean 41.68 57.59  
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Table 5.8 Range of Latino Members’ Actions 109th 
 
Latino Members's Actions in the 109th Session
Name of Representative Non Roll Call Total Actions
Bonilla, Henry -3 -4
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln 4 9
Diaz-Balart, Mario 5 9
Sanchez, Loretta 9 14
Cuellar, Henry 10 15
Salazar, John 13 16
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana 12 17
Becerra, Xavier 15 20
Menendez, Robert 21 22
Velázquez, Nydia M. 17 22
Ortiz, Solomon P. 17 23
Pastor, Ed 18 23
Baca, Joe 19 24
Napolitano, Grace F. 21 25
Roybal-Allard, Lucille 19 26
Reyes, Silvestre 22 27
Serrano, José E. 30 35
Gonzalez, Charles A. 31 37
Sánchez, Linda T. 33 38
Solis, Hilda L. 35 40
Gutierrez, Luis V. 40 45
Hinojosa, Rubén 46 52
Grijalva, Raúl M. 68 73
Mean 21.83 26.43  
 
The tables demonstrate which members are the most active and which 
members are the least active. The least active three members across every sample are 
Republicans and the most active members are Democrats. This is consistent with the 
partisan effect noted in the quantitative models and with the Cuban finding, where in 
Model 4 Latino Non-Cubans (Democrats) are the most active. While the Diaz-Balart 
brothers demonstrate comparable levels of participation, the Sanchez sisters behave in 
radically different ways. Rep. Linda Sanchez is twice as active as her sister, Loretta, in 
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 the 108th session and three times more active in the 109th and 110th sessions. Latinos as 
a group are quite active especially compared to their non-Latino peers from similar 
districts, however there are meaningful differences in their participation levels within 
the sub-group. To assess in group variation in more detail I examine the case of three 
Latino representatives from the Texas.  
Table 5.9 Range of Latino Members’ Actions 110th 
Name of Representative Non-Roll Call Total Actions
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln 8 19
Diaz-Balart, Mario 12 24
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana 18 30
Sanchez, Loretta 20 32
Velázquez, Nydia M. 19 33
Becerra, Xavier 22 35
Salazar, John 23 36
Rodriguez, Ciro 23 37
Ortiz, Solomon P. 29 41
Cuellar, Henry 33 46
Baca, Joe 33 47
Serrano, José E. 34 48
Reyes, Silvestre 35 49
Gutierrez, Luis V. 37 51
Roybal-Allard, Lucille 39 52
Gonzalez, Charles A. 42 55
Napolitano, Grace F. 41 55
Pastor, Ed 43 57
Solis, Hilda L. 46 60
Sires, Albio 51 65
Sánchez, Linda T. 59 73
Hinojosa, Rubén 69 82
Grijalva, Raúl M. 86 99
Mean 35.74 48.96  
The Texas Trifecta  
 I selected a case of  members from the same geographic area, in order to keep 
constant as many characteristics as possible such as constituencies and local interests, 
and allow the inferences that I draw from their actions to be the strongest. The three 
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 Latino representatives either currently serve or have served the two districts that 
encompass San Antonio and Laredo areas of Texas. The three members are 
Representatives Henry Cuellar, Henry Bonilla, and Ciro Rodriguez.   
This group of members has a long and complicated history that I will briefly 
review before comparing their legislative actions. At the start of my quantitative 
analysis in the 108th session, Henry Bonilla represented the 23rd district which 
included a portion of San Antonio and Laredo. Bonilla had a conservative voting 
record and was a Republican, despite the fact that Laredo was dominated by 
Democrats. The presence of liberal voters in his district resulted in a very close 
election in 2002. He was challenged by Henry Cuellar, a conservative Democrat, and 
won by a two point margin. In response to the closeness of the race, the Republican-
controlled state legislature redrew district lines by packing the liberal voters of Laredo 
into the already heavily Democratic 28th district, which was represented by Ciro 
Rodriguez.  As a consequence of the 2003 redistricting, Bonilla’s seat was protected.  
In the 108th session, both Bonilla and Rodriguez held congressional offices. 
After losing to Bonilla in the 2002 election, Cuellar challenged Rodriquez in 
the 2004 Democratic primary election for the 28th district and won by an extremely 
small margin. Rodriguez challenged the results, but the Texas Court of Appeals did 
not find in his favor. Thus, in the 109th session, Bonilla and Cuellar were in office.  In 
the spring of 2006 Rodriquez attempted to regain his seat but lost in the primary 
election again to Cuellar. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in League 
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry that the 2003 redistricting plan 
implemented by the Texas legislature was unconstitutional because it violated the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting the strength of Latino voters in the 23rd district. 
A three-judge panel drew new district lines and reincorporated much of the south side 
of San Antonio, which had been a strong component of Rodriguez’s base. In the fall of 
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 2006, Rodriguez decided to run against Bonilla in the 23rd district race. Despite the 
bad blood between Rodriguez and Cuellar, Cuellar helped Rodriguez defeat Bonilla in 
the runoff election.56 What makes this case so interesting is that both of the districts 
have at one time contained a portion of the other district, all three members are Latino, 
and one of the members, Rep. Rodriguez has served two of the three districts.  It 
provides an unusual and unique situation for studying variation among Latino 
legislators. 
The primary research question of this section is whether all three members 
provide the same degree of representation to their Latino constituents. A brief 
examination of their legislative records that I presented earlier has already put serious 
doubt into the similarity of all members. If we look more closely at the three people 
involved in this case, the differences are even starker.  
In Tables 5.7 and 5.8, Bonilla is the least active Latino member and lags 
considerably behind Rodriguez and Cuellar in total representation actions. He is also 
the lone Mexican-American Republican legislator in the House. Substantive review of 
his legislative record reveals a very low level of participation in any policy domain. 
The only two areas that he participates in are health care and tax policies. However, on 
health care his activity levels were fairly limited which is evidenced by co-sponsoring 
six bills in the 109th and eight bills in the 108th.  His activity in immigration, education, 
and labor policies are is almost non-existent in the 108th and 109th sessions with less 
than four bills in each area. Bonilla was not involved in any Latino-related bills that 
sought to specifically help the Latino community. Moreover, when he was active in 
immigration, half of the time his actions were in support of anti-immigrant legislation. 
These actions are despite the heavy Latino presence in his district, which is 55% of the 
                                                 
56 Rio Grande Guardian.com “Cuellar: Bonilla’s Vote for Border Wall will help Rodriguez campaign” 
November 22,2006. http://www.riograndeguardian.com/archives_results.asp. 
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 population. In response to his apparent lack of concern for the Latino community, 
some members of the media accused him of only being Latino in name and called him 
‘Henry Vanilla’ since he relied mostly on conservative white voters for re-election.57 
Additionally, he criticized politically active Latinos for waving Mexican flags during 
demonstrations as insulting to Americans, thus demonstrating an underlying hostility 
towards the transnational and dual identities that many immigrants possess.58 
Moreover, other politicos and politicians such as Rep. Cuellar claimed his anti-
immigrant votes led to his loss to Rodriguez in the runoff election.59 Ultimately, 
Bonilla demonstrated very weak allegiances to the Latino community and provided 
limited substantive representation for Latinos. 
In contrast, Rep. Cuellar and Rep. Rodriguez have stronger records of activity 
in high salience Latino issue areas. However, Rodriguez’s record is more consistent 
with promoting Latino interests than Cuellar. In his first term during the 109th session, 
Cuellar was primarily very active in health care policy and co-sponsored forty-two 
bills in this area compared to Bonilla’s six bills. Health care is an important issue for 
the Latino community given some of the problems they face as a group such as 
increasing rates of diabetes and obesity (Martinez et al. 2004). On education policy, he 
participated in a range of bills that sought to increase grants, reduce student loan 
interest rates, and expand opportunities at Hispanic serving institutions. When active 
on immigration, he often co-sponsored bills that aimed to solve border control 
problems. In the area of labor policy, Cuellar is quite inactive compared to some of his 
other Latino peers. In each session, he only co-sponsored two pieces of legislation. His 
                                                 
57 Ken Rudin, 2006. “Obama or a History of Black Presidents” 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6594955&ps=rs 
58 NBC News Transcripts. Meet the Press. “Representatives Bonilla, Hayworth, and Gutierrez discuss 
immigration reform” April 9th 2006.  
59 “Cuellar: Bonilla’s vote for Border wall will help Rodriguez campaign” Riogrande Guardian  
November 22,2006. 
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 website reflects his lack of attention to these two areas by failing to list either 
Immigration or Jobs/Labor on the Issues and Legislation portion of his website. 
Despite his inaction in these two areas, Cuellar frequently supports Latino-related bills 
that recognize Latino contributions and heritage. Rep. Cuellar is also very active in the 
area of Veterans’ Affairs and believes it to be an important issue that cannot be 
disregarded.60 In particular, he has co-sponsored several bills that address the 
healthcare of veterans. While not traditionally thought of as a Latino issue, Veterans’ 
Affairs are relevant to the Latino community since they comprise nearly 10% of the 
military and there is a large presence of Veterans in the South Texas area.61 While not 
necessarily active as defined in the quantitative sections from the previous chapters, 
Rep. Cuellar has found other issues areas that are important to the Latino community 
to demonstrate his commitment.  
In the 108th session, Rep. Ciro Rodriguez represented most of the district that 
is now represented by Rep. Cuellar. There are some similarities in their behavior but 
also some significant differences in the way in which they served the same 
constituency. While serving the 28th district, Rodriguez, like Cuellar, devoted 
significant amounts of time to health care policy and co-sponsored fifty-four bills. 
Similarly, in education he supported a wide range of bills that addressed various 
aspects of education, with an emphasis on aid for student loans. Rodriguez was also an 
active participant on Veterans’ Affairs bills. He also demonstrated enthusiasm for 
Latino-related bills by co-sponsoring 20 bills during this term, which is twice the 
amount of Cuellar. On labor policy, the two members diverged and Rodriguez co-
sponsored ten bills that ranged from increasing minimum wage, to supporting labor 
                                                 
60 Rep. Cuellar’s Website, Issues, Veterans’ Affairs 
http://cuellar.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=3827. 
61 Pew Hispanic Center. 2003 Hispanics in the Military. 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=17 
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 unions to increasing unemployment benefits. In the area of immigration, Rodriguez 
was very active and co-sponsored fifteen bills. Only two of these bills were focused on 
border security, unlike Cuellar’s record. The vast majority of the bills sought to help 
immigrants adjust their status and allow more visa and worker programs. Despite his 
legislative record on immigration policy, on his campaign website, Rodriguez lists 
‘securing our homeland’ as a top priority.62 The geographical location in South Texas 
and the proximity of the two districts to the border has led to a particular way in which 
immigration is framed to the media and public by all of the legislators. However, 
Bonilla, Cuellar, and Rodriguez have acted differently in the degree to which they 
support pro-immigration policies within the House. Ultimately, Rep. Rodriguez 
demonstrated a serious commitment to issues that both affect Latinos and are 
important to them as a group. His actions indicate that he offered the Latino residents 
of the 28th district more substantive representation that Rep. Cuellar since assuming 
office.  
In the 109th session, Ciro Rodriquez was not in office since he was beaten by 
Henry Cuellar. However, in the 110th session, he came back to the House when he beat 
Henry Bonilla in the 23rd district. Rodriquez continued his high levels of participation 
in his new district. Recall Bonilla’s relative inaction in the areas of education and 
labor and often anti-immigration actions.  In contrast, when representing the same 
constituency, Rep. Rodriguez co-sponsored eleven education bills, seven labor bills, 
and five immigration bills. He also continued his dedication to health care and 
Veterans’’ Affairs issues with the co-sponsorship of forty-eight and thirty eight bills 
respectively. Analogous to his behavior on Latino-related bills in the 108th session 
serving the 28th district, in the 110th serving the 23rd district, he co-sponsored nine bills 
                                                 
62 Rep. Rodriguez Campaign Election Website http://www.cirodrodriguez.com/issues.asp. 
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 in this area. From analyzing Rodriguez’s behavior in relation to both Cuellar and 
Bonilla, it is apparent that he is the most active in representing Latino interests. During 
the 108th session, the 23rd district represented by Bonilla had 66.8% Latinos and the 
28th district represented by Rodriguez had 69.6%. When Cuellar took over the 28th 
district its Latino population had swelled to 77% and the 23rd was back to 65% by the 
time Rodriguez took over.63 Given the variation among the three members’ behavior 
despite all having Latino majority districts, it is clear that the percentage of Latinos in 
the constituency does not explain the differences in their behavior. To probe 
explanations for variation in behavior, I turn to evidence from interviews with the staff 
members of Latino representatives.  
Interview Methodology 
 In order to evaluate finer differences between Latino members of Congress, I 
conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews with staff members from various 
Latino members’ offices during June 2008-April 2009. Originally the research plan 
also included interviews with members of Congress, but many members were 
extremely hesitant to participate and scheduling was quite difficult given their 
demanding schedules. Consequently, I focused on staff interviews which allowed me 
to learn about the member’s views but also the inner workings of the office and its 
outreach efforts with the Latino community. The interviews lasted between thirty to 
forty-five minutes. I asked various questions regarding representation, community 
outreach, Spanish language usage, legislation, and the specific policy areas that I 
investigated in my quantitative analysis.64  The objective of the interviews was to 
                                                 
63 During the redistricting scandal, Texas Republican state legislators had moved Latinos into the 28th 
district and decreased the number of Latinos in the 23rd district to 55% in the 109th session. 
64 A copy of the questionnaire is contained in the appendix at the end of this manuscript. 
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 glean richer qualitative data that would shed light on the quantitative results in 
addition to exploring the multitude of ways that members serve their districts.  
I contacted the legislative director and Chief of Staff of twenty-three different 
Latino members of Congress during this period requesting to conduct an anonymous 
interview.65 Of those people contacted, ten offices agreed to participate as long the 
information supplied during the interview was not attributed to the staff member, the 
office, or the representative in any way.66 This is roughly a forty-five percent 
participation rate. The response rate to my request was seventy percent. The other 
twenty-five percent indicated that they were not able to participate due to rules in their 
office against interviews, even those conducted for the purposes of academic research. 
Office policies banning staff interviews reflect concerns over public perceptions of the 
member and potential electoral ramifications. The other thirty percent of those 
contacted did not respond to my various requests despite using the connections of staff 
members from interviews I had already conducted. Interestingly, of those offices that 
agreed to participate, none of the members were Republican and consequently my 
analysis of variation among Latino members in this section is restricted to Latino 
Democrat members of Congress. However, this limitation does not pose a significant 
problem given that only four of the Latino members are Republicans.67  Overall, the 
interviews revealed several main differences in member behavior regarding their view 
                                                 
65 I contacted all members from the sample, however for some members who had left office since the 
108th session, I was not able to locate any contact information for the member directly or any of the 
previous members of their staffs.   
66  Interviews were contacted with either a Chief of Staff, Legislative Director or Hispanic Caucus 
Liaison.  Due to the assurance of anonymity, I am unable to name the offices that agreed to participate 
since the total number of staff is small enough that the identity of persons making statements could 
potentially be determined by others who are intimately aware of the politics and actions of these 
members.   
67  In previous sections of this chapter, I have explored the effects of being Republican on the 
representation of districts with significant Latino populations.  
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 of Latino identity, working with the Latino community, and which policies merited the 
greatest attention. 
Latino Identity 
 When discussing the member’s relationship to their Latino constituency and 
their views of representing Latino interests as a group, the role of identity became a 
crucial explanatory variable.  I tried to determine what leads a member to focus on his 
Latino constituency but also national policy concerns for Latinos as a group. For six of 
the ten members interviewed, the staff member indicated that being Latino was a 
critically important characteristic that shaped the member’s view on representation. 
Similar to the representation literature on African-American Representatives (Tate 
2003), these six members felt compelled to serve all Latinos as a group, not just their 
constituents.  In other words they were ambassadors for Latino policy concerns writ 
large and adopted a model of surrogate representation. For them, being Latino was a 
critical part of their identity and served as a way to connect with their constituency. 
Additionally, they were also very proud of their national identity, for example as a 
Mexican-American.  
I examined the backgrounds of the members, office characteristics, and 
composition of their districts to try to determine what led to the adoption of a strong 
Latino identity and its consequent effect on how the member viewed his role as a 
representative. One striking similarity between the members with a strong Latino 
identity was their high level of Spanish language usage. For example, all members in 
this group frequently spoke Spanish in their offices, at least 70% of the office staff 
was fluent in Spanish and they reported that at least 50% of their Latino constituents 
contacted their D.C. office in Spanish. This is in contrast to the other members who 
rarely spoke Spanish in the office, had less than 30% of the D.C. office staff who was 
fluent in Spanish, and reported infrequent contact from Latino constituents in Spanish. 
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 In essence this demonstrated that the member’s dominant view of identity led to other 
policies and practices inside and outside the office that promoted a strong connection 
to Latino culture.  
The diverse nature of the backgrounds of the members failed to provide a 
single variable that could explain the identity outcome.  Of those who adopted this 
viewpoint, some were born in other countries, grew-up in predominately Spanish 
speaking house, or both parents were immigrants, while others had been in the U.S. 
for several generations, grew up in integrated areas, and primarily spoke English. 
Despite, not being able to pinpoint an explanation for the factors that led to embracing 
Latino identity, the adoption of a strong ethnic identity resulted in distinct differences 
in their behavior compared to the other members who did not express the same sense 
of shared pan-ethnic identity.  
Relationship with the Latino Community 
 The members who identified strongly as Latino tended to utilize different 
strategies of communication and interaction with their Latino constituents than those 
with a weak identity. Strong identity members (SIMs) sent mailings to some segments 
of their constituents in Spanish whereas weak members (WIMs) did not. 
Representatives in the former group attended more community organization meetings 
or hometown association meetings in their district than members with a weaker Latino 
identity.  When visiting their districts, SIM staffs attempted to organize town hall 
meetings or events that specifically addressed Latino policy concerns. This is on 
contrast to WIMs who still organized a comparable number of meetings but the events 
were framed in terms of the broader constituency or issues not specifically related to 
Latinos.  When WIMs staff members were asked about the member’s interaction with 
the Latino community, two of them specifically indicated that they did not address 
Latino-specific concerns per se, since they felt Latinos were adequately represented by 
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 addressing issues important to their constituency as a whole. While this would not 
necessarily lead to less substantive representation for Latinos, a closer examination of 
the legislative record and their professed policy foci is necessary to make this 
determination. 
Policy Work 
 When discussing decisions on which policy areas to focus on both WIMs and 
SIMs offices indicated the same decision rule. In essence, a balance between views 
expressed by constituents via direct contact such as mail, e-mail, organized 
community interest groups from within the constituency, and their personal 
background or interests. The responses to the question regarding what are the most 
important issues affecting Latinos reflected the diversity of influential sources. All 
members indicated that education, labor/jobs, healthcare, and immigration were top 
issues. However, when asked on which issues the member devoted the most time, the 
responses did not necessarily coincide with the top Latino issues.  One member 
indicated trade was a top priority for her office, while others indicated education and 
immigration were key areas of action. One office even cited working with the Census 
as a critical part of the member’s work in order to reduce or eliminate undercounting 
of Latinos to ensure representation for all. Others focused on various aspects of labor 
policy such as job training, the creation of new jobs, and minimum wages. One 
member cited security as a top priority given the proximity of his district to a port. 
There appeared to be a disjuncture between perceived important issues facing Latino 
and how members actually spent their time.  
After conducting the interviews, I went back to the data set of member actions 
to examine member behavior across the three high salience policy areas which all 
interviewees identified as important issues facing the Latino community. When 
comparing the total number of actions in each issue area and total number of actions 
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 across the 108th-110 sessions, there is no observable difference in the legislative 
behavior of WIMs and SIMs. Some of the most active Latino members are those who 
possessed a weaker Latino identity. This finding is counter to what one might expect 
given the level of engagement of SIMs with their Latino constituencies.  However, one 
potential explanation for this finding is that even if members do not closely identify or 
appeal to their Latino constituents, on a pragmatic level they are realistic about re-
election and pander to an important part of their constituency (Mayhew 1973).  While 
my strong versus weak identity theory does not explain variation in member’s actions 
in the legislative sphere, it may still have important effects on the views Latinos have 
of their representatives, Latino voter turnout, trust in government, or the level of 
support in elections by Latinos.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have sought to probe deeper into the statistical findings in the 
previous two chapters. I studied in close detail differences in non-Latino and Latino 
behavior to assess if Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation.  
After a series of paired comparisons, I conclude that on average Latinos offer greater 
substantive representation and the percentage of Latinos does not seem to be a key 
determining factor in member behavior. Among the non-Latino members who have 
sizeable Latino populations, I find that certain members are quite active in Latino 
policy areas. Republicans in this-group are systematically inactive and often engage in 
actions counter to Latino policy interests.  Within the Latino subgroup, there is 
substantial variation among members’ actions, where Republican members are 
considerably less active than the others. Finally, I find that certain Latino members 
adopt a strong sense of Latino identity that affects the ways in which they interact with 
their constituents and frame salient policy issues but does not necessarily change the 
overall amount of substantive representation derived from legislative work.
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                                                         CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
  In studies of Congress, it is often argued that descriptive representation is 
necessary for the substantive representation of minority groups. In other words 
minority members will serve minority interests best. The bulk of the work in this area 
concerns black interests and black members of Congress. This dissertation has sought 
to determine if Latinos need Latino representatives in order to have their interests 
represented. I have argued two main points throughout this dissertation: 
1) On the whole, Latinos offer greater substantive representation than their non-
Latino counterparts. 
2) We must examine actions beyond roll call votes, such as bill introduction and 
co-sponsorship, because rolls call-only analysis obscures important findings. 
While the first claim is not controversial in nature given the findings from the black 
representation literature, some scholars have been suspect about whether the findings 
would apply to Latinos. The second claim regarding non-roll call behavior is a bit 
more radical given that a sizeable portion of the Congressional literature has focused 
on roll call behavior.  By analyzing a wide range of member actions from the 108th-
110th sessions, paired comparisons, case studies and interviews, I have amassed a 
substantial amount of evidence to support my claims. 
Latinos vs. Non-Latino Representatives 
 In the congressional literature, it is assumed that members are responsive to 
their constituencies, which is often primarily due to electoral concerns (Griffin 2006). 
I investigated whether non-Latino members were responsive to Latino policy concerns 
when Latinos comprised a significant portion of their district. The statistical evidence 
presented in Chapters Three and Four indicates that for both labor and immigration, 
Latino representatives are considerably more active in bill introductions and co-
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 sponsorships than non-Latino members. On education policy, Latinos are very active 
but so are Democrats and black members of Congress. In this policy arena, it is less 
clear that Latinos are best served by Latinos.  To assess if Latino representatives are 
simply more active or liberal than non-Latino legislators, I also examined Social 
Security policy. Across all three sessions, I find that Latinos are not simply more 
active and the only predictor of the most representation in social security is whether a 
member is a Democrat.  This finding provides strong evidence to support my 
argument that Latino representatives are only more active on high salience issues to 
the Latino community.  
In Chapter Five, I probe the quantitative results to examine pairs of members 
with similar percentage of Latinos in their district. The examination confirms the 
previous findings and reveals a pattern of steady action on Latino issues by Latino 
members of Congress. However, the paired comparisons reveal that some non-Latino 
members are very active in their pursuit of immigration, education, and labor policies. 
Republican members with sizeable Latino populations are consistently less active than 
their Democratic counterparts.  Moreover, Latino members of Congress are also very 
active in additional policy areas that are important to the Latino community such as 
health care, Veterans’ Affairs, and more particular Latino-focused bills.  The 
components from Chapters Three, Four and Five come together to build a strong case 
that Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation than non-Latino 
representatives on the whole.  
The Importance of Non-Roll Call Behavior 
 Throughout my study of the legislative record, it became apparent that a small 
percentage of members’ actions involve roll call votes. The vast majority of legislative 
action is non-roll call behavior such as bill introduction and bill co-sponsorship. I 
adopted a broad view of legislative participation to assess the representation of Latino 
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 interests. Part of the reason for this view was because of relative amount of time 
members spend on non-roll call actions, but also the fact that the existing literature 
based on votes was uncertain about whether being Latino had a substantive effect on 
representation. The design of my models allowed a comparison of the results of roll 
call and non-call behavior. The roll call models indicated that the only salient variable 
was whether a member was a Democrat, which resulted in higher representation 
scores. In sharp contrast, in the models that incorporated non-roll call behavior, the 
role of the ethnicity of the representative became a critical explanatory variable. This 
important finding was obscured in the roll call-only models.  Moreover, detailed 
analysis of the legislative records of various members confirmed the marginal 
importance of roll call votes in a given member’s scope of actions. It was in activities 
such as bill introductions and co-sponsorships where members truly signaled their 
support or resistance to certain policy changes. It was also the domain in which they 
could devote scarce resources to their most important policy concerns. By examining 
this portion of their legislative records a broader picture of each member’s policy 
preferences emerged.  
Implications  
The findings of this research study have four main implications. The primary 
implication is that descriptive representation is necessary for maximum substantive 
representation for Latinos. Descriptive representation may make constituents feel 
closer to their representatives and more able to reach out to them for support when 
they need help. Current studies have documented that descriptive representation 
enhances views of representatives and more positive feelings towards Congress 
(Brunell et. al. 2008).  Recent work has also shown that Latino preferences are not 
represented as much as white preferences (Griffin and Newman 2007).  
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 Despite controversy surrounding majority-minority districts and member 
responsiveness in non-competitive districts, Gay (2007) demonstrates that minority 
members are actually quite responsive to their constituent concerns. My study has 
shown that members do not grow more responsive to Latino policy concerns as the 
percentage of Latinos in a district rises. In fact some non-Latinos representatives have 
districts that have up to 63% Latinos, and yet they remain very inactive and 
ambivalent towards a large segment of their district. This study did not explicitly test 
why non-Latinos are less responsive to Latino policy concerns. However, two 
plausible explanations include re-election constituency and the absence of feelings of 
group consciousness and surrogate representation. It is possible that the lack of 
attention for Latino constituents could be the role of that constituency in re-election of 
the non-Latino members. Fenno (1978) advocates the concept of multi-layered 
constituencies with a core re-election constituency at the heart of the model. Non-
Latino members may not rely on their Latino constituents for support and are able to 
form a winning coalition without their support. This could be due to low levels of 
participation from Latinos and/or a small enough number of Latinos in the district that 
their votes become unnecessary for re-election. However, in some of the non-Latino 
member districts, Latinos comprise more than half of the district population and other 
minority groups comprise an additional 10-15% percent. For Democrats who 
traditionally rely on minority groups for their electoral support it becomes less 
plausible that the Latino constituency is not an important part of the voting 
constituency.  Future work, should examine more closely the types of electoral 
coalitions utilized by non-Latinos to determine if this winning coalition hypothesis 
explains non-Latino member behavior.  
 An alternate explanation for the difference between Latino and non-Latino 
member actions stems from the concepts of group consciousness and surrogate 
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 representation. Latino members do afford greater substantive representation than non-
Latinos by being considerably more active on the issues. While much of the literature 
on ethnic group consciousness has focused on blacks, there is evidence that Latinos 
also possess an ethnic group consciousness (Stokes 2003, Welch and Hibbing 1984). 
Moreover, ethnic group consciousness for Latinos can affect Latino policy preferences 
(Sanchez 2006).  In addition to group consciousness, surrogate representation is 
advocated in the mission of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC). Mansbridge 
(2003) defines surrogate representation as the notion that representatives believe that 
they have a duty to represent a larger constituency beyond their geographical 
constituency. The CHC proclaims to be “dedicated to voicing and advancing through 
the legislative process the issues affecting Hispanics in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.”68 
Nearly all of the Latino members of the House other than the Republican members are 
members of the CHC.  Thus, Latino representatives as in group members are likely 
have a sense of group consciousness and surrogate representation. Together these 
concepts combine to form a strong theoretical explanation of the observed difference 
in behavior between Latino and non-Latino representatives.  Implied by this statement 
is that as out group members, non-Latinos would not share a sense of group 
consciousness or a duty of surrogate representation for Latinos. Additional case 
studies and interviews with representatives would shed more light on the feeling that 
Latino representatives may share due to their shared ethnicity and group membership. 
Another implication of the findings is how we conceptualize representation. 
The case studies revealed that members have different representation styles and 
different foci even when serving the same constituencies. Traditionally, we have been 
stuck in two standard dichotomies of descriptive versus substantive representation and 
                                                 
68 http://velazquez.house.gov/chc/ 
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 trustee versus delegate. This research has shown that members often adopt trustee and 
delegate modes of representation at different times and it is exceedingly difficult to 
categorize them as one type. New theories of representation must encompass the wide 
variation in styles of representation and reflect their fluid adoption of various styles 
under different circumstances.  Theories of representation should aim to be more 
general in nature to encompass the diversity of ways in which members act to balance 
their own interests and background with the demands of their constituents. 
 For Latinos to achieve the most substantive representation, they need 
descriptive representation where members as act delegates. The purpose of 
representation is to act as an advocate for constituents and ultimately must reflect 
some degree of their constituents’ policy preferences. The most active Latino 
members acted as delegates on high salience issues and as trustees in policy areas of 
personal interest. This balance allows the maximum substantive representation of 
Latinos while allowing members to specialize and utilize their expertise. An important 
additional conceptualization of descriptive representation would include the concept of 
surrogate representation. In this instance it would be the representation of all Latinos 
by Latino members of Congress. Evidence from interviews with staff members and 
case studies indicates that many Latino members often felt a duty to represent Latinos 
as a group. Latinos need a mixture of delegate, descriptive and surrogate 
representation in order to be fully represented. 
This dissertation also has important implications for the composition of 
minority districts and how to achieve maximum representation.  As discussed in the 
introduction, one of the primary purposes of the VRA was to allow minority groups 
access to the political system by having a voice and ability to elect members of their 
own group. Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA have been utilized and justified via various 
Supreme Court cases to allow the creation of majority-minority districts for the 
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 purposes of achieving minority representation. However the ability of blacks and 
Latinos to utilize the VRA to achieve descriptive representation varies quite 
considerably. Currently there are only 23 Latino representatives in the House despite 
Latino presence as the largest minority group in the U.S. Compare this figure to the 
total number of black representatives, which is 42 House members. According to the 
2004 Current Population Survey Estimates, the black population in the U.S. is 
approximately 12.5% and their corresponding population in the House is 9.5%. 
Despite comprising 15% of the U.S. population, Latinos are only 5% of the House. 
Latinos are lagging behind in descriptive representation within the institution 
compared to blacks. While this dissertation has not attempted to explain why Latinos 
have been less successful than black in securing more seats within the legislature69, 
this fact makes the topic of this dissertation an important avenue of inquiry in terms of 
minority representation. 
One immediate policy solution might be to create more Latino majority 
districts to increase the number of Latino representatives to be more commensurate 
with the national Latino population and to offer greater representation of the Latinos. 
Other long-term possibilities to create more representation for Latinos include higher 
Latino voter turnout, increased interaction with members of Congress by Latino 
constituents, and forming alliances with other groups within the district. This project 
has also demonstrated that not all descriptive representation is created equal. The least 
active Latino members may not actually provide better legislative representation for 
Latinos than active non-Latino members. In terms of policy, this may mean that in 
some instances Latinos might better served by other minority group members such 
Black representatives who often reflect similar policy positions.  In addition to the 
                                                 
69 See Casellas (2006) for more on the election of Latinos to higher offices at both the state and federal 
levels. 
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 potential creation of Latino majority districts, another option is the creation of mixed 
majority-minority districts. I found evidence of considerable action in favor of Latino 
policy positions by black representatives particularly in the area of education. It may 
be the case that a mix of black and Latino constituents would allow the election of 
more black and Latino members and allow greater representation of both groups.  
Increased coordination between the Black and Hispanic Caucus may lead to increased 
effectiveness on legislative actions introduced my minority members of Congress. 
Additionally, in my examination of active non-Latinos, I found evidence that a 
sizeable Asian population resulted in more actions in high salience issue areas.  It is 
possible that minority groups may share common interests and districts may be able to 
utilize mixed racial and ethnic composition to achieve optimal substantive 
representation.  Ultimately, it is important that Latinos apply more electoral pressure 
on representatives so that they cannot simply ignore Latinos and create a separate 
winning coalition without Latino support.   
 A final implication is that future congressional studies focused on 
representation must move beyond roll call votes in order to obtain a broader picture of 
member behavior. This study has demonstrated the critical role of ethnicity in non-roll 
call activity and Latino representation. The finding that it mattered if a member was 
Latino was obscured in the roll call-only analysis.  Studies have increasingly become 
cognizant that important differences in member behavior and legislative contributions 
are present in non-roll call actions (Minta 2009; Carruba et. al 2009).  The research 
presented here has demonstrated that most representatives spend a small fraction of 
their time on roll call votes, largely due to how few bills actually come up for a floor 
vote. Members choose non-roll call behavior, such as bill introduction and co-
sponsorship, to focus on certain policy passions and develop a reputation as 
champions of certain causes. Representatives utilize input from their constituents, 
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 national policy concerns, their personal backgrounds and interests to develop a policy 
agenda. An examination of roll call votes only gives a researcher a snapshot of their 
policy positions. What it does not show is which policy areas members focus on and 
whether these are issues that are important to constituents in their district.  To assess 
the quality of a representative it is critical to examine not only the congruence of their 
policy positions with their district, but also on which policies they are spending the 
most time and whether these issues matter at all to their constituents (Jones et al. 
2009). Moreover, a given member’s ability to deviate from the party line is extremely 
limited in roll call votes. In non-roll activity, members are making active decisions to 
introduce a bill or co-sponsor a piece of legislation and reveal policy preferences and 
interests.  
Skeptics could argue that bill introduction and co-sponsorship are costless 
activities that are utilized for the purposed of credit claiming with constituents. I argue 
that these activities are not costless because it takes time and resources to draft and 
create a bill, identify and lobby co-sponsors, and potential costs within the institution 
of signaling a position on an issue. Most importantly if these actions are cheap and 
meaningless, then why are all members independent of ethnicity not engaging in 
them? The stark difference between the observed actions of Latino and non-Latino 
members’ actions indicates that Latinos are more focused on Latino representation.  
The results in this research endeavor necessitate a move beyond roll call votes in 
evaluating representation.  
While this dissertation has demonstrated that Latinos do engage in more total 
acts of representation than non-Latinos i.e. time spent, the question concerning 
effectiveness is not one that can be summarily dismissed. I argue that the act of 
introducing and sponsoring bills still counts as representation, regardless of the 
outcome of the bill for two reasons. As discussed in Chapter 2, the acts of bill 
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 introduction and bill-sponsorship can have a wide range of effects including but not 
limited to, bringing issues to table that would not otherwise be discussed, changing the 
terms of debate on in issue, increasing the salience and support of an issue over time, 
widening the range of possible options, and the likelihood of future success of a bills. 
These are meaningful consequences within the legislature that have significant 
implications for politics and policy that cannot be dismissed because they are not 
synonymous with passing a bill. In particular for minority representation where the 
number of minority members in Congress is so small, the actions of these members 
become even more critical since other members are significantly less likely to 
champion the causes of minority groups. Second, given the slow trajectory of most 
bills and the difficulty in getting a bill passed, it is an unreasonable standard to 
measure effectiveness in terms of bills that are voted on or pass a floor vote. 
Additionally, often the types of bills that are voted on and pass are often related to 
taxes and appropriations and less focused on substantive policy changes.  
Nevertheless, it is still important to measure effectiveness and future work on this 
project will attempt to assess progress on bills. For example, rather than using house 
floor votes as effectiveness, other measures to capture effectiveness might include the 
length of time to move through different stages of the legislative process, debate in 
committee, and size of coalitions and co-sponsor support for bills. 
Future Research  
 I have discussed the major findings and implications of this research endeavor 
and now address how this research project could be augmented in future research. This 
project focused on the question of whether Latino representatives offered the most 
substantive representation by examining various pieces of data. The implication of the 
statistical findings was that we still need descriptive representation and without it 
Latinos constituents will not be represented to the fullest degree. In the quantitative 
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 analysis, I only addressed three salient issue areas for a sample of members. In the 
narrowest sense of expanding from this project, the next step would be to examine 
additional sessions and policy areas and the entire population of all 435 House 
members. Moreover, additional interviews with staffers from Latino members’ offices 
would provide more insight into variation among Latino representatives.  
In Chapter Five, I examine several case studies to analyze how member 
behavior changes when the same district is represented by different members. This is 
particularly important in the area of Latino members to better understand what factors 
explain why some members are considerably more active than others and what causes 
members to adopt strong Latino identities. Additionally, Judy Chu winning former 
Rep. Solis’ seat provides a new and exciting example of an instance where a 
predominately Latino district was represented by a Latino member and then switched 
to a non-Latino member. This is the first instance of this kind of switch and it will 
provide great insights into how we view representation of minority groups if Rep. Chu 
is very active on Latino issues. 
 Beyond the immediate extensions of this project, future work should explore 
the theoretical conception of descriptive representation. I found that in the case of 
education, the importance of black members was equal to that of party, and blacks 
offered more substantive representation than Latinos in this area. This finding 
indicates that minority groups may share certain commonalities or viewpoints that 
enable members to serve other minority groups outside of their own group.  Do 
different minority groups share common policy positions and thus can a minority 
member catering to their own group at the same time represent another minority 
group? If Latino members are just as well served by a black Congressman, this 
changes how we view descriptive representation and the need for members from the 
exact same group.  
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 The way we conceptualize majority-minority districts could be radically than 
the present form. Do Latinos need majority-minority districts for representation 
purposes, or can they be one part of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial district and still 
have their concerns adequately addressed? If not, is this because there is something 
unique about Latino identity, such as Spanish language, that prevents a multi-ethnic 
coalition? Future work should examine behavior of black and Latino representatives 
with particular attention on mixed districts. 
It is also critical to probe deeper into the Latino public’s view of the 
importance of Latino representatives. The 2004 Pew Hispanic National Latino Survey 
found that 70% of Latinos would vote for a Latino candidate and another 56% would 
vote for a Latino candidate even if there was a more qualified non-Latino on the 
ballot.  While studies of black representatives have sought to explain the group’s 
desire for a legislator of the same race and the benefits gleaned from it, there has been 
a fundamental lack of scholarly work in this area for Latinos. What drives Latinos to 
want a Latino representative? Is it the desire to have someone like themselves? Does it 
matter if the member has a strong Latino identity or speaks in Spanish? Do they 
believe that person will do the best job and why?  What are the benefits for Latinos in 
having Latino members besides policy representation? Does having a Latino member 
of Congress make Latinos participate more, increase voter turnout, or develop greater 
trust in government? Finally, how do Latinos view their representatives and evaluate 
their behavior? To gain more traction on potential benefits of descriptive 
representation beyond legislative outcomes, it is necessary to actually ask Latinos 
what they feel is gained by having members with a shared ethnicity.  
 Moving away from the narrow subset of the race and representation literature, 
another future avenue of research is exploring further non-roll call behavior. This 
dissertation demonstrated that non-roll call activity is common and is necessary to 
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 examine given its dominance in the legislative record. I evaluated a small subset of 
non-roll activity including bill introductions, bill co-sponsorship, and house 
resolutions, however future work should consider additional forms of non-roll call 
activity, such as committee actions and house floor speeches, to gain more analytical 
depth. When we evaluate whether a representative is doing a good job, it is critical to 
include a wide range of participatory acts in order to truly get a sense of how a 
member spends his time.  Future research could examine under which conditions 
members choose non-roll call approaches over voting. Also, are their certain non-roll 
call activities that members engage in more frequently and why do they choose those 
activities over others?  Do members use the forum of non-roll call behavior to 
differentiate themselves and build a reputation? If members are going to adopt 
controversial stances that may differ from the party line, do members utilize the non-
roll arena to participate on those issues?  Given the dominance of roll call voting in the 
literature, it is critical that we begin to understand more about when and why members 
utilize non-roll call actions.   
Ultimately, this research endeavor has addressed Latino representation from an 
institutional perspective. More research is needed on the public opinion side of this 
topic in order to understand the complex relationship between Latino constituencies 
and the members who serve them. As the Latino national population and geographical 
dispersion over additional congressional district grows, it will be interesting to see 
how representatives change their level of responsiveness to this increasingly important 
constituency.  
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 APPENDIX 
Interview Instrument -For interviews with a staff member of a Congressperson  
Section I. Representation 
1) In what ways does the office seek to represent Latinos? 
2) According to direct communications with Latino constituents such as email or 
letters, what issues seem to be the most important to Latinos? 
a. What type of actions has the member taken in these areas? 
b. Are these areas different than what the office or member thought would 
be the most salient issues?  
c. Have constituents introduced new issues?  What were these?  How has 
the office responded to these?  
3) What kinds of constituent service work are directly aimed at Latinos? 
a. How much time or resources are dedicated to this work? 
b. How does your office determine what types of constituent work would 
best serve the Latino portion of the constituency? 
c. What is the relationship between this work and informing the Latino 
constituency of this work? 
4) In terms of mobilizing Latino voters, what are the main methods your office 
uses? 
a. What factors determine your mobilization methods? 
b. Which methods seem to be most effective? 
c. What types of contact does your office use and why? 
Section II. Spanish Language Usage 
1) How important is it to the member that persons on the staff speak Spanish? 
2) What percentage of the office staff speaks Spanish? 
3) How often are activities within the office conducted in Spanish? For example, 
conversations, staff meetings 
4) How often are activities outside of the office conducted in Spanish?  
a. How often in rallies? 
b. How often in mailings 
c. How often in commercials? 
d. How often on radio ads? 
e. How often in constituent letters? 
f. How often in constituent phone calls? 
g. How often in campaign TV commercials? 
h. Are any of these activities conducted in a combination of English and 
Spanish? 
i. What factors determine whether it is a Spanish, English, or 
Bilingual event?  
Section III. Specific Representation 
1) Regarding immigration, in what ways does your office seek to represent the 
interests of your Latino constituency? 
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 2) Regarding labor, in what ways does your office seek to represent the interests 
of your Latino constituency? 
3) Regarding education, in what ways does your office seek to represent the 
interests of your Latino constituency? 
4) Regarding social security, in what ways does your office seek to represent the 
interests of your Latino constituency? 
5) Outside of these four policy areas, are there other policy areas your office has 
done work that you believe represent the interests of your Latino constituents? 
Please describe these areas and the work done. 
6) Are there designated staff persons in each of these areas? 
a. If so, how many? 
b. What types of work does this person perform? 
7) Is there a designated staff person for Latino representation? 
8) Overall, how would you evaluate the office as a whole in terms of 
representation of Latino constituents? 
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